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Mapping Digital Media
Th e values that underpin good journalism, the need of citizens for reliable and abundant information, and 
the importance of such information for a healthy society and a robust democracy: these are perennial, and 
provide compass-bearings for anyone trying to make sense of current changes across the media landscape. 
Th e standards in the profession are in the process of being set. Most of the eff ects on journalism imposed 
by new technology are shaped in the most developed societies, but these changes are equally infl uencing the 
media in less developed societies.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project, which examines the changes in-depth, aims to build bridges between 
researchers and policymakers, activists, academics and standard-setters across the world. It also builds policy 
capacity in countries where this is less developed, encouraging stakeholders to participate in and infl uence 
change. At the same time, this research creates a knowledge base, laying foundations for advocacy work, 
building capacity and enhancing debate. 
Th e Media Program of the Open Society Foundations has seen how changes and continuity aff ect the media in 
diff erent places, redefi ning the way they can operate sustainably while staying true to values of pluralism and 
diversity, transparency and accountability, editorial independence, freedom of expression and information, 
public service, and high professional standards.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project assesses, in the light of these values, the global opportunities and risks 
that are created for media by the following developments:
 the switch-over from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting;
 growth of new media platforms as sources of news;
 convergence of traditional broadcasting with telecommunications.
Covering 60 countries, the project examines how these changes aff ect the core democratic service that any 
media system should provide—news about political, economic and social aff airs. 
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Th e Mapping Digital Media reports are produced by local researchers and partner organizations in each 
country. Cumulatively, these reports will provide a much-needed resource on the democratic role of digital 
media.
In addition to the country reports, the Open Society Media Program has commissioned research papers on a 
range of topics related to digital media. Th ese papers are published as the MDM Reference Series.
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     S P A I N6
Mapping Digital Media: Spain
Executive Summary
Since 2005, Spain has designed and implemented aggressive digitization policies that secured the switch-
off  of analog television in 2010, and developed the digital terrestrial television (DTT) market to saturation 
point. As a result, cable and satellite subscription services have experienced some decline since 2008. Th e 
rapid rise of free-to-air (FTA) digital television has not, however, been replicated in radio, where take-up of 
the assigned digital audio broadcasting (DAB) standard has been marginal, with little promise of imminent 
signifi cant growth. Th is is attributed to a policy focus on digital television, the absence of a digital radio 
publicity campaign and a switch-off  deadline, and the cost of upgrading to digital radio faced by consumers 
and broadcasters alike. 
Like digital television, the roll-out of broadband infrastructure has been successful, accounting for 99 percent 
of all fi xed-line connections in 2010. But the consumers’ cost of connection remains one of the highest in 
the European Union (EU), and an enduring digital divide is refl ected in the fact that fi xed-line internet 
connections reached only 22 percent of households in 2010. Th e most competitive broadband and television 
package prices are on average more than 20 percent dearer than comparable packages in other EU countries. 
Th ere are signs that mobile broadband might help to plug this gap, with substantive year-on-year growth in 
take-up of 3G services and smartphones since 2008.
Internet take-up has not grown at the expense of traditional platforms. Th e reach of radio, television, and 
even newspapers has remained stable. Television consumption actually grew from an average of 221 minutes 
a day in 2005 to 237 minutes in 2011, and television remains by all measures the catch-all medium. 
Although information is a secondary preference among viewers after entertainment, a 2010 survey indicates 
that newscasts are among the most valued programs. However, the overall volume of television news services 
is diminishing, and is increasingly confi ned to the public broadcasters. Recent survey data also suggest that 
television is perceived as a less credible information source than radio and print. What is more, a dearth of 
current aff airs programs has led to Spanish television being labeled “the champion of news superfi ciality.”
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Th e technical success of DTT has not been matched by improvements in diversity, a reality underlined by 
recent consumer survey data. While viewers value improvements in audiovisual quality, they do not recognize 
any meaningful enhancement of program variety. If anything, this report suggests that intense competition 
in the DTT sector has encouraged homogenization and prioritized established brand programming. Th e 
majority of DTT licensees are incumbent broadcasters or press groups, and the picture has changed little 
since digital licensing began in 2002, with political allegiances governing the allocation of licenses, especially 
at the regional and local levels, and market saturation and adverse economic conditions maintaining steep 
barriers to entry. 
Th e same cannot be said of the internet, which has fostered a proliferation of domestic news and information 
websites beyond the major news brands, as well as a sharp rise in the use of social media by citizen and 
professional journalists alike. But these outlets are dominated by opinion-based rather than reporting-based 
journalism, due primarily to a lack of resources, while the social media news space is still largely the domain of 
an educated and media-literate minority. In terms of audience share, established news brands have extended 
their dominance to the online sphere, though eff ective monetization of traffi  c remains, in Spain as elsewhere, 
elusive.
Nevertheless, digital media have enhanced the voice of social minorities and encouraged political pluralism. 
Th ey have also had a signifi cant impact on civil society, particularly with the rise of digital activism. In 2011, 
the former president, Rodríguez Zapatero, acknowledged the role of internet-driven protest in delaying and 
amending a new law governing digital copyright protection. Th e campaign was also at the heart of a broader 
democracy-regeneration movement known as “15-M”, after a day of widespread protests mobilized through 
online and offl  ine social networks on 15 May 2011.
While all major news outlets have embraced digital media in production and delivery, newsrooms have not 
undergone signifi cant restructure by way of convergence. Th e working conditions of digital journalists remain 
distinct from, and considerably inferior to, those of traditional journalists. As their work hours increase, 
their salaries fall, and there is little union protection. Digitization has also increased demand for cross-
category multi-skilled journalists as opposed to fi eld specialists. Under these conditions, it is not surprising 
that investigative journalism has not benefi tted from a post-digitization resurgence, or that online news relies 
increasingly on wire services and opinion editorials. 
Th e climate of austerity is partly a consequence of the global economic crisis which precipitated a sharp 
and sustained decline in advertising revenues across print, television, and radio since 2008. Th us, although 
the audience reach of traditional media platforms has remained stable under digitization, the business of 
journalism has faced unprecedented turmoil. Th is has been most acute in the newspaper sector, which lost 
27 percent of its revenue between 2005 and 2009. Th e concomitant failure to capitalize on the exceptional 
growth in internet advertising has led to the closure of several titles, further eroding any gains in overall news 
plurality. In television, the fl urry of DTT licensing prior to the economic crisis was followed—inevitably—by 
a period of rapid merger activity and consolidation around the two dominant commercial players (Mediaset 
and Antena 3). 
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Against this backdrop, the policy and regulatory framework has been responsive to digitization in certain 
respects, but inadequate in others. Th e General Audiovisual Law (2010) has been eff ective in consolidating 
legislation and providing new defi nitions and distinctions, such as between linear and non-linear content. 
Although it did not establish a converged national regulatory authority for telecommunications and the 
media, it did envisage an independent national regulator for audiovisual services, which promised to usurp 
supervision power from the state. As this entity has failed to get off  the ground, however, content monitoring 
and control remains in the hands of the state and the judiciary. Th is has given added leverage to incumbent 
commercial lobbyists who have been able to capture licensing policy through political posturing. Th e scarcity 
of new entrants and consequent limits to plurality gains is partly a refl ection of this. Th is situation contrasts 
with the telecoms sector, where an independent national regulator has been eff ective in limiting both state 
interference and signifi cant market power.
A fl exible policy approach during the build-up to DTT switch-over enabled the Government to adapt to 
challenges that emerged in each phase of the transition, but it also created some insecurity and inconsistency. 
A more serious problem stemmed from the decentralized structure of the regulatory framework, which has 
meant that regional and local authority for audiovisual regulation rests with the country’s 17 Autonomous 
Communities (Comunidades Autónomas), while the national government regulates national broadcasters 
directly. 
Th is has opened a back door to political clientelism with licenses awarded more for political loyalties 
than public interest. It has also led to an over-licensed DTT market controlled largely by established and 
incumbent operators, which experts and consumer groups have criticized as unsustainable, ineffi  cient, and 
unfair. Finally, there has been a transparency defi cit, manifest in the absence of public consultation during 
the development of DTT policy. 
Digitization did not initiate or even exacerbate state interference in the media and communications markets. 
Yet it has increased the potential for such interference, particularly at the regional level, where the authorities 
have a wider array of regulatory instruments at their disposal compared with the analog era. Th eir response 
to the reallocation of frequencies following recent withdrawals, mergers, and takeovers will be critical, for 
it will determine whether there will be a policy shift towards favoring telecoms companies over commercial 
broadcasters, or whether competition, plurality, and the public interest will be advanced through the 
emergence of genuine new entrants. 
At national level, government interference is re-emerging at the public service broadcaster, the Spanish Radio 
and Television Corporation (Corporación de Radio Televisión Española, RTVE), as a result of political decisions 
unrelated to digitization. Arguing for the need to end the RTVE board’s vacant presidency and implement 
harsh spending cuts, the right-wing ruling party, the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) introduced an 
amendment to the RTVE 2006 Law that enabled the appointment of a president of the RTVE board 
exclusively with PP votes in the lower house of Parliament. A cascade of newly appointed radio and television 
directors and editors-in-chief has followed. As a result, an attitude of bitter resentment has spread among 
the opposition parties, some civil society groups, and individual citizens—quite notably, through the social 
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media. RTVE has lost its ratings leadership since March 2012. Th e situation threatens to return Spain to a 
pre-digitization scenario, where RTVE was singled out by the Council of Europe as an example of political 
instrumentalization.
Th is report predicts that mobile internet platforms could broaden access to the diverse news off ered online and 
expand the digital public sphere. Th is might go some way to off set the plurality defi cit caused by consolidation 
and closures in the print sector. Th e ongoing development and growth of social media platforms in particular 
are seen as positive forces that can potentially challenge the dominance of large media conglomerations over 
the public conversation. 
But protection of the public interest and diversity in the new digital mediascape will not fl ourish of their 
own accord. To this end, the report calls for the setting up of an independent regulatory authority on 
audiovisual matters; the eff ective implementation of self-regulatory codes concerning media and children; a 
comprehensive policy program involving concerted action by state institutions, universities, and journalism 
associations/unions to tackle problems of journalists’ pay and conditions; the eff ective implementation of 
ethical codes and principles to challenge the abusive dominance of opinion and ideological polarization in the 
media; the setting up by the Government of a radiocommunications agency to handle radio spectrum policy; 
the delegation of DTT licensing to this radiocommunications agency; improved publicity for public tenders 
through the approval of a law on transparency and citizens’ access to public information; the promotion of 
media literacy in school curricula; and fi nally, the protection of RTVE’s political and fi nancing independence 
to ensure the provision of non-partisan and good-quality journalism to Spanish society. 
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     S P A I N1 0
Context
In the period 2005–2011, Spain’s economy was characterized by three years of growth at a level unparalleled 
in Europe, followed by one of the most dramatic declines since the current fi nancial crisis started in 2008.
Until 2008, Spain’s economic success had mostly been based on the construction sector’s excessive growth. 
Its expansion at the end of the 1990s was due to a combination of factors, including unprecedented low 
interest rates, high demand through increased levels of family indebtedness, a large unskilled workforce, 
and an economic and fi scal policy aimed at liberalizing access to land and promoting the acquisition of 
property. Despite the supply of property far exceeding the demand, prices rose disproportionately as a result 
of speculative transactions.
Th e 2008 global fi nancial crisis put an abrupt end to this scenario. Gross domestic product (GDP) has been 
falling since mid-2008, while the annual unemployment rate rose 10 points, from 11.34 percent in 2008 to 
21.64 percent in 2011.1 According to Eurostat fi gures, in February 2012 Spain had the highest percentage 
of unemployed workforce in the EU (23.6 percent), which more than doubled for people aged 16–24 
(50.5 percent).2
As far as policy solutions to the crisis are concerned, the Government’s discourse has shifted from an early call 
to reform capitalism to the need to reduce the government defi cit (i.e. the gap between public spending and 
tax revenue) and debt in line with EU institutions. In 2011, gross debt was 68.5 percent of GDP, still below 
that of Greece, France or Germany,3 but the government estimates that it will have risen to nearly 80 percent 
1. Data from the annual Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA) by the National Statistics Offi  ce (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 
INE), last updated March 2012.
2. Eurostat, “Euro area unemployment rate at 10.8%,” 2 April 2012, press release, at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-
02042012-AP/EN/3-02042012-AP-EN.PDF (accessed 3 April 2012).
3. Cinco Días, “La deuda pública alcanza ya el 68,5% del PIB, su máximo histórico” (Public debt already reaches 68.5 percent of GDP, its record 
high), at http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/economia/deuda-publica-alcanza-685-pib-maximo-historico/20120316cdscdseco_1 (accessed 6 
April 2011)
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by the end of 2012.4 If this is confi rmed, debt will have almost doubled over four years. Government defi cit 
has been rated at 8.51 percent of GDP (2011),5 two and a half points above the fi gure agreed with the EU 
economics and fi nance ministers in May 2010. 
Pressed by these pledges, two diff erent Spanish governments—one led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), the other by the Christian Democrats of the People’s Party (Partido 
Popular, PP)—have taken the harshest economic decisions in Spanish democratic history. On the one hand, 
two specifi c adjustment plans have been approved, the fi rst relying on cuts in public employees’ wages and 
public investments (2010),6 the second on overall public spending cuts and increases in citizens’ yearly income 
tax (2011).7 Th e general budget for 2012 established new spending cuts in government departments, along 
with more income tax increases for the largest fi rms and the so-called fi scal amnesty, a pardon of penalties for 
tax evaders in return for a lowered tax.8 Public investment in R&D programs has been cut by a quarter, going 
back to 2005 fi gures.9 Th is, along with cuts in education, puts the political and social will to change Spain’s 
production structure at risk. In April 2012, the government announced two further urgent reforms and cuts 
in the public educational and health systems.10 While the latter is still one of the most praised in Europe as 
regards research and treatment, the dropout rate in secondary schools is twice the EU average (31 percent 
compared with 14 percent).11
Along with the spending cuts and budgetary adjustments, governments have expedited legislative reforms 
(2010–2012). An article of the Constitution has been amended to force state, regional, and local governments 
to comply with EU defi cit ceilings (2011),12 and a recently approved Budgetary Stability Law will not allow 
budgetary defi cit in any state-owned companies or any government, except in certain special cases (2012).13 
4. Expansión, “La deuda pública subirá once puntos en 2012, hasta el 79,8% del PIB” (Public debt will rise 11 points in 2012, up to 79.8% of 
GDP), at http://www.expansion.com/2012/04/03/economia/1333447478.html (accessed 9 April 2011).
5. El País, “Las autonomías disparan el défi cit de 2011 por encima de la peor previsión” (Autonomous Communities take the 2011 defi cit far above 
the worst forecast), 27 February 2011, at http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2012/02/27/actualidad/1330363465_191928.html (accessed 
6 April 2011).
6. Royal Decree-Law 8/2010 on extraordinary measures to reduce the government defi cit, Boletín Ofi cial del Estado (BOE) no. 126, 24 May 2010. 
7. Royal Decree-Law 20/2011 on urgent budgetary, tax, and fi nancial measures for the correction of the government defi cit, BOE no. 315, 31 
December 2011. 
8. Government of Spain, “Aprobado el proyecto de ley de presupuestos generales del estado para 2012” (Bill on the 2012 state budget approved), 
press release, 30 March 2012, at http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ConsejodeMinistros/Referencias/_2012/refc20120330.htm#Presupuestos (ac-
cessed 10 April 2012).
9. El País, “La ciencia retrocede a niveles de hace siete años por el recorte” (Science goes back to levels similar to those of seven years ago due to the 
spending cuts),10 April 2012.
10. El País, “Rajoy anuncia el recorte de 10.000 millones en Educación y Sanidad” (Rajoy announces a Health and Education cut of 10,000 million), 
9 April 2012, at http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/04/09/actualidad/1333985643_619652.html (accessed 10 April 2012). 
11. European Commission, “Commission launches action plan to reduce early school leaving,”press release, Brussels, 31 January 2011, at http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/109&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr (accessed 18 February 
2011).
12. Amendment to Art. 135 of the Spanish Constitution, BOE no. 233, 27 September 2011, at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/09/27/pdfs/
BOE-A-2011-15210.pdf (accessed 1 May 2012).
13. Law 2/2012 on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability, BOE no. 103, 30 April 2012, at http://boe.es/boe/dias/2012/04/30/pdfs/BOE-
A-2012-5730.pdf (accessed 1 May 2012).
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Financial regulation has been updated to facilitate mergers between companies (2010) and the provision of 
public and private funds for banks to cover the risk of default after the housing bubble burst (2012).14 Also, 
the legal retirement age will be raised gradually from 65 to 67 (between September 2012 and 2027. But 
the two labor reforms (2010 and 2012) have been the more controversial.15 Th e latter, currently in force, 
substantially reduces redundancy costs and makes it easier for companies to resort to collective lay-off s. As a 
result of these policies, social protest has risen, in the form of a series of street demonstrations, an emergent 
social movement (15-M), and three general strikes between 2010 and November 2012.
In spite of these austerity measures, the Government fi nally asked for a banking bailout in June 2012.16 
However, the banking bailout conditions will be set at the end of the year by the EU, and the possibility of 
a second, more general bailout for the whole economy looms over the country in the second half of 2012.
 
Along with the rest of the economy, the media—especially the print media—are undergoing one of their 
most severe crises, following a decline in advertising revenue and the need to adapt to the digital world. Since 
2009, broadcast media takeovers and mergers have been made easier by reducing restrictions on ownership 
and introducing audience thresholds applicable only at the point of the merger. Online-only editions are both 
proliferating and disappearing in an unstable scenario. Th ese reorganizations have added more uncertainty to 
an already precarious and overcrowded labor market: massive lay-off s have been common in the media sector 
since 2009—the most recent, resonant ones entailed by the October 2012 redundancy plan of El País, Spain’s 
chief newspaper of record, born with the transition from Francoist dictatorship to democracy.
In the midst of this crisis, all terrestrial television channels went digital by law (3 April 2010), two years 
before the EU’s switch-off  deadline. Th e technical process was quick and smooth and it has been considered a 
success, even if some future spectrum adjustments will be needed. As a consequence, the number of available 
nationwide free-to-air (FTA) television channels has increased from six to about 30 over the past two years. 
However, from an economic point of view, the crisis of advertising revenue seems to have rendered this new 
digital scenario totally unsustainable.17
14. Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 on governing bodies and other aspects of the savings banks’ legal regime, BOE no. 169, 13 July 2010, at http://
www.boe.es/boe/dias/2010/07/13/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-11086.pdf (accessed 1 May 2012); Royal Decree-Law 2/2012 on the rationalization of 
the fi nancial system, BOE no. 30, 4 February 2012, at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2012/02/04/pdfs/BOE-A-2012-1674.pdf (accessed 1 May 
2012). 
15. Royal Decree-Law 10/2010 on urgent measures to reform the labor market, BOE no. 147, 17 June 2010, at http://www.boe.es/boe/
dias/2010/06/17/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-9542.pdf (accessed 1 May 2012); Royal Decree-Law 3/2012 on urgent measures to reform the labor mar-
ket, BOE no. 36, 11 February 2012, at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2012/02/11/pdfs/BOE-A-2012-2076.pdf (accessed 1 May 2012).
16. Th e Guardian, “Q&A on Spain’s banking bailout,” 11 June 2012, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jun/11/question-an-
swer-spain-banking-bailout (accessed 8 August 2012).
17. J. Villanueva, J. Irisarri, E. Campos, F. Baz, La TDT: ¿un negocio imposible? (DTT: an impossible business?), Deusto, Barcelona, 2008 (hereafter 
Villanueva et al., La TDT: ¿un negocio imposible?).
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Despite the growing popularity of social media, especially among young people, the majority of the viewing 
audience remains faithful to television as the main entertainment and news source, and the level of its 
consumption has actually increased. At the same time, Spain has the second-highest mobile broadband and 
smartphone penetration levels in the EU after Italy: market research indicates that 52.5 percent of people 
owned one such device as of January 2012.18
18. Comscore, “Number of European Smartphone Users Accessing News Surges 74 Percent Over Past Year,” press release, 22 March 2012, at 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/3/Number_of_European_Smartphone_Users_Accessing_News_Surges_74_Per-
cent_Over_Past_Year (accessed 10 May 2012) (hereafter Comscore, “Number of European Smartphone Users”).
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Social Indicators
Population: 47.15 million (2010)19
Households: 15.30 million (2010)20
Figure 1. 
Rural–urban breakdown (% of total population), 2011
Source: Censo de Población y Viviendas 2001 (Households and Population Census 2001), National Statistics Offi  ce (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística, INE), 2002
19. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Offi  ce, INE), “Padrón municipal: población total, miles)” (Municipal register of inhabi-
tants: total population,:thousands), at http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft20%2Fe245&fi le=inebase&L=0 (accessed 30 
March 2011).
20. INE, “Encuesta sobre Equipamiento y Uso de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación en los hogares 2010” (Survey on Equipment and 
Use of ICTs in Spanish households 2010), at http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do?path=/t25/p450/a2010/l0/&fi le=01001.px&type=pcaxis&L=0 
(accessed 30 March 2012) (hereafter INE, “Encuesta sobre equipamiento y uso de las TICs 2010”).
Rural, 16
Urban, 66Semi-urban, 18
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Figure 2.
Linguistic composition (% of total population), 2006
Source: European Commission, “Europeans and their languages,” Special Eurobarometer, no. 243, 2006, p. 7, at http://ec.europa.
eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_en.pdf (accessed 31 January 2010)
Figure 3.
National composition (% of total population), 2012 
Note: Th is fi gure refl ects, in its title and data, the usage of “nation” that is adopted in article 2 of the Spanish Constitution (viz. 
“the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”). Th e Spanish 
political order also recognizes three historic “nationalities”: Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia.
 * Th e largest non-Spanish groups are Romanians (15.7 percent), Moroccans (13.7 percent), UK citizens (7 percent), and 
Ecuadorians (5.4 percent). By regions, EU citizens form 42.7 percent of the non-Spanish population, South Americans 
form 22.6 percent, and 19.1 percent are from Africa.
Source: INE, “Avance de la Explotación estadística del Padrón a 1 de enero de 2012” (Advanced Statistical Analysis of the Census 
as of 1 January 2012), at http://www.ine.es/prensa/np710.pdf (accessed 30 April 2012)
Figure 4.
Religious composition (% of total population), 2010
Source: Center for Sociological Investigations (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, CIS), “Barómetro de Diciembre” 
(December Barometer), Study No. 2856, December 2010, p. 19, at http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Margina-
les/2840_2859/2856/es2856.pdf (accessed 3 February 2011)
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Economic Indicators
Table 1.
Economic indicators
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP (current prices), 
in US$ billion
1,132.13 1,235.92 1,444.02 1,601.41 1,467.89 1,409.94 1,536.47f 1,575.11f
GDP (current prices), 
per head in US$ 
26,305 28,244 32,468 35,364 32,030 30,639 33,297f 34,050f
Gross National Income (GNI), 
per head, current $
26,990 29,810 31,490 32,270 31,520 31,640 n/a n/a
Unemployment 
(% of total labor force)
9.2 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 21.6 19.7f
Infl ation (average annual rate 
in % against previous year)
3.4 3.6 2.8 4.1 –0.2 3.0 2,4 1.4f
Notes: n/a: not available; f: forecast
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011 (GDP, GDP per head, infl ation, and 
unemployment rate); INE (average yearly net income, average infl ation rate in 2010 and 2011, average unemployment 
rate in 2011) 
1 7O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 2
1. Media Consumption: 
 The Digital Factor
1.1 Digital Take-up
1.1.1 Digital Equipment
Th ere appear to be two distinct trends in the ownership of digital equipment. Whereas digital television sets 
and personal computers continue to grow in popularity, digital radio sets have been largely unsuccessful.
Digital media content is available in Spanish households mainly through television sets and personal 
computers. Not only are these omnipresent or increasingly part of the family media ecosystem (see Table 2): 
they have also been supported by specifi c policy programs since the end of 2005. Th at year, under a 
government led by the social democratic PSOE, the date of 3 April 2010 was fi xed by law as the defi nite date 
for analog television switch-off . (On government plans to subsidize reception equipment for certain sectors 
of the population, see section 7.1.1.2.)
Table 2.
Households owning media equipment, 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No. of 
HH*
(’000)
% of 
THH**
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
TV sets 15,441 99.3 14,541 99.6 14,619 99.5 15,035 99.7 15,254 99.6 15,303 99.5
Radio sets 13,580 87.4 12,994 89.0 12,885 87.7 12,969 86.0 12,941 84.5 12,549 82.0
PCs*** 8,060 51.8 8,526 58.4 8,874 60.4 9,591 63.6 10,154 66.3 10,513 68.7
Notes: * Total number of households owning the equipment
 ** Percentage of total number of households in the country
 *** Includes households with any kind of computer: home PC, laptop, or other
Source: INE, “Encuesta sobre equipamiento y uso de las TICs 2010”
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According to Impulsa TDT data, between 2005 and 2009 25.6 million DTT receivers were sold either as 
external set-top boxes or appliances with integrated tuners, e.g. television sets, DVD recorders, USB data 
cards (the latter constituting the majority).21 Expectations were also high for 2010, since by March another 
3 million receivers had been sold.22 Finally, 5.3 million digital TV digital sets were sold in 2010 and 4.06 
million in 2011, of which 400,000 had 3D, while 1.4 million were HBB (Hybrid Broadcast Broadband) 
TV.23 
Radio digital sets, as already mentioned, have not been so successful. Th is can be partly explained by 
competition from the internet and the rise in the number of DTT platforms, along with the failure of digital 
terrestrial radio stations to attract signifi cant audiences. Both media policy and market behavior can account 
for this failure. Th e EU DAB standard, adopted in 1999, demands the replacement of existing frequencies 
and receivers at a high cost in an already overcrowded market. In Spain, unlike in most of Western Europe, 
private and public stations have traditionally coexisted at national and local levels. Alternative standards 
(such as Digital Radio Mondiale, DRM) have appeared, but have not yet taken off . Besides, where there is 
no stimulus, there is no demand: no publicity has been set up and consumers have hardly heard of digital 
radio sets. Other factors are the high cost of receivers and some technical reception problems encountered 
by the early adopters.24 As a further attempt to revitalize digital radio, the General Law on Audiovisual 
Communication (LGCA) 2010 forces the Government to present, before November 2011, a technical plan 
for the transition from any frequency to digital-only radio.25 Presented in July 2011, this Digitization Plan 
included:
1) Th e modifi cation of the Terrestrial Sound Broadcasting Technical Plan (1999) to preserve the continuity of 
the current digital terrestrial radio broadcasting services. Th e actual licensees are granted more fl exibility. 
More specifi cally, the principle of technological neutrality is adopted to enable them to switch from DAB 
to DAB+. Moreover, their coverage obligations are reduced from 50 to 20 percent of the population. Th is 
implies a cost reduction to the detriment—or indeed the virtual disappearance—of digital radio in Spain, 
outside Madrid and Barcelona.
2) Th e drafting of a study on the possible redistribution of programs in each of the current multiplexes. Th is 
may lead to mergers between digital radio operators.
 3) Th e development of promotional activities aimed at the general population. 
4) Th e implementation of pilot tests to assess the technical viability of the digitization of AM and FM 
broadcasts with DRM/DRM+ technologies.
21. Impulsa TDT, TDT. Informe Final 2010 (DTT. Final Report 2010), Madrid, 2010, p. 74 (hereafter Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010).
22. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, p. 82.
23. AMETIC, Informe Anual 2011 (2011 Annual Report), AMETIC, Madrid, 2012, pp. 24-25. Available at http://www.ametic.es/download/
documents/MEMORIA%20AMETIC_2011_FINAL.pdf (accessed 18 October 2012)
24. On the failure of digital terrestrial radio in Spain, see R. Franquet, “La radio digital en España: incertidumbres tecnológicas y amenazas al plural-
ismo” (Spanish digital radio: technology uncertainties and pluralism threats), Fundación Alternativas, Madrid, 2008; M. Bonet, M. Corominas, 
I. Fernández, and M. Díez, “Keys to the failure of DAB in Spain,” Journal of Radio and Audio Media 16(1) 2009, pp. 83–101.
25. General Law 7/2010 on Audiovisual Communication (hereafter LGCA 2010), BOE no. 79, 1 April 2010, transitory provision 15.
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5) Th e drafting of a study on necessary conditions and requirements to establish a deadline for analog radio 
switch-off .26
With regard to public preferences, the television set remains central to media consumption, as revealed by 
both market research and opinion polls. In 2009, 4.7 million television sets were sold, nearly half of all DTT 
equipment sold that year.27 A continuous decline in prices has helped. Television online consumption is still 
weak in general terms, however: according to a May 2010 survey by the CIS, six out of 10 people have never 
watched television online.28 
Regardless of platform, television also remains the catch-all medium. Th e viewing public turns it on fi rst 
for entertainment, and second for information.29 Despite this, viewers say that newscasts are their favorite 
programs.30 Indeed, television is the only medium that most people turn to on a daily basis for information 
(75 percent31), and in the last fi ve years, television has invariably been the preferred way to consume political 
news stories.32 Th is is true in spite of television being regarded as less credible than the radio or the print press, 
according to a 2011 report by the Ortega-Marañón Foundation.33 
Th e profi le of the internet user in Spain can be analyzed through the 2005–2010 surveys by the INE.34 Users 
prefer to connect to the internet at home (home access has grown from 65 percent to 85 percent of the total), 
but increasingly through broadband mobile phones: the number of people using a 3G terminal access has 
almost doubled in three years (10.5 percent in 2007 compared with 20.3 percent in 2010). Th ese results 
fi t with the fi gures suggesting that Spain is one of Europe’s leaders in smartphone penetration: the market 
research company Comscore states that nearly fi ve out of 10 people own one such device.35 
1.1.2 Platforms
Th e last fi ve years have witnessed three interconnected trends in Spanish households’ preferred television 
platforms.
26. Resolution of 13 July 2011 by the Secretary of State for Telecommunications and for the Information Society, publishing the Agreement passed 
by the Council of Ministers on 10 June 2011 approving the digitization plan for terrestrial sound broadcasting service. BOE nº 179, 27 July 
2011.
27. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, pp. 77–78.
28. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo” (May Barometer), Study No. 2836, May 2010, p. 21, at http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Margina-
les/2820_2839/2836/es2836.pdf (accessed 28 February 2011) (hereafter CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo”).
29. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” p. 16.
30. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” p. 15.
31. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” p. 18.
32. Several 2005–2010 CIS political opinion polls have been analyzed with regard to the question of “frequency of use of diff erent media to get 
political and social news”: CIS Studies Nos. 2842 (2010), 2802 (2009), 2760, 2749 (2008), 2726 (2007), 2642 (2006), 2588 (2005).
33. J.J. Toharia (coord.), Pulso de España 2010 (Spain’s Pulse 2010), Fundación Ortega-Marañón and Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2011.
34. INE, “Encuesta sobre equipamiento y uso de las TICs 2010.”
35. Comscore, “Number of European Smartphone Users.”
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Th e fi rst trend is the increase in DTT penetration, with a fi nal two-year surge as the offi  cial switch-off  deadline 
approached (Table 3). Interestingly, the economic downturn has not aff ected this adversely. Th e INE and 
the industry’s Association for Media Research (Asociación para la Investigación de Medios de Comunicación, 
AIMC), responsible for the widely respected General Media Survey (Estudio General de Medios, EGM), both 
concur with this fi nding. INE’s 2010 penetration fi gure was 90 percent in 2010,36 whereas AIMC stated that 
93 percent of Spanish households owned a DTT-ready set in 2010 and 97 percent in 2011.37
Th e number of DTT channels on off er in Spain is one of the highest in Europe. As of March 2011, there 
were 1,180 according to the European Audiovisual Observatory, compared with 1,222 in the UK and 1,059 
in Italy.38 
Table 3.
Platform for the main TV reception and digital take-up, 2006–2010*
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No. of 
HH** 
(’000)
% of 
THH***
No. of 
HH 
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH 
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH 
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH 
(’000)
% of 
THH
Terrestrial reception 11,014 70* 15,963 100 16,161 100 16,683 100 16,802 100
– of which digital n/a n/a 2,075 13 4,074 25.2 6,951 41,1 12,884 76.6
Cable reception 2,187 13.9 2,598 16.2 2,975 18.4 2,786 16.7 2,768 16.4
– of which digital n/a n/a 1,949 12.2 2,359 14.6 2,681 16.0 2,674 15.9
Satellite reception 2,895 18.4 2,987 18.7 3,068 18.9 3,134 18.5 2,740 16.3
– of which digital n/a n/a 1,551 9.7 1,566 9.6 1,650 9.8 1,503 8.9
IPTV n/a n/a 314 1.9 503 3.1 647 3.8 813 4.8
– of which digital n/a n/a 314 1.9 503 3,1 647 3.8 813 4.8
Total 15,734 100 15,963 100 16,161 100 16,683 100 16,802 100
– of which digital n/a n/a 5,605 35.1 7,871 48.7 10,545 63.2 15,032 89.4
Notes: n/a: not available
 * Th e fi gures refer to the main TV set in multi-TV households.
 ** Percentage of total number of households in the country. 
 *** Percentage of total number of TV households.
Source: Médiamétrie Eurodata TV Worldwide, based on data from surveys by TNS-Kantar Media
36. INE, “Encuesta sobre equipamiento y uso de las TICs 2010.”
37. AIMC, Marco General de los Medios en España 2012 (General Media Framework in Spain 2012), Madrid, 2012, p. 64 (hereafter AIMC, Marco 
General de los Medios en España 2012).
38. European Audiovisual Observatory, “Th e European Digital Television market continues to be dynamic: more platforms, channels and HD,” 
press release, Strasbourg, 28 March 2011, at http://www.obs.coe.int/about/oea/pr/mavise_mars2011.html (accessed 21 August 2012). In 
August 2012, the Observatory’s database, Mavise, provided an overall fi gure of 969 state-wide channels operating in Spain on all types of plat-
forms and exploitation regimes: DTT, cable, satellite, FTA, pay-TV. Th ese, however, included a number of simulcast HD channels replicating 
SD channels’ schedules. See http://mavise.obs.coe.int/welcome (accessed 21 August 2012).
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Th e second trend is a slight decrease in pay-TV subscriptions, both via satellite and cable (see Table 3). Since 
2008, their presence has been weaker, as households have embraced the DTT multi-channel off er. Th is is in 
line with a general fall in pay-TV revenues.39 
Th e third trend is a sustained, slight increase in the growth of internet protocol television (IPTV) despite 
the economic downturn. Th is can be attributed to its newness in a market that is not yet saturated. Here, 
the dominant player is Telefónica, with its Imagenio brand commanding 17.2 percent of Spanish pay-TV 
subscribers and 12 percent of the pay-TV market revenues in 2010.40 
Finally, almost all the Spanish population using the internet has fi xed broadband connections (see Table 4). 
It is mobile broadband that has experienced the most dramatic rise in recent years. According to Eurostat, 
Spain had the sixth-highest mobile internet penetration rate (via the Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System, UMTS) in 2010.41 
Table 4. 
Internet penetration rate (total internet subscriptions as % of total population) 
and mobile penetration rate (total active SIM cards as % of total population), 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Fixed internet 36 39 45 51 54 59 64
 – of which broadband 58.3 74.4 86.7 88.2 94.4 96.6 96.9
Mobile telephony 96.7 102.1 107.1 107.5 109.2 109,7 n/a
 – of which 3G n/a n/a n/a 44.2 52.1 58.9 n/a
Note: n/a: not available
Sources: Data for internet from: Level of Internet Access and Households and Type of connection to the Internet. Broadband; data for 
mobile telephony from: Telecommunications Market Commission (CMT), Informe anual 2010 (based on lines per 100 
inhabitants) 
However, both fi xed and mobile broadband are still expensive. According to the Telecommunications Market 
Commission (Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones, CMT), the best prices for combined fi xed 
broadband and telephony packages at medium speed levels in 2010 were on average 37.5 percent higher 
than similar packages in the rest of the EU.42 Mobile broadband in general also remains expensive. Th e UK’s 
39. Telecommunications Market Commission (CMT), Informe anual 2010 (Annual Report 2010), 2010, p. 361 (hereafter CMT, Informe anual 
2010).
40. CMT, Informe anual 2010, p. 366.
41. Eurostat, “Individuals using a mobile phone via UMTS (3G) to access the internet,” at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
product_details/dataset?p_product_code=TIN00117 (accessed 15 May 2012). Th e fi rst fi ve countries were Iceland (23 percent), Luxemburg 
(20 percent), Sweden (20 percent), Norway (19 percent), Denmark (15 percent), and the Netherlands (15 percent).
42. CMT, “Comparativa Internacional de ofertas comerciales de banda ancha en la Unión Europea y España” (Commercial Broadband Off ers in the 
EU and Spain; an International Comparison), December 2010, p. 8, at http://www.cmt.es/c/document_library/get_fi le?uuid=945757ae-f829-
46d5-9b7e-99e034e58fc5&groupId=10138 (accessed 28 May 2012).
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regulator Ofcom singles out Spain as having the highest European prices for all 1, 3, and 5 GB speeds.43 On 
the other hand, mobile phone tariff s remain low and are indeed falling.44 
1 .2 Media Preferences 
 1.2.1 Main Shifts in News Consumption
Th e main development in recent years has been the rapid increase in internet use. More than half the population 
now surfs the web regularly, compared with less than one-third in 2005 (see Figure 5). However, Spaniards 
use the internet mainly for communicating and researching information on products and services. Th is 
notwithstanding, reading press news stories online is more and more popular an as internet activity. In 2009, 
50 percent of Spanish citizens who had used the internet in the last three months had read or downloaded 
online newspapers or current-event magazines By 2011, this number was 67.2 percent. Simultaneously, 
in 2009 print readership fell below 40 percent for the fi rst time since 2005.45 Nevertheless, there is still 
insuffi  cient empirical evidence to determine how much of the decline in newspaper readership is due to 
online migration.46 
Online news consumption via mobile phones is increasing. Comscore’s data for November 2011 to January 
2012 showed that 10.3 percent of Spaniards with a smartphone (52.5 percent of the total population) accessed 
news through their mobile handsets almost every day. Th is proportion is low compared with other Western 
European countries. However, the Spanish smartphone audience reported the strongest gains between 2010 
and 2012, with a 160 percent increase in near-daily news access. 
Th e broadcast media, meanwhile, maintain a stable penetration, and in the case of television, this appears to 
be benefi tting from the economic crisis as a cheaper medium. Nearly nine out of 10 people watch television 
daily (see Figure 5), and according to Kantar Media’s peoplemeters, in 2011 viewers watched an average of 
3 hours and 59 minutes a day, an unprecedentedly high fi gure.47 Radio has stabilized at around half of the 
television audience rate, and is less favored for everyday information. In 2010, only 15.7 percent of Spaniards 
chose it as their fi rst option for news, after television (46.2 percent), newspapers (18.8 percent), and the 
internet (16 percent).48 As in the case of the print press, the most important challenge it faces regarding 
audiences is its inability to engage adolescents.49
43. Ofcom, International Communications Market Report 2010, London, 2 December 2010, p. 85, at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/
research/cmr/753567/icmr/ICMR_2010.pdf (accessed 10 October 2012).
44. El País, “El precio de las llamadas de móvil disminuyó un 9 % en 2010” (Mobile phone calls fell 9 percent in 2010), 1 April 2011 at http://www.
elpais.com/articulo/economia/precio/llamadas/movil/disminuyo/2010/elpepueco/20110401elpepueco_4/Tes (accessed 1 April 2011).
45. INE, “Encuesta sobre equipamiento y uso de las TICs 2010.”
46. Interview with Manuel Sala, director of the online press audience measurement agency OJDi, Barcelona, 12 February 2011.
47. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis televisivo 2011” (Television Analysis 2011), p. 10, at http://www.barloventocomunicacion.es/images/pub-
licaciones/ANALISIS_TELEVISIVO_2011[2].pdf (accessed 15 May 2012) (hereafter Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis Televisivo 2011”).
48. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” 2010, p. 6.
49. J.Mª. Martí, X. Ribes, M. Gutiérrez, L. Martínez and B. Monclús, “Apunts sobre la recerca la ràdio i els joves. Problemàtica actual i tendències de 
futur” (Research notes on radio and young people. Present problems and future trends), in J.Mª. Martí and B. Monclús (coords), Informe 2009 
sobre la ràdio a Catalunya (2009 report on Catalonia’s radio), Observatori de la ràdio a Catalunya-Servei de Publicacions de la UAB, Barcelona, 
2010, pp. 86–98, at http://www.l-obsradio.org/fi les/informe_radio_09.pdf (accessed 30 March 2011).
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Figure 5.
Media use (% of population over 14 years old), 2005–2011
 Print (dailies)    Magazines    Radio    Television    Internet
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80.0
100.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
88.9 88.6 88.7 88.5 89.0 87.9 88.5
55.5 56.1 54.7 53.1 55.3
56.9 58.5
53.8
47.7 49.4
53.3 51.3
50.4
48.9
41.1 41.8 41.3 42.1
39.8 38.0
37.4
19.7 22.2
26.2
29.9
34.3
38.4
42.5
Note: Print (dailies), radio, television, and internet refer to daily use. Magazines data refer to weekly or monthly use. 
Sources: INE; AIMC, Marco general de los medios en España 2012, Madrid, p. 11
1.2.2 Availability of a Diverse Range of News Platforms
Media consumption has not changed since 2005 such as to infl uence the availability of a diverse range 
of news platforms. Th e sole exception is the internet, with, however, some qualifi cations. It is true that 
online news dailies have proliferated, but their sustainability is still uncertain. Th e Association of Spanish 
Daily Newspapers’ Publishers (Asociación de Editores de Diarios Españoles, AEDE) registered 59 digital dailies 
in 2009, the same number as in 2007, following a surge (76 dailies) in 2008.50 However, in addition to 
increased audience interest in online reading, other factors might also account for this variation, for example, 
the overwhelming annual number of graduate journalists unable to fi nd a job in an already overcrowded labor 
market or the low cost of internet start-ups.
With respect to DTT, information and news are increasingly confi ned to public broadcasters, and are 
diminishing overall. Th is is not due to audience attitudes, for research data show that television is still the 
most important news source. Private licensees mostly concentrate on entertainment and drama,51 depending 
on long-established brands at a time of economic crisis and an oversupply of DTT channels. 
50. Association of Spanish Daily Newspapers’ Publishers (Asociación de Editores de Diarios Españoles), Libro Blanco de la prensa diaria 2010 (Daily 
Press White paper), AEDE, Madrid, 2011 (hereafter AEDE, Libro Blanco de la prensa diaria 2010).
51. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis Televisivo 2011,” p. 22.
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     S P A I N2 4
1.3. News Providers
1.3.1 Leading Sources of News
Television
Th e public broadcaster, RTVE, has led audience share rankings since 2009 through its general-interest 
television channel La 1, followed closely by Telecinco and Antena 3 (see Figure 6). Telecinco belongs to the 
Spanish division of Mediaset, owned by the Italian Silvio Berlusconi. It has lost the long-standing audience 
leadership that it had maintained since 2005. As previously mentioned, it is committed to entertainment 
content and indeed devoted nearly half of its schedule to this in 2011 (49.6 percent).52 
Respondents to CIS have identifi ed Telecinco’s schedule as the most entertaining (17.9 percent), closely 
followed by La Sexta (15.2 percent) and Antena 3 (14.3 percent).53 Antena 3 is the main general-interest 
channel of the media group Grupo Antena 3, with Planeta as the main stakeholder. Planeta is one of the 
largest Spanish communication conglomerates, having its origin and core business in the book publishing 
sector. Antena 3’s schedule balances entertainment, information, and drama,54 and—like Telecinco—tends 
towards a sensationalist news topic selection and treatment. During the last fi ve years, these two channels 
have competed fi ercely against each other on prime-time celebrity programs.
Th ere are, in addition, 13 regional public broadcasters, owned and managed by administrative regional 
entities. Th ey are associated within the Regional Radio and Television Organizations’ Federation (Federación 
de Organismos de Radio y Televisión Autonómicos, FORTA). Th ey almost parallel Antena 3 in their annual, 
nationwide average audience share. In some regions with their own distinct national identities, such as 
Catalonia, they are major sources of news.
PRISA’s Cuatro, launched in 2005, is the fi fth general-interest channel in terms of audience share. Two 
trends should be noted: it has overtaken RTVE’s La 2, which now almost behaves like a minority channel 
specializing in cultural content (see section 2). And, after consolidating a schedule based on high-quality 
international drama for adult urban audiences (drama made up almost 38 percent of its schedule in 2010),55 
it has been absorbed by Telecinco. Mr Berlusconi’s company has repositioned Cuatro in its DTT portfolio 
for a young and adolescent market.
52. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis Televisivo 2011,” p. 22.
53. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” 2010, p. 12.
54. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis Televisivo 2011,” p. 22.
55. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis Televisivo 2011,” p. 23.
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Figure 6. 
TV outlets’ ranking by annual average audience share (%), 2005–2011
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 Telecinco    Antena3    La1(TVE)    FORTA*    Cuatro    La2 (TVE)    La Sexta
Note: * FORTA represents the public regional broadcasters
Sources: Kantar Media data cited in CMT, Informe anual 2009 (Annual Report 2009), 2009; Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis 
Televisivo 2011.”
As Figure 6 shows, the Spanish television market has become more pluralized in recent years as individual 
audience shares have declined. Th is audience fragmentation may be attributed, fi rst, to the emergence of two 
new broadcasters, in 2005 (Cuatro) and 2006 (La Sexta), and second, to the multiplication of digital channels 
after analog switch-over in 2010. Th is two-stage process has been acknowledged by television consultants (see 
section 1.3.2).56
Radio
Spanish radio audience rankings present at least three consolidated trends: the signifi cance of private licensees, 
the high concentration of the market, and the popularity of thematic music stations.
Private players control both state-wide and regional markets. Spanish National Radio (Radio Nacional de 
España, RNE), the main RTVE general-interest radio channel, only ranks fourth in the talk radio audience 
ratings (see Figure 7). However, 10.3 percent of Spaniards choose it as their preferred station to listen to radio 
news, and since 2009 RNE has experienced the highest increase in audience share. In specifi c local markets, 
regional public broadcasters have led the audience ratings, as in the Catalan case (Catalunya Ràdio has a 
56. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis Televisivo 2011,” p. 11; E. Prado and M. Delgado, “La televisión generalista en la era digital. Tendencias 
internacionales de programación” (Generalist TV in the Digital Era: International Programming Trends), Telos, no. 84, July–September 2010, 
at http://sociedadinformacion.fundacion.telefonica.com/seccion=1268&idioma=es_ES&id=2010083011290001&activo=6.do (accessed 10 
March 2011) (hereafter Prado and Delgado, “La televisión generalista en la era digital”). 
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7.9 percent reach),57 but even in Catalonia most recent fi gures show that some commercial regional radio 
networks, for example RAC 1, are providing strong competition.
Nevertheless, the market overall is highly concentrated. Radio station networks belonging to big nationwide 
media groups dominate. Th is follows a consolidation path started in the 1980s.58 Among these groups, 
PRISA exercises absolute hegemony in audience reach: three of its brands are in the top fi ve station rankings. 
Th e other state-wide media group present in the ranking is Grupo Antena 3, owning the Onda Cero stations 
network. With a steady increase in audience, it has succeeded in becoming the second-ranked talk radio 
station in terms of audience reach and share. Th is has relegated the private Catholic radio network, People’s 
Radiowaves of Spain Network (Cadena de Ondas Populares Españolas, COPE), to third place, closely followed 
by the public RNE. According to the April 2010 CIS barometer, one-third of listeners prefer Cadena SER 
(owned by Unión Radio, itself controlled by PRISA) for listening to radio news. Onda Cero is chosen by 14.3 
percent of those who listen to radio news, RNE by 10.3 percent, and COPE by 7.7 percent.59 
Figure 7.
Talk radio stations’ ranking by annual average audience share (%), 2005–2011
 Cadena SER      Onda Cero      COPE      RNE (RTVE)      Catalunya Ràdio      Punto Radio      RAC1
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Source: AIMC, Marco general de los medios en España 2012, p. 34
57. Fundación de la Comunicación y la Cultura (FUNDACC), Baròmetre de la Comunicació i la Cultura. 6a onada 2010 (Communication and 
Culture Barometer), January 2011, p. 43.
58. R. Franquet, La radio digital en España: incertidumbres tecnológicas y amenazas al pluralismo (Spanish digital radio: technology uncertainty and 
pluralism threats), Fundación Alternativas, Madrid, 2008.
59. CIS, “Barómetro de abril” (April Barometer), Study no. 2834, 2010, p. 9 (hereafter CIS, “Barómetro de abril”). 
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Th ematic music radio broadcasting remains strong, and its reach is in some cases higher than talk radio. 
PRISA’s Cadena 40, set up in 1966, has been a social phenomenon among the young and has expanded into 
other areas, such as the DTT market, credit cards, and the promotion of musical theatre shows. 
Print
El País tops the daily newspaper circulation ranking. In the April 2010 CIS barometer, 16.3 percent of 
respondents chose this title as their preferred newspaper information source—twice as many as preferred 
El Mundo at 8.6 percent). Th e Barcelona newspaper La Vanguardia, was third, followed by El Periodico with 
4.1 percent and another national newspaper, ABC, with 3.8 percent.60 
El País is owned by PRISA, a group owned by the founding family, and Liberty, a hedge fund company 
recently incorporated to PRISA due to the latter’s fi nancial problems. El Mundo, established in 1989, belongs 
to Unidad Editorial, which is in turn controlled by the publisher of Corriere della Sera, the Italian media 
group RCS. Ideologically, El Mundo leans towards center-right liberalism. Th e sports daily Marca, the third 
paper in the circulation ranking, is also included in Unidad Editorial and RCS’s portfolios. In the last fi ve 
years, Marca has competed for sports readers with PRISA’s As, but the latter always holds second position. 
Both titles are evidence of the importance of sports dailies in the Spanish print market.
Th e picture of paid newspaper circulation is completed with the traditionally monarchist and rightist 
broadsheet ABC, founded in 1903 and now owned by the Vocento media group, the product of the 2002 
merger of two publishers with origins in the early 20th century, ABC ’s Prensa Española and the Basque 
Grupo Correo, both strong in regional dailies. Another historic title is the Catalan, liberal right-leaning 
La Vanguardia, founded in 1881 by the former paper publisher and now multimedia company Grupo Godó. 
A fi nal word has to be said about free daily sheets. Th eir appearance in the 1990s has had an important 
impact: 20 minutos, owned by the Norwegian media group Schibsted, had an average circulation of 702,518 
in 2010, whereas Grupo Zeta’s Qué!, off ering a more entertaining news treatment, had an average circulation 
of 619,129, far higher than the circulation fi gures of the paid newspapers (see Figure 8). From a local and 
regional perspective, they give prominence to consumer issues, transportation, housing, local politics, sports, 
television, and the cultural agenda.61
60. CIS, “Barómetro de abril,” p. 10.
61. M.T. Santos, El auge de la prensa gratuita en España (Th e growth of the free press in Spain), UPV/EHV, Bilbao, 2007; Circulation Audit Bureau 
(Ofi cina de Justifi cación de la Difusión, OJD), “Detalle de la publicación” (Publication details), March 2011, at http://www.ojd.es (accessed 10 
March 2011).
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Figure 8. 
Ranking of daily (paid) newspapers by circulation, 2005–2010
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Sources: AEDE, Libro Blanco de la prensa diaria 2010, Madrid, 2009, based on data from the Circulation Audit Bureau (Ofi cina 
de Justifi cación de la Difusión, OJD) 
Online
It is diffi  cult to identify trends in news websites’ audiences due to the lack of agreement among industry players 
over which online audience measurement methods are most appropriate.62 For instance, since 2005 PRISA’s 
websites (Elpais.com, Cadenaser.com) have not been audited by the industry organization, the Interactive 
Circulation Audit Bureau (Ofi cina de Justifi cación de la Difusión interactiva, OJDi), which supervises more 
than 450 sites. However, PRISA has recently asked to be reincorporated in the audit. Likewise, Elmundo.es 
is not included in AIMC’s EGM survey, based on more than 30,000 yearly interviews. Moreover, in 2009, 
OJDi, which uses a census-based method, adopted a Nielsen tool that does not correct the deletion of cookies. 
Th is situation may change if the industry fi nally accepts a new Nielsen Online hybrid method, combining 
panel and census and using EGM’s sample universe. Nielsen has chosen Spain to apply it for the fi rst time 
62. See El País, “La nueva OJD digital desata la polémica entre los grandes medios” (Th e new digital OJD unleashes controversy among big me-
dia), 13 March 2009, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/nueva/OJD/digital/desata/polemica/grandes/medios/elpepisoc/20090313el-
pepisoc_7/Tes (accessed 10 March 2011); Europa Press, “España, pionera en la medición híbrida de audiencias online” (Spain, a pioneer in a 
hybrid online audience system), 5 March 2011, at http://www.europapress.es/portaltic/internet/noticia-espana-pionera-medicion-hibrida-audi-
encias-online-20110305080009.html (accessed 15 March 2011).
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and issued its fi rst results in January 2011 (see Table 5). Google News is not included in these results, 
however. Th erefore, audience data from Google AdPlanner are shown (Table 6). Th e situation is further 
complicated by media outlets’ habit of publishing total monthly fi gures for unique users, for marketing 
purposes, despite OJDi insisting on numbers of daily average unique users as the best tool to measure and 
compare sites’ audience impact.63 
Table 5.
Online news media audience ranking, hybrid method (panel + census), January 2011
Rank Media outlet/URL Monthly unique users (million)
1 Elmundo.es 5.6
2 Rtve.es 4.3
3 Abc.es 3.4
4 Telecinco.es 3.2
5 Antena3.com 2.9
20minutos.es 2.9
6 Laverdad.es 1.8
7 Elperiodico.com 1.5
Europapress.com 1.5
Es.noticias.yahoo.com 1.5
Cuatro.com 1.5
8 Que.es 1.4
9 Publico.es 1.3
10 LibertadDigital.com 1.1
Source: Compiled from Nielsen Online/Ión Comunicación data 
Table 6.
Online news media audience ranking, January 2011
Rank Media outlet/URL Monthly unique users (million)
1 Marca.com 6.9
2 As.com 5.6
3 Elmundo.es 5.6
4 Elpais.com 5.0
5 Rtve.es 4.2
6 Telecinco.es 3.1
7 Antena3.com 2.6
8 Abc.es 2.4
9 Sport.es 2.1
10 20minutos.es 2.0
Source: Google AdPlanner
63. Interview with Manuel Sala, director of the online press audience measurement agency OJDi, Barcelona, 12 February 2011.
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Th e most visited news media sites seem to replicate the market shares of publishers and broadcasters offl  ine. 
Th ey include the national sport paper Marca; quality newspapers such as El Mundo, El País, ABC, and 20 
minutos; and among broadcast media, Telecinco.es, Antena3.es, and Rtve.es, the last being the leader among 
broadcasters in both tables. Nielsen’s hybrid measurement in Table 5 includes some regional leaders such as 
La Verdad. Other sites worthy of note on Nielsen’s table are third-party news aggregators or portals off ering 
a wide range of content and services, including reworked, third-party, or self-produced hard and soft news 
(MSN, Yahoo or Terra.es).
1. 3.2 Television News Programs
One third of the Spanish audience chooses the public broadcaster channel La 1 as their preferred television 
news source (34.9 percent).64 La 1 is followed by commercial channels Antena 3 (20.4 percent) and Telecinco 
(9.4 percent). 
In the period 2005–2011, the top fi ve prime-time newscasts on nationwide television were those belonging to 
the former analog operators, and these are dominated by long-established public and private licensees, that is, 
operating before 2005. According to Kantar people-metering, RTVE’s La 1 has been the prime-time news leader 
since 2007, and this accords with people’s preferences according to sociological surveys. Th e private channels 
Telecinco and Antena 3 have repositioned themselves in second and third places, respectively (see Table 7).
Table 7.
Prime-time news on state-wide television, audience share rankings (%), 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Antena 3 24.2 Antena 3 22.4 La 1 20.2 La 1 19.3 La 1 18.3 La 1 17.5 La 1 18.1
La 1 22.5 La 1 20.8 Antena 3 20 Telecinco 18.2 Telecinco 16.7 Telecinco 13.1 Telecinco 13.1
Telecinco 18.2 Telecinco 17.4 Telecinco 17.4 Antena 3 17 Antena 3 14.6 Antena 3 12 Antena 3 12.6
La 2 5.7 Cuatro 5.4 Cuatro 6.4 Cuatro 6.8 La Sexta 6.8 La Sexta 6.7 La Sexta 6.1
Cuatro 5.5 La 2 4.9 La 2 3.8 La Sexta 4.7 Cuatro 6.2 Cuatro 4.4 Cuatro 6.2
Source: Barlovento Comunicación, based on Kantar Media data
Th is picture does not mention regional public broadcasters. In the last fi ve years, some of their prime-time 
newscasts have been audience leaders in their respective territories, especially in those regions with their own 
language other than Spanish. Th is is the case with the Basque channel ETB2 or Catalan TV3, with the latter’s 
share never falling below 20 percent. 
Diff erent measurement tools show a decrease in audience numbers for all operators’ prime-time newscasts. 
Given that overall television viewing remains buoyant, the decline in audience shares could be attributed to 
DTT audience fragmentation rather than the possible impact of online news media.
64. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” 2010, p. 36.
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1.3.3 Impact of Digital Media on Good-quality News
Th e most read, viewed, and heard digital news content is provided by traditional, long-established players, 
except for one operator, LibertadDigital.es (see Table 5). New DTT entrants are not really competing on 
news production, but mainly on television entertainment and drama. In the case of online-only media, new 
entrants are competing on opinion (see section 4). 
However, some news websites committed to more serious journalism have emerged online. Th ey are usually 
the result of the exploitation of new online platforms by independent journalists. Periodismohumano.com, 
for example, was set up in 2010 by the Pulitzer prize winner Javier Bauluz. Perhaps the most interesting 
was the shortlived Soitu.es. Th is site was launched in December 2007 and very soon had half a million 
unique visitors a month and another 2 million users monthly through its third-party widgets. Despite its new 
approach to an online journalism with an important social dimension, the site closed after just 22 months, 
in October 2009, following a decision by its main fi nancial backer and principal shareholder, the Spanish 
bank BBVA.65 
Th ere is a debate about the contribution of social media to good-quality news. Online media editors 
acknowledge that social media can enhance research if they are used properly (see section 4). However, 
everyday experience shows that journalists are still sceptical, especially in large, long-established corporations 
like RTVE.66 Th e Conference on Digital Journalism (Huesca, 10–13 March 2011) awarded web investigative 
reporting prizes on the basis of traditional professional standards, while some expert digital journalists 
attending the meeting questioned why good journalism has to be identifi ed with serious reporting as opposed 
to the superfi cial immediacy of social media. 
In terms of public perception of how DTT has aff ected overall quality (not only of news), the evidence is 
mixed. Th e majority of survey respondents point to an improvement in sound and image quality (almost 61 
percent), but there is less agreement about greater program variety (46 percent believe this, against 43 percent 
who see no change). As for content quality, the fi nding is clear: 58 percent of people believe there has been 
no improvement.67
1.4 Assessments 
Digitization has multiplied the DTT channels and online media outlets in Spain, as it has elsewhere. Th e 
digital signal production, compression, and transmission, and the regulatory changes needed to keep up 
with them have the potential to increase diversity through quantity. But digitization includes a social process 
65. L. Bennet, “Soitu.es couldn’t fi nd the business model to match its content creativity,” Nieman Journalism Lab, 5 March 2010, at http://www.
niemanlab.org/2010/03/soitu-es-couldnt-fi nd-the-business-model-to-match-its-content-creativity (accessed 15 May 2012).
66. Telephone interview with David Varona, social media manager and journalist at RTVE.es, 20 February 2011.
67. CIS, “Barómetro de abril,” p. 17.
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which is more complex, with other factors having defi nite limiting eff ects on content diversity and quality. 
Th ese include the following points.
 Path dependency in licensing. Spanish DTT licensees have remained unchanged since 2002, the majority 
of them being long-established broadcasters. DTT has not started from scratch.
 Audience concentration in online news outlets and economic diffi  culties for new entrants. Online media 
outlets have proliferated, but those leading audience rankings belong to consolidated media groups. 
Newly created digital online outlets suff er from a lack of resources and branding. Some are testing new 
sources of revenue.
 Overcrowded DTT market. Commentators, critical scholars, and media groups alike acknowledge that 
there is little room for distinct local players to survive in such a saturated market, with so many state-wide 
digital channels on off er.
 Content homogenization and news marginalization. Content analysis confi rms that mainstream 
genres (entertainment and fi ction) are repeated across television platforms.68 Information genres are 
only prominent in public broadcasters. Moreover, they are not necessarily profound: the Euromonitor 
International European TV Observatory, based in Barcelona, has labeled Spanish television as “the 
champion of news superfi ciality” because of its preference for newscasts to the detriment of such genres 
as debates, interviews, and documentaries.69
 News production. Online outlets are not truly competing on news-making due to the above-mentioned 
lack of resources (see section 4).
68. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis Televisivo 2011,” p. 22; Prado and Delgado, “La televisión generalista en la era digital.” 
69. E. Prado & M. Delgado, “Tendencias internacionales en programación” (International Trends in Programming), Telos, no. 84. July-September 
2010.
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2. Digital Media and Public or 
 State-administered Broadcasters
2.1 Public Service and State Institutions
Spain’s public service media system is complex and heterogeneous. An easy way to reduce the complexity is 
to see it as mirroring the country’s decentralized political structure. Spanish state executive power is made up 
of three layers: local, regional, and state-run authorities. 
Th e state-owned RTVE is the largest, country-wide public service broadcaster with its headquarters 
in Madrid. At the regional level, however, there are another 13 state-owned public service broadcasters, 
covering some of the 17 Autonomous Communities, the territorial and administrative entities that were 
established when Spain’s democratic Constitution was adopted in 1978 (see section 1.1.2). Most of these 
broadcasters are strongly criticized by the private media industry and the political right for misuse and abuse 
of public funding.70 Th is controversy runs parallel to the broader debate concerning the sustainability of the 
Autonomous Communities in the current fi nancial crisis.71 
In addition to formal public service broadcasters, a number of regional private broadcasters which emerged 
following the transition to democracy adopted a public service, not-for-profi t model. Although most have 
now been integrated into commercial conglomerates, the community-based third sector (TS) media remains 
relatively strong; these outlets were legally defi ned for the fi rst time under the LGCA 2010. However, other 
than providing recognition, the LGCA 2010 does not establish clear enforcement measures, and a technical 
plan for its protection and development is pending. Th is is regarded as insuffi  cient by the Community Media 
State Network (Red Estatal de Medios Comunitarios, ReMC), which includes 30 media organizations: radio, 
television, and multimedia services. With unprofessional programming mainly centered on issues such as 
immigration, cultural and political pluralism, and media education, the impact of TS media as public service 
70. See El País editorial, “Públicas y carísimas” (Public and very expensive), 17 November 2010, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Publi-
cas/carisimas/elpepiopi/20101117elpepiopi_1/Tes? (accessed 24 November 2010). 
71. See El Mundo, “Jáuregui plantea que las comunidades valoren si deben tener televisión pública” (Jáuregui proposes that Communities assess 
whether they must have public service televison), 18 January 2011, at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/01/18/espana/1295343550.html 
(accessed 12 Februrary 2012).
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providers in quantitative audience terms is marginal. According to the ReMC, however, their continuing 
existence, despite the legal and economic deterrents, proves that they meet a social need.72
Th e portrait of public service media in Spain has to be completed with the state-owned news agency, EFE. 
Built on a previous news-making undertaking, EFE was founded in 1939 by Franco’s brother-in-law, the 
fascist politician Ramón Serrano Súñer, and Manuel Aznar, the grandfather of the former Spanish prime 
minister (1996–2004), the conservative José María Aznar. It now claims to be the fourth biggest news agency 
in the world, with 2,000 clients all round the globe.73 However, the change in government in 2011 along 
with the ongoing economic crisis has aff ected the agency, with cuts translating into redundancies and wage 
reductions. 
RTVE comprises radio (RNE), television (TVE), and associated web and interactive services. Th e corporation 
underwent far-reaching reform after the social democratic PSOE party’s return to government in 2004. Th e 
goals of the reform were to eliminate an unsustainable debt; to end the tradition of blatant manipulation by 
all three parties that have held offi  ce since the restoration of democracy; and to respond to the EU’s state aid 
requirements on funding for public broadcasters, thereby including proportionality in funding in order to 
allow free market competition to function unimpeded. However, the change of government in November 
2011 and the fi nancial crisis are undermining the legal, funding, and content reform of RTVE.
2.1.1 Overview of Public Service Media; News and Current Affairs Output
DTT switch-over was completed in April 2010. TVE maintains the two traditional general-interest channels, 
La 1 and La 2 (fi rst broadcast in 1956 and 1965, respectively). La 1 leads the television news output. According 
to Kantar, 47.9 percent of its program schedule was devoted to information content in its various formats in 
2011. Th is was nearly 28 points above the average (20.2 percent) of the current six general channels. For La 2, 
however, news and current aff airs output was just 2.6 percent of its total schedule, and half of what it was a year 
earlier.74 Although formally a general-interest channel, it also performs as a home for cultural content. 
Some unions have criticized the historic lack of a clear-cut strategy for the channel, and blamed an excessive 
focus on highbrow cultural content for marginalizing La 2. La 1’s daily news programs rank fi rst in the 
public’s preferences; 35 percent of the people surveyed watched them, according to the CIS special barometer 
(May 2010). Th is was 14 percentage points ahead of the immediate follower, the commercial broadcaster 
Antena 3.75 As of July 2012, peoplemetering research continues to register La 1 news audience leadership, 
uninterrupted since September 2007.76
72. Interview with Laura Bergés, ReMC network’s spokesperson, Barcelona (Bellaterra), 20 December 2010.
73. See http://www.efe.com/efe/queesefe/presentacion/english/4 (accessed 12 September 2012).
74. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis televisivo 2011,” p. 22.
75. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” 2010, pp. 18–19.
76. Audience data are an average of the two main news broadcasts, at 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. See Barlovento Comunicación, Press note, Audiencias 
TV Julio 2012, at http://www.barloventocomunicacion.com/blog/15-audiencia-mensual/45-audiencias-tv-julio-2012.html (accessed 10 August 
2012).
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Th e TVE news and current aff airs output includes the whole schedule of the 24-hour news channel Canal 
24 Horas (broadcast in a cable platform since 1997), with a 0.8 percent average audience share in 2010. 
Th e channel is currently the only 24-hour news channel in Spain, after the closure of CNN+ in December 
2010. Th e TVE channel portfolio is completed with TVE Internacional, which broadcasts a general-interest 
program schedule for the Spanish diaspora population in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Finally, the 
TVE-HD channel focusses on football and drama in high defi nition (HD) and does not broadcast news. 
RTVE runs six radio channels: the general-interest network RNE, the thematic music and culture channel 
Radio 3, news-only Radio 5, Radio 4 (for Catalonia), Radio Clásica (classical music), and Radio Exterior 
(for international listeners, broadcasting in English, Russian, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Ladino, 
along with Spanish). Among these, only Radio 5 is a 24-hour news channel, but RNE and Radio 4 off er 
considerable news output. Unlike the RTVE television channels, the RTVE public radio stations are behind 
the commercial competitors in terms of audience share. RNE was the fourth talk-radio network in Spain in 
2011 (see Figure 7), but in May 2012 it moved up to third position.77
2.1.2 Digitization and Services
Along with La 1, La 2, Canal 24 Horas, TVE International, and TVE-HD, TVE owns two other digital 
thematic channels: the sports channel Teledeporte (since 1994, it went digital in 1997 through a satellite 
platform) and the children’s channel Clan. Both of these went into DTT in 2005. Th e RTVE radio channels 
broadcast in an analog platform, in DTT, through the internet, and also in DAB and DRM formats. Radio’s 
complete analog switch-off  date is still uncertain in Spain, as elsewhere in Europe (see section 1.1.1).
Regarding online operations, prior to 2007 RTVE.es was outdated in comparison with other public regional 
broadcasters, such as the Catalan Broadcasting Corporation (Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals, 
CCMA). Its website included little more than program schedules. As shown in Table 5, in 2011 RTVE was 
in second position among the Spanish online media audience. Th e key for its success was the transfer of 
management know-how through the appointment of experienced digital editors from the commercial media. 
Th is has been carried out since 2006, under the RTVE law on state-owned radio and television78 (RTVE Law 
17/2006). RTVE created a specifi c interactive division, iRTVE, with clear objectives and means. It triggered 
a radical improvement. Th e website RTVE.es includes television and radio channels and programs by way 
of streaming and podcast, along with the digitized historical archive. It has also rapidly got involved in social 
media: the site hosts several online communities (fora) and 125 blogs (November 2010), the highest number 
in Europe, according to one expert.79
77. Data can be downloaded from the AIMC at http://www.aimc.es/-Datos-EGM-Resumen-General-.html (accessed 9 August 2012).
78. Law 17/2006 on state-owned radio and television services, BOE no. 134, 6 June 2006 (hereafter Law 17/2006).
79. José A. García Avilés, Professor of Journalism Studies at Universidad Miguel Hernández, Elche, in the forum “Transformar la TV. Otra Tele-
visión es posible” (Transforming TV, Another TV is possible) held in Madrid, 18 November 2010.
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David Varona, RTVE’s social media and participation manager, says that RTVE has at least 50 Facebook 
accounts, 35 Twitter profi les, fi ve Tuenti accounts (the successful Spanish social network site with 8 million 
users), and a pilot presence in Sigojoven.com, a Spanish social network for the over-40s.80 Th ere is also a 
channel on YouTube and La Villa, the fi rst sport social network in Spain. Finally, it is developing some apps 
for Google Android, Apple’s iPhone, and Sony’s PlayStation. Th e changes have been revolutionary and, as a 
result, the website is currently among the top three broadcast media internet portals, with nearly 11,114,000 
unique users in June 2012 (after Telecinco.es), according to OJDi. RTVE.es is also the website where users 
spend the most time (nearly 37 minutes per day on average).81
2.1.3 Government Support
Social democratic governments (led by the PSOE) shaped media policy in Spain from 2004 to 2011. Th e 
government allocated two digital multiplexes (eight channels) to RTVE in 2005, which meant multiplying its 
capacity fourfold. Th ere was a commitment to a free and open DTT led by the public, state-wide broadcaster 
(see section 5.1.1). Consistent with this, the RTVE Law 17/2006, passed by a consensus in Parliament, gave 
RTVE the special task of fostering the information society as part of its public service broadcasting duties. 
Th e corporation must “participate in the technological progress” through new technologies and services, 
aiming to “complete its program schedules and bring the state authorities closer to the citizens.”82 
But this mission had to be fulfi lled with shrinking resources. In order to ensure fi nancing, a rationalization 
plan allowed the state to absorb RTVE’s galloping debt (almost €8,000 million) and a new corporate structure 
was created in 2007: RTVE Corporation (Corporación RTVE). It was followed by massive lay-off s, aff ecting 
4,150 out of nearly 10,000 employees. 
As a result, RTVE’s Annual Review 2009 emphasized the “strongly rejuvenated and reduced staff .”83 Th e 
corporation has not provided access to any in-house qualitative audience studies. In the absence of an alternative 
source, it is not possible to confi rm or discount the eff ects of staff  reduction, equipment digitization, and 
the ensuing new organizational routines on perceived product quality and audience engagement. So far, 
situations and perceptions vary across diff erent regional production centers. 
Workers in the Canary Islands, for instance, have had to adapt to longer working days and split shifts. Catalan 
editors, whose production center was digitized between 2008 and 2010, state that they do not think their 
public service commitment has been eroded as the result of the combination of digitization and employment 
cuts. On the contrary, they say, digitized content ingestion and management systems have brought about a 
faster and more rational exploitation of resources.84 
80. Telephone interview with David Varona, social media manager and journalist at RTVE.es, 20 February 2011.
81. Data are available at http://www.ojdinteractiva.es/ultimos-medios-auditados.php# (accessed 10 August 2012). Th e categories “entertainment” 
and “broadcast” have to be selected to single out only broadcast media websites.
82. Law 17/2006, Art. 3.3.
83. Radiotelevisión Española (RTVE), Annual Review 2009.
84. Interview with Rafael Lara, TVE Catalunya News Deputy Editor, and Adriana Monclús, Digital Coordinator, Sant Cugat, 28 March 2011.
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RTVE’s 2006 new legal and regulatory framework for the digital era did not endanger editorial independence. 
On the contrary, it eff ectively promoted it until very recently, as RTVE news staff  repeatedly acknowledged.85 
With the new law, board members were elected by Parliament for the fi rst time, and, what is more, with a 
mandatory and ample cross-party majority (two-thirds of votes were legally required). Th e board’s membership 
was to comprise 10 media professionals proposed by parties according to their representation in the two 
houses, along with two others proposed by the main unions. RTVE’s president was held accountable by his or 
her board and by Parliament, where previously he or she was appointed by and accountable to the government 
only.
In addition, two self-regulatory news councils, representing professional journalists in RNE and TVE, have 
been put in place, and a “right of access”, that is, a 1978 constitutional provision guaranteeing program 
representation for the most signifi cant social groups, has been fi nally implemented. 
All these reforms notwithstanding, the actual regulatory implementation and the latest amendments to the 
law by the new PP government have threatened RTVE’s journalistic independence. Th ree examples illustrate 
this. In September 2011, a majority of the board approved an initiative that there should be direct access 
to the computer system used by editors in order to know in advance the texts and topics of newscasts. Th is 
initiative was submitted by a member who had been proposed by the PP, but only the representatives of one 
union, the General Workers Union (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT), and the leftist coalition, United 
Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) opposed it. Th e decision was reversed only two days later, thanks to resistance by 
news management and also broader social uproar, mainly funneled through Twitter.
More problematic was the president’s resignation in July 2011 and the inability of the lower chamber, 
the Congress, to elect a replacement. Alberto Oliart, a former government minister elected with broad 
parliamentary support, resigned following the board’s decision to sign a contract with Telefónica Broadcast 
Services (TBS), a subsidiary of Telefónica telecoms company, to transport the signal of a TVE breakfast show. 
Mr Oliart’s son was the sole managing partner of TBS. Th e president said he was resigning for health reasons 
(he was 82), but the press cast doubt on his version. Th e two signal transport operators that had competed 
in the public tender, Overon and TBS, are the sole players, along with Abertis, operating nationwide in the 
highly concentrated signal transport market. Overon had been in charge of the service prior to the tender. 
Th e board argued that the budget proposed by TBS was lower and, hence, better.86
Finally, the most serious challenge to RTVE’s professional independence was the decree to amend the RTVE 
17/2006 Law, approved by Parliament in April 2012. Arguing the necessity of ending the vacant presidency 
85. See J. Retis, M.L. Graván, A. García Matilla, Los informativos diarios en BBC y RTVE (Daily newscasts in BBC and RTVE), Ediciones de la 
Torre, Madrid, 2010 (hereafter Retis, Graván, García Matilla, Los informativos en BBC y RTVE). Apart from this published research on TVE 
news staff ’s perceptions of RTVE’s actual performance, workers and some unions have claimed to see the end of the political manipulation of 
news production. 
86. See CMT’s annual report (2010), at http://informecmt.cmt.es (accessed 12 November 2012). For an interpretation from the press, see, e.g., 
El País, “El Consejo de Administración de RTVE assume la direction tras la division de Oliart” (RTVE’s board assumes direction after Oliart’s 
resignation), at http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2011/07/06/actualidad/1309903201_850215.html (accessed 9 April 2012). 
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and implementing harsh spending cuts, this decree has changed the law’s provisions on the number, status, and 
appointment of board members. Th e two posts reserved for the main Spanish unions have been eliminated, 
leaving a reduced board of 10 members proposed by Parliament, which only needs an absolute majority if a 
two-thirds vote is not achieved in a fi rst vote. 
In June 2012, new board members, including the president, were elected on a second vote after 24 hours 
in their respective houses of parliament and by an absolute majority (currently in the possession of the PP). 
Th e new president was a high-ranking government employee during the previous PP administration (2000–
2004). A cascade of newly appointed radio and television directors and editors-in-chief followed between 29 
June and 3 August 2012; no fewer than 21 were noted by the authors of this report, covering all management 
and editorial posts. Most of them had held managerial responsibilities in RTVE during the previous PP 
administration. Th e sequence of appointments must also be emphasized: RTVE’s new president replaced 
TVE’s news director the same day that he was confi rmed by the board members’ vote (29 June), almost a full 
month before the TVE director-general (24 July). 
Along with these management posts, there have been seven dismissals in news programs’ editors and presenters 
who had a consolidated or rising audience: two in the main RNE magazines and fi ve at TVE. Most of them 
have won several prizes, and the dismissed TVE news director received unprecedented long applause from 
his staff  on the day of his farewell.87
Government intervention in RTVE’s funding may also have risked the corporation’s future market 
competitiveness. When advertising was eliminated as a source of revenue in 2010 (see section 6.2.1), the 
market was left entirely to private players. A new law promoted by the PSOE government replaced this 
revenue with direct state budgetary subsidies and new levies on private broadcasters’ and telecoms’ turnover: 
a charge of 0.9 percent on the gross revenues of telecoms operators, 3 percent on national broadcating 
operators, and 1.5 percent on subscription television operators.88 However, in March 2011 the European 
Commission referred the levy on telecoms to the European Court of Justice, on the grounds that it does 
not conform to the EU’s telecoms regulatory framework; more specifi cally, the imposition of such levies on 
telecoms is acceptable only to fi nance charges derived from the sector’s regulation. As of November 2012, the 
case is still in progress.89 Furthermore, the telecoms companies have repeatedly rejected this levy and appealed 
to the Spanish telecoms regulator, CMT. 
87. Recent prizes received by TVE include the New York Festival’s World’s Best Television and Films competition and the Iris, awarded by the 
Spanish Television Academy: see Elmundo.es, “TVE triunfa en Nueva York” (TVE triumphs in New York), 18 April 2012, at http://www.
elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/18/television/1334746011.html (accessed 13 August 2012); ABC.es, “TVE arrasa en la gala de los Premios 
Iris de la Academia de televisión” (TVE sweeps the Spanish TV Academy Iris Prizes’ show), at http://www.abc.es/20120705/tv/abci-academia-
premios-201207050037.html (accessed 13 August 2012). 
88. Law 8/2009 on the Financing of RTVE Corporation, BOE no. 210, 31 August 2009, Art. 2.
89. European Commission, “Digital Agenda: Commission refers France and Spain to Court over ‘telecoms taxes’,” press release, Brussels, 14 March 
2011, at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/309&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
(accessed 30 March 2011). Th e case (C-468/11, Commission vs Spain) is still pending, as the European Court of Justice shows on its website, 
at http://curia.europa.eu/juris (accessed 13 August 2012).
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In July 2012, the RTVE board president presented the corporation’s yearly accounts for 2011, revealing a 
€29 million defi cit. In total, Spain’s broadcasters and telecoms operators still owe €60 million.90 Nevertheless, 
the defi cit had been cut by nearly 40 percent on the previous year. Here, a lack of transparency has been 
detected: contrary to what happened in 2011, RTVE did not issue a press release, despite the fact that the 
fi nancial statement was also approved on the day some new directors were appointed. Th e CMT did not 
issue a statement and the regulator’s 2011 annual report included no precise fi gure on the money actually 
levied, unlike the previous year’s report.91 Th e same document acknowledges that confl icts over RTVE levies 
represented the majority of decisions taken by the CMT that year.92
Th e confusing and non-transparent accounting combines with a €204 million cut in RTVE’s 2012 budget, 
announced in December 2011. Th is is more than 10 percent of its 2011 budget (€1,200 million), and nearly 
40 percent of the state subsidy included in the budget (€550 million).93 Th e board reacted in February 2012 
with a fi rst package of adjustment measures, which included the replacement of drama serials (produced in-
house) and fi rst-run feature fi lms with “classic” movies.94
In this scenario, the state’s limitation of spectrum use for all public broadcasters seems the less important 
form of political intervention: LGCA 2010 prohibits public broadcasters from controlling more than a 
maximum threshold of 25 percent of the available spectrum allocated to television and 35 percent for radio.95
2.1.4 Public Service Media and Digital Switch-over
RTVE’s DTT geographical reach is virtually the whole Spanish territory. As of April 2011, the multiplex 
including La 1, La 2, Clan, 24 Horas, RNE, and Radio 5 already covered more than 98 percent, whereas the 
second multiplex holding TVE HD, Teledeporte, Radio Clásica, and Radio 3 achieved 96 percent coverage 
in May 2011.96 However, RTVE did not play a leading role in the digital switch-over, which was conducted 
by the Government in the form of a detailed number of deadlines for broadcasters and terrestrial network 
operators to meet.
90. Th e RTVE press release on the 2010 accounts is at http://www.rtve.es/rtve/20110330/corporacion-rtve-ahorra-123-mi...pecto-presupuestado-
gasta-648-millones-menos-2009/420804.shtml (accessed 13 August 2012). RTVE’s 2011 main fi nancial data are formally accessible via a note 
by Europa Press news agency: see http://www.europapress.es/tv/noticia-rtve-cierra-cuentas-2011-defi cit-29-millones-euros-20120724175227.
html (accessed 13 August 2012).
91. Some fi gures remain hidden in legal orders accessible by the CMT website’s search engine. As for the 2009 consolidated fi gures, they were pub-
lished in a CMT blog entry dating from March 2011. See http://blogcmt.com/2011/03/18/fi nanciacion-de-rtve-cuantias-defi nitivas-que-de-
ben-aportar-las-tv-en-2009 (accessed 13 August 2012).
92. CMT, “Memoria anual de actividades 2011” (2011 yearly activity statement), p. 7, at http://informecmt.cmt.es (accessed 13 August 2012).
93. Rtve.es, “El Consejo de ministro aprueba una rebaja de 200 millones en el presupuesto de RTVE” (Council of Ministers approves a reduction 
of €200 million in RTVE’s budget), 30 December 2011, at http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20111230/consejo-ministros-aprueba-rebaja-200-mil-
lones-presupuesto-rtve/486089.shtml (accessed 13 August 2012).
94. Rtve.es, “El presidente de turno de RTVE: los recortes harían peligrar la existencia de Teledeporte y Clan” (RTVE’s interim president: cuts would 
risk the existence of Teledeporte and Clan channels), 29 February 2012, at http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20120229/rtve/502644.shtml (accessed 
13 August 2013).
95. LGCA 2010, Art. 42.
96. Data obtained from a questionnaire sent to RTVE’s Radiocommunications Unit Director, Ignacio Saló. Answers were received on 8 April 2011.
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David Varona, the corporation’s social media and participation manager, believes that audience engagement 
in RTVE web products and services has been able to increase through new web participation strategies. Th is 
is a positive response to a corporate strategic move to add value to broadcast output through the RTVE’s 
enriched online services. Mr Varona states that audience engagement has been especially signifi cant in the 
thematic channels Clan and Teledeporte.97 Even though there are no studies available confi rming an audience 
fl ux from the web to DTT, both Clan and Teledeporte are the thematic channels leading their respective 
audience niches. 
2.2 Public Service Provision
2.2.1 Perception of Public Service Media
Th e public service concept has actually developed thanks to radio and television case law; this has made up 
for the fact it has never been defi ned as such in law.98 Radio and television were labeled an “essential public 
service” under the fi rst democratic statute (1980).99 Some guiding principles were attached to it: respect for 
fundamental civil rights and constitutional principles (the right to privacy, respect for political and social 
pluralism, the protection of children), along with some journalistic normative ideals (“objectivity, veracity 
and impartiality of information”, “the separation of facts and opinions”).100 
In 1988, these principles were applied to the new commercial broadcasters as well,101 but the positive 
obligations for them to deliver specifi c public service content were vague and unmonitored (see section 
2.2.2). A signifi cant change occurred in 2001: the law provided the fi rst defi nition of a “public service 
function” in radio and television services. It emphasized diversity of content (programs and genres) with the 
aim of providing “quality information culture, education and entertainment.” On this occasion, however, 
this function was limited to RTVE.102
In practice, though, principles were not being observed and social discontent followed. In the same year, 2001, 
a campaign in defense of public radio and television was set up (Plataforma en defensa de la radiotelevisión 
pública). At fi rst this was an initiative by RTVE unions, fearing for their jobs in the face of right-wing PP 
rationalization plans to cut the increasing levels of debt. However, it soon turned into a platform representing 
more than 50 civil and media organizations, along with individual media professionals and scholars. 
97. Telephone interview with David Varona, social media manager and journalist at RTVE.es, 20 February 2011.
98. L. Parejo, “Servicios Públicos y servicios de interés general. La renovada actualidad de los primeros” (Public services and general interest services. 
Th e renewed actuality of the former), Revista de Derecho de la Unión Europea, no.7, 2004, pp. 52 and 54.
99. Law 4/1980, Radio and Television Statute, BOE no. 11, 12 January 1980, Art. 1 (hereafter Law 4/1980).
100. Lawy 4/1980, Art. 4.
101. Law 10/1988 on private television, BOE no. 108, 5 May 1988, Art. 3.
102. Law 24/2001 on fi scal, administrative, and social measures, BOE no. 313, 31 December 2001, additional provision 16.2. It amends Law 
4/1980, Art. 5.
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Its goal also expanded: to raise social awareness about the need to defend high-quality and independent public 
service media, be this at state, regional, or local level. A founding manifesto spoke out about what critics and 
scholars had been denouncing since the 1980s and what was already common knowledge in Spanish society: 
that public radio and television “are not characterized by pluralism, veracity and impartiality, nor by their 
independence from the political power.”103 Indeed, in July 2003 the Spanish high court condemned TVE 
for partiality and hiding data favorable to unions in its coverage of the 2002 general strike against the Aznar 
government’s labor reform. A year later, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe mentioned 
this ruling as an example of “manipulation of information under political infl uence” in a recommendation 
supporting public service broadcasting.104
Th is was a turning point that helped to stir the reform process culminating in the RTVE Law 17/2006. Since 
then, the broadcaster’s overall independence from government interference has greatly improved. Th e right-
wing PP was virtually the only party to denounce, in Parliament, the alleged preferential treatment given by 
public broadcasters to the governing PSOE and was demanding the TVE news director’s dismissal until the 
change of government in 2011.105 
Professionals thought otherwise about the political independence of TVE. In a two-year qualitative study 
(2006–2008) examining perceptions on public service principles and performance, TVE daily news 
professionals maintained that government pressure no longer existed.106 But they also acknowledged that 
previous governments’ utilization of the channel for their own ends had seriously damaged the corporation’s 
reputation.107 In fact, TVE audiences did not identify the normative ideals of “veracity” and “impartiality” in 
news programs. Th e authors of this study concluded that the “legacy of biases” was still very present in the 
audience’s discourse, especially among older and the more educated citizens.108 In any case, subsequent public 
statements by professionals’ representatives have emphasized the independence achieved (see section 2.1.3). 
Th is is consistent with results from the CIS special barometer in 2010 (see section 2.1.1). When fi rst asked 
to choose among possible normative elements defi ning a “public service television function,” respondents 
mentioned the provision of good-quality content, impartiality in the news, and cultural output. Faced 
with adjectives defi ning “quality television content,” they put “educational” in the fi rst place, followed by 
“entertaining,” and in the third place, with similar percentages, “innovative” and “impartiality in news.” 
“Diverse programming” was only mentioned in fourth place. Finally, when asked to assess actual performance 
103. Manifi esto en defensa de la radiotelevisión pública (Manifesto in support of public radio and television), in Comunicar 18 ( 2001), pp. 194–196.
104. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1641 (2004)1 on Public Service Broadcasting, at http://assembly.coe.int//
Mainf.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA04/EREC1641.htm (accessed 13 August 2012).
105. As an example, see Commission for Parliamentary Control of RTVE and Subsidiaries, session 24, Record of parliamentary proceedings no. 157, 
24 November 2010, at http://www.congreso.es/public_ofi ciales/L9/CORT/DS/CM/CM_157.PDF (accessed 10 December 2010).
106. Retis, Graván, García Matilla, Los informativos en BBC y RTVE, p. 117.
107. Retis, Graván, García Matilla, Los informativos en BBC y RTVE, p. 78.
108. Retis, Graván, García Matilla, Los informativos en BBC y RTVE, p. 208.
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of channels in these categories, La 1 ranked fi rst in impartiality, diversity, and social commitment. In 
education, it followed La 2. Both, though, failed in innovation and entertainment.109 
Finally, the economic crisis and recent government decrees (see section 2.1.3) have put the gains in audience 
engagement and independence at risk. As of November 2012, La 1’s daily news programs remain the most 
viewed since September 2007, but the channel’s audience leadership achieved in 2009 (see Figure 6) was lost 
in March 2012; it has ranked third since June 2012.110 
Professional journalist organizations from Spain and abroad have criticized the changes mainly on grounds 
of independence. Th is is the case of Reporters Without Borders (Reporteros sin Fronteras) and the Spanish 
Federation of Journalists’ Unions (Federación Española de Sindicatos de Periodistas, FeSP). Others, such as the 
Spanish Federation of Journalist Associations (Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas de España, FAPE), are 
mostly worried about job losses and public service media viability.
PSOE has appealed against the April 2012 decree (amending the legal provisions on board composition and 
appointment procedures) to the Constitutional Court, the highest in Spain. Th e party’s arguments are that 
there is no justifi cation for the urgency in the legal reform, nor does the economic crisis and the need to cut 
public expenditure account for the elimination of the board members proposed by the unions. Th e Court 
accepted the appeal in July.111
In the Spanish press the treatment of these events varies according to each paper’s ideological allegiances. Th e 
right-wing broadsheets tend to present the news on dismissals and new appointments as neutral data and to 
leave interpretations for editorials, mostly favorable on account of the technical profi les of new managers.112 
Outlets belonging to the center-left group PRISA talk about “involution”113 or a “total takeover” by the 
Government.114
Th is issue has also won the attention of the foreign press. News stories and comments by foreign correspondents 
spread after the dismissal of a high-profi le TV presenter on 3 August 2012. Most of these stories and comments 
described the issue in sensational terms, such as a “purge of those against austerity measures” (Th e Guardian), 
or “government putsch” (Libération).115
109. CIS, “Barómetro de Mayo,” 2010, pp. 11–14.
110. Data from Barlovento Comunicación based on Kantar media. Available at: http://www.barloventocomunicacion.es/images/publicaciones/
NOTA_NOVIEMBRE_2012_BARLOVENTO_COMUNICACION__AUDIENCIAS.pdf (accessed 2 November 2012).
111. Elpais.com, “El Constitucional examinará el nuevo modelo de RTVE” (Th e Constitutional Court will examine the new RTVE model), 5 July 
2012, at http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/07/05/actualidad/1341488293_014078.html (accessed 13 August 2012).
112. See, e.g., La Razón, “El PP elige a un técnico para reestructurar RTVE” (PP chooses a technician to restructure RTVE) and “RTVE, tiempo de 
austeridad” (RTVE, austerity times), p. 18, and editorial, 5 June 2012.
113. Cadenaser.com, “La involución de RTVE” (RTVE’s involution), 6 August 2012, at http://www.cadenaser.com/sociedad/articulo/involucion-
rtve/csrcsrpor/20120806csrcsrsoc_4/Tes (accessed 13 August 2012).
114. Elpais.com, “El gobierno toma el control total de RTVE” (Th e government takes overall control of RTVE), 4 June 2012, at http://sociedad.
elpais.com/sociedad/2012/06/04/actualidad/1338803115_534063.html (accessed 13 August 2012).
115. Along with the online versions of Th e Guardian and Libération, Le Monde also published a news story on the topic, all from 5 to 9 August 
2012. Foreign correspondents from the UK, France, and Germany media have also expressed their personal criticism. A compilation is found in 
Radiocable.com and at http://www.radiocable.com/burridge-pastor-tve-bbc372.html (accessed 10 August 2012).
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Individual members of the public have expressed themselves in diff erent ways: a signature collection campaign 
against the legal reform has been promoted in the activist website Change.org.116 Protest letters to the editor 
have multiplied in the center-left-wing press (e.g., El País). Audiences of specifi c programs have massively 
expressed their outrage through comments in the program’s own phone-in sections or social media channels, 
as with RNE’s breakfast magazine “En días como hoy” (A Day like Today). 
As to organized civil society initiatives, along with the revived Teledetodos campaign in defence of public 
broadcasting,117 media users’ groups such as the Users’ Communication Association (Asociación de Usuarios 
de la Comunicación) or the Federation of Associations of Media Consumers and Users (Federación de 
Asociaciones de Consumidores y Usuarios de los Medios, ICMedia) have protested, as well as some media 
scholars’ organizations like the Latin Union of Political Economy of Information, Communication, and 
Culture (Unión Latina de Economía Política de la Información, la Comunicación y la Cultura, ULEPICC). But 
there has been no substantial mobilization of public protest to date. 
In-house, RTVE staff  have expressed themselves in nuanced and sometimes confusing ways. RNE and TVE 
News councils organized votes on the eligibility of their respective newly appointed news directors in July 
2012, but only 30 percent of staff  participated: a very high abstention rate, hardly highlighted by the press. 
More recently, in November 2012, staff  denounced intimidation by management after some journalists 
refused to sign certain news reports, on the grounds that the editorial line had been imposed against their 
professional principles. Th ey claimed that, by refusing, they were exercising their right to “freedom of 
conscience”, which is protected under Spanish law.118
In private, individual RTVE workers express perplexity, anxiety, and exhaustion. Some feel uneasy with the 
interpretation of the replacements as merely an ideological “purge” by the PP. Th ey emphasize that personal, 
clientelist interests are also involved in the dismissals. 
But all the RTVE staff  members consulted by the authors of this report deplore the impolite manners used in 
sacking the TVE production staff —described by one press commentator as “a Tony Soprano-like approach 
to human resources”119—and especially regret the lack of a successful, long-term, in-house production and 
scheduling strategy. 
116. Th e initiative was submitted on 26 April 2012 by Alberto Estévez in favor of RTVE’s independence, at http://www.change.org/es/peticiones/
por-la-independencia-de-rtve-no-al-control-pol%C3%ADtico-del-gobierno-rtvedetodos (accessed 13 August 2012).
117. See http://teledetodos.com (accessed 13 August 2012).
118. See the press release by TVE’s News Council, Grave ataque a la libertad de información (Serious attack on freedom of information), 23 Novem-
ber 2012, at http://www.consejoinformativostve.es/comunicados/comunicados/75-grave-ataque-a-la-libertad-de-informacion.html (accessed 27 
November 2012).
119. Th e Guardian, “Spain’s cowardly purge of the journalists who ask diffi  cult questions,” 7 August 2012, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commen-
tisfree/2012/aug/07/spain-purge-journalists-government-votes?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+-
theguardian%2Fmedia%2Frss+%28Media%29&utm_content=Google+Reader (accessed 13 August 2012).
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A fi nal word must be said here about public regional broadcasters. Since their emergence in two waves (fi rst 
in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly in those regions considered as “historic nations”, and then in the 2000s), 
they have been accused of fl agrant partisanship in favor of the Autonomous Communities’ governments. 
Th ey have also been criticized for wasting public funds. Th e Spanish commercial broadcasters are pushing 
to transform them into only one regional operator while the regional public service broadcasters themselves 
argue for the real implementation of the original model but with increased effi  ciency.120 Finally, the new 
right-wing government has decided to modify the existing law (LGCA 2010) in order to allow for their 
privatization from 2012 onwards.121 
Parallel with central government action at state-wide level, the Autonomous Communities’ governments 
(Murcia, Catalonia, Valencia, Madrid, and others) have undertaken audiovisual law reforms and are 
considering or already implementing massive redundancy plans. Th is was the case in the Catalan and the 
Valencian regions, which are under conservative governments, as of the fi rst quarter of 2012.122 Arguing 
that the public debt and expenditure must be slashed, the management changes match those of the central 
government: the number of board members has been reduced and their appointment procedure simplifi ed 
in order to avoid the need to reach a broad majority. As to redundancy plans, workers have also issued 
manifestos and set up platforms in defense of public service media. Th ese organizations have also sprung up 
elsewhere, as in Madrid and Galicia.123 Th eir key argument is that public services may not be ineffi  cient per 
se, but those who manage and audit their resources often are.
Th e Valencian broadcaster’s (Radiotelevisió Valenciana, RTVV) redundancy plan, which caught the attention 
of the foreign press,124 is especially relevant for its sheer scale. By July 2012, RTVV’s debt stood at nearly 
€1,300 million: close to one million for each of its 1,695 staff . 
120. Th e association of Spanish commercial televisions, the Association of Commercial Television Broadcasters (Unión de Televisiones Comerciales 
Asociadas,UTECA), commissions year-on-year reports on the budgets of these public broadcasters, and FORTA has recently countered criticism 
with their own commissioned study. See Deloitte and UTECA, “Análisis comparativo de la television regional en Europa: estudio de los modelos 
de televisión pública en Europa” (Comparative analysis of regional television in Europe: study of public television models in Europe), September 
2011, at www.uteca.com/uteca_contenidos/.../UTECA-240920111311.pdf. See also Accenture and FORTA, “Informe sobre el papel de la 
televisión pública en España” (Report on the role of regional public television in Spain), 2012, at http://www.forta.es/Portals/0/Forta1200.pdf 
(accessed 13 August 2012).
121. Europapress.es, “Congreso aprobará la ley que permite privatizar televisions autonómicas” (Congress passes law allowing privatization of au-
tonomous televisions), 23 July 2012, at http://www.europapress.es/castilla-lamancha/noticia-congreso-aprobara-defi nitivamente-martes-ley-
permite-privatizacion-televisiones-autonomicas-20120723173815.html (accessed 13 August 2012); El País, “El Ejecutivo aprueba una ley para 
privatizar las televisiones autonómicas” (Government passes a law to privatize regional television), 20 April 2012, at http://politica.elpais.com/
politica/2012/04/20/actualidad/1334907236_485283.html (accessed 15 May 2012).
122. Th ese laws are: Laws 2/2012 on the modifi cation of several audiovisual laws, Diari Ofi cial de la Generalitat de Catalunya (DOGC) no. 6075, 27 
February 2012; and Laws 3/2012, on the Valencian Radio and Television Corporation Statute, BOE no. 188, 7 August 2012.
123. Th ese platforms are actively blogging and using social media. See http://tv3teva.cat, http://siartvv.wordpress.com, http://www.salvemostelema-
drid.es, and http://agalegapublica.blogspot.com.es (accessed 13 August 2012)
124. See Lemonde.fr, “Les salariés de la television valencienne confi squent l’antenne” (Employees of Valencia TV seize the broadcasting), 17 July 
2012, at http://espagne.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/07/17/les-salaries-de-la-television-valencienne-confi squent-lantenne (accessed 30th August 
2012). According to UGT, the Japanese daily Mainichi was to devote a report on RTVV’s redundancy plan. See http://www.ugtrtvv.net/cms/in-
dex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=197:120808entrevistajapones&catid=39:que-diem-nosaltres&Itemid=48 (accessed 24 August 
2012).
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Under this unsustainable burden, RTVV’s management approved a harsh and unprecedented redundancy 
plan, dismissing three in four employees. RTVV’s board approved the plan hastily in August, after abortive 
negotiation with unions—the only parties to the dispute which made statements to the media.125 Most of the 
board members—who are proposed by the regional parliament in proportion to party representation—are 
PP-related, or simply former PP politicians. Two former general directors are currently accused of serious 
off enses: the sexual harassment of female workers, and the diversion of public funds.126 
Th e debt had grown by 4,000 percent since 1995, with payroll costs rising at the same rate that in-house 
production fell. Public auditors have faulted the infl ated expense of contracting out drama and entertainment, 
but also documentaries, along with the renewal of contracts for programs with very small audiences. Th e 
increase in sports broadcast rights purchases was also singled out for criticism. 
Th e unions announced in September that they would sue RTVV over the plan. At the time of writing, 
however, it looks quite possible that a history of blatant manipulation of news (in favor of the regional ruling 
party), public indiff erence, and the critical economic situation may combine to make RTVV disappear as a 
state-owned public service broadcaster.127
2.2.2 Public Service Provision in Commercial Media
Apart from the respect for fundamental rights mentioned above, no specifi c public service obligations as such 
have ever been imposed on the commercial media. Moreover, with the new LGCA 2010 in place, the 1980s 
legal concept of “essential public service” in television and radio services has been circumscribed to apply only 
to state-owned broadcasting. From now on, “audiovisual communication services” are considered as “general 
interest” services, and, as such, are entitled to some fundamental freedoms, namely the freedom of expression, 
the right to communicate and receive information, the right to participate in political and social life, and the 
freedom of enterprise. Th e only obligation placed on commercial broadcasters is the “promotion of equality, 
plurality and democratic values.” 128
In the previous consultation process, some organizations and state authorities, such as the CMT and the 
consultative Council of State, applauded this change on the grounds of platform convergence and the 
abundance of supply brought about by digitization.129
125. Other broadcasters—such as Telemadrid, in another region governed by the conservative PP—are following the example set by RTVV. See 
Elconfi dencial.com, “Telemadrid arranca el proceso para un ERE que afectará a ‘entre 700 y 800 trabajadores’” (Telemadrid starts a process foro 
a redundancy plan aff ecting “between 700 and 800 workers), at http://www.elconfi dencial.com/comunicacion/2012/08/24/telemadrid-arranca-
el-proceso-para-un-ere-que-afectara-a-entre-700-y-800-trabajadores-104203/ (accessed 24 August 2012).
126. Th e Guardian, “Spanish opposition party rocked by corruption scandal”, 6 March 2009. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/
mar/06/spain-opposition-corruption-scandal (accessed 13 August 2012).
127. An article by RTVV journalist Julià Àlvaro critically analyses the responsibilities for the company’s failure, including not only the regional 
government and RTVV management, but also the opposition, RTVV staff  and audience. See Elpais.com, “Epílogo” (Epilogue), 9 June 2012. At 
http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2012/06/09/valencia/1339260364_823479.html (accessed 13 August 2012).
128. LGCA 2010, Art. 22.
129. See CMT Report, MTZ 2009/1039, 16 July 2009, p. 5; Council of State Report no. 1387/2009, 17 September 2009.
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Civic organisations and professional unions were not able to organize a unifi ed defence of public service 
obligations. Th e Users’ Communication Association (Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación, AUC), 
representing more than 10,000 users and the only civil society organization listened to by the Government, 
was concerned with advertising limits and the protection of children from harmful content. Th is is consistent 
with the priorities listed by the AUC’s president, Alejandro Perales: the “maintenance and strengthening of 
public service” comes only after the enforcement of advertising regulation, protection of children, privacy, 
and the fi ght against the digital divide. He considers that “those are the topics in which basic aspects of the 
defense of users’ rights are set out.” 130
On the other hand, journalists from FeSP and the ReMC demanded further specifi c public service obligations 
to be placed on the commercial media. Among other things, they proposed a requirement on commercial 
broadcasters to respect political, social, and cultural pluralism in their programming; to promote the diff erent 
cultures and languages in Spain; to avoid subliminal messages and to separate advertising from content. Th ey 
included working conditions and professional demands that have been systematically ignored by Parliament: 
the compulsory existence of a union collective agreement and a self-regulatory journalistic statute.131 All these 
amendments were proposed by left-wing opposition groups in the Chamber of Deputies, but were rejected 
in the parliamentary debate.
2.3 Assessments 
Th e digitization of terrestrial television started in Spain at the end of the 1990s, but RTVE never drove the 
process. Two factors, local and global, have contributed to hindering RTVE’s leading role: the complex RTVE 
legal reform aimed at solving its in-house fi nancial, organizational, and professional credibility problems; and 
the enduring economic crisis.
However, after 2004 there was a political commitment to give a special position to RTVE in the DTT 
scenario: it was identifi ed by law as the motor force of DTT roll-out and, as such, given the special duty 
of innovation in platforms and content. Consistently, two out of eight multiplexes were allocated to the 
Spanish public broadcaster. And, after the professionalization of its management, its Web 2.0 and social 
media strategies have borne fruit in terms of audience consumption and engagement. 
But there remain some black holes in fi nancing and management. Th e loss of advertising revenue since 
2010, under the terms of the Financing Law (2009), has made RTVE vulnerable compared with commercial 
broadcasters, because of the contestation and legal uncertainty of levies on telecoms in the EU. Th ere is no 
license fee, and its introduction would be very unpopular in the midst of the economic crisis. Most experts 
dismiss this option in the short run and propose alternatives such as sponsorship, which has so far been 
applied only timidly and for specifi c minority programs.
130. Responses to a questionnaire sent to the AUC’s president, Alejandro Perales, received 20 December 2010.
131. See amendments at http://www.fesp.org/docs/LeyAV_EnmiendasFeSP.pdf (accessed 26 January 2010).
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Th e debt crisis in the Eurozone and the ensuing austerity measures prioritizing the payment of government 
debt and defi cit reduction are putting even more pressure on RTVE.Th is is part of a wider trend also aff ecting 
the state-owned EFE news agency and public regional broadcasters.
Along with the unstable funding regime, more precariousness has been introduced by legal changes to the 
governance of public service broadcasters. For RTVE, in the course of only seven months (from the end of 
December 2011 to the beginning of August 2012), the new PP government diluted a far-reaching governance 
and fi nancial reform program that was established by the previous government after a two-year consultation 
with media experts. Th e audience leadership of RTVE was lost in the fi rst quarter of 2012 and the situation 
threatens a return to a pre-digitization scenario where Spain’s main public service broadcaster was singled 
out by the Council of Europe as an epitome of political interference. Regionally, after the accelerated reform 
of a 30-year-old framework and under pressure from commercial operators, there is now the possibility for 
regional governments to privatize public broadcasters. 
All these media policy choices have prompted questions over the legitimacy of public service broadcasting 
itself, a topic which is highly contested along political lines.
For the moment, the current legal framework has limited the public service mission to the state-owned 
media, on the grounds of digitization. Here, legislators, competition authorities, and some law scholars 
appear to regard this as suffi  cient: the general protection of fundamental rights is seen as already imposing 
content restrictions on commercial broadcasters.132 On the contrary, critical media scholars and left-wing 
parties alike oppose the legal change and have denounced the reform process as opaque, undemocratic, 
and dictated by the Association of Commercial Television Broadcasters (Unión de Televisiones Comerciales 
Asociadas, UTECA)—an undue infl uence that UTECA publicly denies.
To sum up: the Spanish public service media landscape combines a de facto shrinking public service mission 
with recent partisan behavior in state-owned public service management and a huge funding crisis. RTVE 
has recently lost some of the big advances in economic sustainability, professional independence, and good 
governance that it made from 2004 to 2010.
132. S. de la Sierra, E. Guichot, M. Mantini, S. Medina, and I. Sobrino, “Media policies and regulatory practices in a selected set of European coun-
tries, the EU and the Council of Europe: Th e case of Spain,” in European Commission, Mediadem, “Background Information Report,” October 
2010, pp. 378–411, at http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/BIR-fi nal.pdf (accessed 24 November 2010).
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3. Digital Media and Society
3.1 User-Generated Content (UGC)
3.1.1 UGC Overview
According to statistics supplied by Alexa, Comscore, and Google Adplanner, the most popular websites by 
number of unique visitors in Spain are Google, Microsoft, and Facebook (see Table 8).
Table 8.
Most popular websites by number of unique visitors, 2011
Alexa Comscore Google Adplanner
1 Google Microsoft sites Facebook
2 Facebook Google Windows Live
3 YouTube Facebook Blogspot
4 Windows live Terra—Telefónica MSN
5 Blogger.com Yahoo! Yahoo!
6 Yahoo! Grupo PRISA Wikipedia
7 Wikipedia Wikipedia Tuenti
8 Marca Vocento Marca
9 Twitter RSC Media Group Microsoft
10 MSN Orange El País.com
Sources: Alexa.com;133 Comscore.com;134 Google Adplanner135
Th e three sources identify the most visited sites, although their results are not comparable due to their 
diff erent methodologies. Alexa and Google Adplanner quantify visitors per web page. Th is is why Microsoft 
has two sites among the top 10: the e-mail, online messaging, and fi le-sharing site, Windows Live, and the 
133. See http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/ES (accessed 28 February 2011). 
134. Th e Comscore 2010 Europe Digital Year in Review, February 2011, p. 32 (hereafter Comscore 2010 Digital Year).
135. It should be noted that this internet media planning system does not measure Google sites.
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search and news portal, MSN. Comscore aggregates visitors from all pages and sites by company, which 
makes Microsoft’s sites rank fi rst and permits entrants from the media sector, such as the PRISA and Vocento 
groups. Had unique users from each of their media been taken into account, neither of these two groups 
would be among the top 10. Indeed, Alexa’s and Google’s lists show that the fi rst digital media outlet, Marca.
com, belonging to another media group, Unidad Editorial, ranks eighth. 
If we consider as UGC the contribution of public, free, and original content by web users, 60 percent 
of Alexa’s top 10 sites contain this type of content, although just one of them is a media outlet, which is 
a general-interest outlet, the sports news daily Marca. A similar situation could be found in the Google 
Adplanner classifi cation.
Facebook is the leading UGC website and YouTube ranks second, according to Alexa statistics. Josep 
Martínez Piñero, an expert in education and information and communication technology (ICT), states that 
this trend “is unstoppable, Spanish adolescents do not want to read or learn through interactions, they prefer 
a video clip and their main source of information is YouTube.”136 We may well be living the “Justin Bieber” 
eff ect (named after the 17-year-old Canadian singer discovered on YouTube) as defi ned by the analyst Jesús 
Encinar: “a perfect example of how the relation between UGC and the production [of the content] industry 
works. Th e challenge […] is not downloads but the free content avalanche.”137
YouTube is followed by a diverse range of sites, such as Blogger.com, which hosts blogs on many diff erent topics 
such as politics, social action, cooking, and travelling. Wikipedia ranks seventh in the Alexa list, followed by 
the only news media outlet, the sports news daily Marca. Here, UGC is limited to introducing comments on 
the news and live matches, participating in some of the forum discussions with sports celebrities, and playing 
a news game based on the competitions’ results. Twitter is in ninth place, a social network that has not only 
become a reference point in interpersonal communication among interest groups, but is also seen by some 
analysts as the future platform for online journalism.138
As described above, UGC is present in six out of the 10 most visited sites, but contents are diverse and 
encompass all types: video, photo, text, and comments. As for the quality of these contents, on most sites 
there is a need to control this kind of contribution: fi rst, to regulate the users’ behavior; second, to guarantee 
that UGC meets minimum standards and is not damaging the web’s reputation. According to Elvira García 
de Torres, a professor of communication and information of the Universidad CEU Cardenal Herrera, 
“beyond confi rming the presence of UGC, researchers begin now the diffi  cult but needed path towards the 
understanding of what future journalism will be like: assessing UGC’s quality.”139  
136. Interview with Josep Martínez Piñero, teaching trainer at the Catalan’s government’s Department of Education, Barcelona, 28 March 2011.
137. See http://www.jesusencinar.com/2011/02/en-el-contenido-generado-por-el-usuario-es-donde-nacen-los-exitos-profesionales.html (accessed 5 
March 2011).
138. N. Presas and Vicent Partal, “Twitter és l’única xarxa social que canviarà la manera de fer periodisme” (Twitter is the only social network that 
will change the way of doing journalism), Comunicació 21, 29 November 2010, at http://comunicacio21.cat/2010/11/vicent-partal-“twitter-es-
l’unica-xarxa-social-que-canviara-la-manera-de-fer-periodisme”/ (accessed 3 March 2011).
139. E. García de Torres, “Contenido generado por el usuario: aproximación al estado de la cuestión” (User-generated content: approaches to the 
framework), El profesional de la información 19(6) (November–December 2010), pp. 585–594. 
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3.1.2 Social Networks
As can be seen from Table 8, the three most infl uential social networks in Spain are international, although 
the fourth one is of Spanish origin and is more signifi cant in some areas, such as Andalusia. Other social 
networks such as MySpace or Vimeo rank below 86. According to the Comscore survey,140 social networking 
has grown 11.3 percent year on year. Facebook is the most popular networking site, with growth of more 
than 18 percent per year and outperforming Tuenti from 2009 onwards. News consumption through Twitter 
has grown, fi rst as a result of events such as Barcelona’s historic snowfall in March 2010, extensively followed 
through the hashtag #neucat,141 then because of being able to access information on the city’s suburban 
railroad transport that can be followed through #rod1, #rod2,142 as well as anything related to the democratic 
regeneration movement, 15-M, developed in Madrid and Barcelona’s main square (and other cities) in May 
2011. 
Table 9.
Most popular social networks, 2011
Alexa Google Adplanner Million users according to Google 
Adplanner January 2011
1 Facebook Facebook 21
2 YouTube Tuenti 9
3 Twitter Twitter 4.1
4 Tuenti LinkedIn 2.3
5 LinkedIn Taringa 2.2
6 Flickr Flickr 1.5
Sources: Alexa.com; GoogleAdplanner143
3.1.3 News in Social Media
With regard to news consumption and its relation to social media, Meneame.net144 is a good example of a 
Spanish bookmarking site where users can share the most relevant news references on the web and move them 
so that other users can also read and give them prominence. Th is site ranks 43 in Alexa’s list.
As for the degree of novelty of the news in social media, a study by Appletree Communications of Twitter 
(March 2012) stresses that 86 percent of trending topics in Spain “are mere repetitions of news stories 
coming from the legacy media.”145 Among the most important topics analyzed during 2011 there were 
140. Comscore 2010 Digital Year, p. 7.
141. See http://twitter.com/23neucat (accessed 3 March 2011). 
142. See http://rodalia.info/ca/l/rod1; http://twitter.com/rodalia4 (accessed 3 March 2011).
143. See http:// www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/es (accessed 28 February 2011). 
144. See http://www.meneame.net (accessed 3 March 2011).
145. AppleTreeCommunications, Twitterscopio #03, at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/2242091/appletree_Twitteroscopio03.pdf (accessed 1 April 2012).
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mainly political and economic stories, along with sport and social news which derived from traditional media 
sources. Th is suggests that the news consumed through social media and blogs depends overwhelmingly on 
these sources whose content is often embedded or linked to by social media users.146 
Finally, the rankings of Spanish blog sites suggest that they mostly focus on technology interests rather than 
news about politics or current aff airs (see Table 10). 
Table 10. 
Blogs ranked by popularity, July 2012
Rank* Blog Subject ’000 users per month in Spain 
according to Google AdPlanner**
1 ALT1040 Technology 240
2 FayerWayer Technology 150
3 Escolar.net Politics 180
4 El Comidista Gastronomy n/a
5 Applesfera Technology 430
6 Amazings.es Science 77
7 Genbeta Technology 430
8 El Blog Salmon Economy 290
9 Microsiervos Technology 320
10 Xataka Technology 760
11 Gizmodo Technology 48
12 Yorokobu Arts and Culture 120
13 Engadget Technology 260
14 Apple Weblog Technology 180
15 Cooking Ideas Technology 85
16 ReadWriteWeb España Technology 140
17 El blog de Enrique Dans Technology 100
18 Bitelia Technology 120
19 WWWhat’s Technology 380
20 Xataka Foto Technology 160
Note: n/a: not available
Sources: * Ebuzzing. http://labs.ebuzzing.es/top-blogs; **Google AdPlanner (accessed 10 July 2012)
146. See http://bitacoras.com/informe#medios-enlazados (accessed 3 April 2012).
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3.2 Digital Activism
3.2.1 Digital Platforms and Civil Society Activism
Digital platforms are a good way for all those groups that have traditionally lacked a platform in traditional 
media to get their voice heard. Th ree categories can be singled out: those groups defi ning themselves as “anti-
establishment,” the groups fi ghting “the establishment” from inside, and individuals organizing for specifi c 
causes.
Th e anarchists and anticapitalists organized loosely in the anti-establishment group call intermittently for 
protests around, for instance, an international summit. Among those with a longer online tradition, the 
Spanish Indymedia,147 Kaosenlared,148 Alerta Solidaria,149 and Nodo 50150 stand out. All these portals bring 
together radical social protest, publicity for counter-information activities, and calls for civil disobedience.
Following the riots in Barcelona in October 2010, stirred by young anti-establishment protesters, the city 
authorities proposed to shut down websites encouraging violence on occasions such as police eviction 
of squatters or universities’ adaptation to the new European Higher Education System.151 Th e groups 
responsible for these online organizations argued that each page or blog “is an intermediary and everything 
that is uploaded is the author’s responsibility.”152 Sites warn that, even though there is no censorship before 
information is posted, they delete illegal or off ensive content if someone demands it.
Th e groups working inside the system and using the web to disseminate their proposals and actions for social 
change include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), users’ and consumers’ associations, and citizens’ 
platforms. Th ese resort to the web’s viral capability to mobilize the civil population, with results that seem to 
have sometimes infl uenced political decisions. 
147. See http://madrid.indymedia.org/; http://barcelona.indymedia.org (accessed 3 March 2011).
148. See http://www.kaosenlared.org (accessed 3 March 2011).
149. See http://www.lahaine.org (accessed 3 March 2011).
150. See http://www.nodo50.org/ (accessed 3 March 2011). 
151. J. García, “¿Expulsar a los antisistema de Internet?” (Expel the anti-internet?), El País, 5 October 2010, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/
cataluna/Expulsar/antisistema/Internet/elpepuespcat/20101005elpcat_3/Tes (accessed 7 March 2011).
152. J. García, “Internet, motor de los antisistema” (Internet, the anti-system engine), El País, 7 October 2010, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/
cataluna/Internet/motor/antisistema/elpepiespcat/20101007elpcat_8/Tes (accessed 7 March 2011).
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Sinde Law
An example of political change initiated by internet action was the protest against the so-called Sinde 
Law, a section of the Sustainable Economy Law. This law intended to prosecute illegal downloading, 
streaming, and sharing of licensed content. The U.S. government put huge pressure on the Spanish 
Government to get the law passed, according to diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks.153
The associations in favor of a free fl ow of internet information called for a protest in the form of the 
closure of all websites on 20 December 2010. The following day, the parliamentary commission in 
charge of the approval of the law rejected the shutting down of websites without the intervention of 
a judge.154
The internet users’ associations, the association of small and medium-sized enterprises, and up to 
20 more groups submitted an alternative proposal to the Senate Chamber. Among the proposed 
changes was the mandatory intervention of a judge to shut down websites, which was included in the 
fi nal text, but this was to be only used as a last legal resort.155 In the end, the controversial Sustainable 
Economy Law was passed in the Chamber of Deputies on 15 February 2011 with a 92 percent vote in 
favor, and published in the offi cial gazette (BOE) on 5 March 2011. It gives a government committee 
the power to blacklist internet sites traffi cking in copyrighted fi les. However, a new regulation for that 
committee had to be drawn up in order to apply the new law, and again the level of digital activism 
was suffi cient to hold up its approval until the new liberal government took offi ce at the end of 
December 2011. The former Spanish president, Rodríguez Zapatero, has acknowledged that internet 
activism and internal cabinet differences were key to holding up the approval of this regulation.156
A more recent example was the protest against the decision of the RTVE board to have access to the computer 
systems with information on editorial newscast decision-making in September 2011. Th e uproar in the 
social media, especially Twitter, was important for quickly reversing this decision in a new vote just two days 
later. However, it has to be said that traditional political and social reactions also played a signifi cant role in 
changing the board’s initial position. 
Th ere are some exceptional cases in which the web works as a citizen’s platform for independent individuals. An 
example is the Facebook page “Contra el residuazo del Ayuntamiento de Barcelona”157 (“Against Barcelona’s 
local government big waste tax”) created by a member of the public.158 Th e municipality announced that it 
153. N. Anderson, “How the U.S. Pressured Spain to adopt unpopular Web blocking law,” Ars Technica, 6 January 2012, at http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/news/2012/01/how-the-us-convinced-spain-to-adopt-internet-censorship.ars (accessed 8 January 2012).
154. See http://www.red-sostenible.net (accessed 7 March 2011).
155. See http://aui.es/index.php?body=dest_v1article&id_article=3371 (accessed 7 March 2011).
156. El País, “La presión en la red contribuyó a tumbar la ley Sinde” (Internet pressure helped to overturn the Sinde law), 12 December 2011, at 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/cultura/presion/Red/contribuyo/tumbar/ley/Sinde/elpepucul/20111212elpepucul_2/Tes (accessed 26 Decem-
ber 2011).
157. See http://www.facebook.com/pages/Contra-el-residuazo-del-Ayuntamiento-de-Barcelona/104562959618146 (accessed 7 March 2011).
158. See http://www.establedentrodelagravedad.com/2011/01/20/el-ayuntamiento-de-barcelona-remata-a-los-pequenos-autonomos-cobrando-por-
residuos-fi cticios (accessed 7 March 2011).
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would levy a tax on the self-employed working at home for the collection of industrial wastes. An individual 
citizen tried to mobilize the self-employed to lodge an appeal against the municipality and reach the media. 
As a result of the media scandal, the local government modifi ed the tax.
Another case of citizen activism fostered by digital media is provided by Pablo Herreros, who blogs at 
Comunicacionsellamaeljuego.com. A specialist in media aff airs, Herreros started a campaign on digital media 
in late 2011 to boycott a very popular late night entertainment program, “La Noria” (Ferris Wheel), on 
Telecinco. Th is program had paid €10,000 to interview the mother of a boy charged with murder. It was the 
last straw for a program with a history of dubious practices. Th e boycott called on “La Noria” advertisers to 
stop running their ads in this program. Th e response on the net was huge, more than 50 brands withdrew 
their commercials from “La Noria”, and Telecinco changed the program’s name to “El Gran Debate” (Th e 
Great Debate), and altered the concept to favor more social and political issues. 
Th e case resurfaced in November 2012, when Telecinco took legal action against Herreros, demanding 
damages of €3.6 million to off set the losses incurred by the boycott. A digital initiative (based on Change.
org) collected 169,000 signatures in 10 days, in support of Herreros. Telecinco withdrew its claim under this 
pressure, and in exchange for a joint declaration by Telecinco and Herreros which recognized that advertisers 
cannot be held accountable for messages by media companies.159
3.2.2 The Importance of Digital Mobilizations
Digital activist groups who challenged the Sinde Law were part of the origin of the democratic regeneration 
social movement, 15-M, developed in the main squares of Madrid, Barcelona and other Spanish cities in 
May 2011. Its objective was to rethink and reform parliamentary democracy and capitalism, and it attracted 
huge media attention during spring and summer 2011. Th e movement reached such an unprecedented size 
in Spain that all public authorities have been surprised and unable to react to the problem and neutralize its 
impact. However, as the movement is leaderless (because it supports direct democracy as a way to regenerate 
the political system), its impact on parliamentary democracy has been limited, even if some left-oriented 
parties have adopted some of the movement’s proposals.
According to Ismael Peña of the Open University of Catalonia, “With no social media, the 15-M movement 
would not have appeared.”160 Th e ground for the emergence of the movement was prepared during several 
months of social media hostility to the Sinde Law. Its origin can also be traced in some alternative websites 
and blogs opposing the hegemonic political discourse, although with no specifi c party allegiance. It is in those 
social media that the main ideas and arguments were born which would later gather together in the broad-
based movement.161 Th eir means of communication are Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. With these social 
media they disseminate manifestos and call for public demonstrations, of which the most successful were held 
159. See http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/11/27/comunicacion/1354041442.html.
160. See http://www.noticiasdenavarra.com/2011/06/01/sociedad/navarra/el-15-m-nacio-y-se-desarrollo-en-las-redes-sociales (accessed 2 April 2012).
161. See http://www.adslzone.net/article6045-las-redes-sociales-impulsan-el-movimiento-15-m-contra-la-clase-politica.html, and http://storify.
com/pablobuentes/que-es-y-como-se-gesto-el-movimiento-15m (accessed 2 April 2012).
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simultaneously in the main Spanish capital cities on 15 May 2011. Later on, street camps and assemblies were 
formed in the most important Spanish squares to sustain and prolong the mobilization.
Two days after the 15 May demonstration, the Facebook page of “Democracia Real Ya” had 46,000 friends. 
By 20 May, it had amassed 180,000. Th e movement also projected its infl uence beyond the Spanish borders, 
and it received international support with the setting up of hundreds of sites abroad: Sydney, London, 
Brussels, Hamburg, Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City.162
Not all popular mobilizations emerging in the social media are successful. Th e dissemination of some very 
cruel images on the death of a puppy, which is known as the Schnauzi case, brought about the campaign “No 
al maltrato animal” (Say no to animal mistreatment). Th e group called for public protests on 20 March 2012 
with strong support from affi  liated groups and associations online suggested. In the event, however, turnout 
was not as signifi cant as was expected.163
3.3 Assessments
It is clear that in Spain there is original, public, and free UGC, and that this content has both a social and 
political impact, although it is not always present in the most visited websites. 
Th ere is social activism through democratic and participatory platforms and associations, along with real 
concern among citizens, who are critical of social inequalities and who use digital tools to combat them. But 
not all UGC is of good enough quality in relation to its discursive and technical construction. Nor does it 
always respect democratic legal rules. It is necessary to continue with media literacy programs so that society 
ends up commanding the tools and discourse from a critical perspective, which will result in an enrichment 
of the democratic debate. 
As for user-generated news online, we fi nd there is little good-quality content in blogs or social media. Users 
tend to redistribute the news stories they consume through any online platform. In so doing, they also 
comment and disseminate these pieces on their own platforms, be it a blog or a personal page in a social 
network. Very few news stories are born on the web and gain a country-wide resonance without support from 
the legacy media. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that social media in Spain do have the potential to achieve signifi cant 
mobilization, but that developing this potential will depend on the prior existence of offl  ine reasons for 
mobilization, on simple and visible public appeals, on viral reproduction, and on the amplifi cation of protests 
by legacy media. 
162. See http://blogs.lavanguardia.com/inspiracion-digital/2011/05/20/estudio-el-movimiento-15-m-y-las-redes-sociales-como-caldo-de-cultivo/ 
(accessed 2 April 2012).
163. See http://www.scoobyzamora.org/concentracion.html (accessed 2 April 2012).
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4. Digital Media and Journalism
4.1 Impact on Journalists and Newsrooms
4.1.1 Journalists
During the past few years, diff erences between newsrooms in online-only media and those in the legacy 
media have been reduced to such an extent that they hardly exist. Both use the same production technologies. 
Th ey diff er in the particular content distribution platform through which they get to the end-user via a range 
of reception devices: TV and radio, paper, radio waves, personal computer or mobile handset. 
During this period, newsrooms have been digitized all over the country, not only the large, country-wide 
media, but also local media and production companies.
Th e fi rst moves into digital news were made by the dominant traditional brands. Both in print and 
audiovisual media sectors, the wealthiest companies set up digital newsrooms working alongside traditional 
newsrooms.164 Later on, new digital-only media sprang up, sometimes with support from a powerful media 
group or as an independent enterprise by a group of journalists committed to a free media model.165 Currently, 
both kinds of media exist, and also a new third type, which is digital-only and fi nancially supported by a 
media corporation.166 Th e important point is therefore where digital outlets originate: from a big traditional 
corporation or a new digital company. According to a Spanish government media phone book, there are 
only 23 digital online news sites in Spain: 13 are digital-only enterprises and 10 are supported or owned by 
a traditional media corporation.167 
Each newsroom has followed a diff erent kind of convergence procedure. Big companies and public corporations 
have adopted a diff erentiated model. Th ey have large, distinct newsrooms for each media outlet with no 
contact among them. Th eir output, though, can be shared. Each newsroom has its own special technology, 
164. Th e fi rst two digital newspapers were Barcelona’s dailies Avui and El Periódico, both in 1995.
165. Th e fi rst was Vilaweb in 1995.
166. One example is Lamalla.
167. Presidencia del Gobierno, “Agenda de la Comunicación” (Communication phone book), Gobierno de España, Madrid, 2011, at http://www.
agenciasaeacp.es/publicaciones/docs/AGENDA2011.pdf (accessed 20 April 2011).
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resources, and journalists. One example is the public CCMA, which encompasses diff erent digital media: the 
Catalan Television Company (Televisió de Catalunya), the Catalan Radio Company (Catalunya Ràdio) and 
the news portal 3cat24.ca.168 Each one has its own newsroom and website, but television and radio content 
from the former two is shared and recombined in the latter. So far, 3cat24.cat also produces its own content, 
but on a much smaller scale and only in text form. 
Small online-only news companies use multimedia language, and there is just one newsroom with the same 
journalists and technology for the whole workfl ow. An example is Vilaweb,169 the oldest online-only news 
outlet, which has a small newsroom (only 12 journalists) for its online newspaper and IPTV, using multimedia 
language as a tool.170 
Another diff erence between the digital media from a big or traditional news company and those from digital-
only media is the content that they can aff ord. Th e former have big newsrooms and economic resources 
that enable them to produce their own news. For example, Rtve.es updated news stories about the air traffi  c 
controllers’ strike in December 2010 on a minute-by-minute basis.171 Th e new online-only digital media 
do not have these economic and human resources, so they rely on agencies to produce news. However, 
they can compete on local news and opinions. Th e latter are used to draw audiences’ attention by including 
columnists that follow a particular editorial line and write more freely than in the traditional media. In the 
same air traffi  c controllers’ strike, the online-only news outlet Libertad Digital posted agency information 
and a wealth of journalistic opinions, which were followed by thousands of audience comments.172 
According to interviews with 10 editors from the main Spanish online-only outlets, direct interaction with 
the audience (through a visitors’ counter system or users’ comments on the site) appears to facilitate an 
immediate follow-up response. Editors stress that they can modify the news and adapt their content to 
audience demands. Th is carries risks and advantages unknown to traditional media. Th e fi rst advantage is the 
ability to cater to audience needs, creating specialized contents, improving the update of news, and analyzing 
public responses. On the other hand, editors say that there is a risk in trivializing the news, because the public 
often follows sensationalist criteria, demanding scandals, stories involving sex and violence, etc., that respond 
to short-term curiosity but not to information needs aimed at the construction of a critical and democratic 
society.
Editors underlined as well the audience’s role as a source through its interaction using the new digital tools. 
Audiences can be primary sources of information thanks to mobile phones or other communications devices. 
Th is means an increase in the number of witnesses and sources, which at the same time poses a risk because it 
168. See http://www.tv3.cat; www.catradio.cat; www.3cat24.cat (both accessed 5 November 2010).
169. See http://www.vilaweb.cat (accessed 5 November 2010).
170. R. Salaverría and S. Negredo, Periodismo integrado: convergencia de medios y reorganización de redacciones (Integrated journalism: media con-
vergence and newsroom), Sol90Media, Barcelona, 2008; M.A. Cabrera, Evolución Tecnológica y Cibermedios (Technological developments and 
cybermedia), Comunicación Social y Ediciones, Seville, 2010.
171. See http://www.rtve.es (accessed 4 December 2010).
172. See http://www.libertaddigital.com (accessed 4 December 2010).
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is hard to verify these sources. One example was the news coverage of the confl ict in the Sahara in November 
2010, where new technologies allowed witnesses to provide newsrooms with pictures and information on 
invasions of encampments. In the case of this particular story, the media had evidence and material and thus 
could skip the information blockade imposed by the Moroccan government. But not all the information was 
true: some people close to the Polisario Front sent the newsrooms a picture of a group of children who had 
allegedly been wounded by the Moroccan army. In reality, they had been injured in the Palestine confl ict.173 
Almost all digital media published the picture without verifying the information or the source.
According to the editors surveyed, digital newsrooms save money for media corporations. Th e working 
conditions of digital journalists are diff erent from those of standard journalists. Th ey have lower salaries but 
are expected to multi-task, a new job that is not included in traditional union agreements. Th ere is a new 
professional fi gure, the digital journalist, who is witnessing a continuing change in his or her job description. 
Since the fading of specialization, working hours have tended to go up and salaries go down. For example, 
a regional broadcaster like Televisió de Catalunya or Canal Sur Televisión pays a digital journalist half the 
standard salary. Th e new digital media, with lower production costs, are unable to attract big advertising 
revenues and are forced to survive at the cash fl ow limit, with journalists living on low salaries and providing 
unpaid contributions. However, the future might be brighter if the Spanish internet advertising market 
follows other mature markets. At the moment, internet media hold a 13 percent share of the whole Spanish 
advertising market, compared with 24.3 percent in the UK.174 But it is also true that advertising investment 
in digital media is growing twice as fast as in the UK and the United States. 
4.1.2 Ethics
Th e impact of digitization on the ethical behavior of journalists is not yet visible in deontological codes. 
Only the Catalan Professional Journalists’ Association (Collegi de Periodistes de Catalunya) attempted to start 
a debate in 2000 on the use of internet resources “in order to reach an agreement on all the problems we may 
have when writing an Internet Ethical Code. Among them, advertising, hypertext links, e-commerce, image 
manipulation, copyright, privacy, impartiality, accuracy and credibility in on-line news.”175 Th ere are a few 
deontological codes that include the use of internet resources, like those in the daily El Correo Gallego, the 
media group Vocento, Barcelona’s local television station, Barcelona TV, and the Catalan public broadcaster, 
CCMA.176 But none of them sets out how to use internet resources to improve journalism or what uses the 
journalist must avoid. 
173. See http://www.periodistadigital.com/periodismo/prensa/2010/11/13/propaganda-manipulacion-periodismo-foto-el-aaiun-el-pais-el-mundo-
abc.shtml (accessed 20 December 2010).
174. “Marketing y comunicación IAB Spain”, Interactive Advertising Bureau, at http://www.iabspain.net (accessed 10 December 2010).
175. See http://www.periodistes.org/documents_codi_deontologic (accessed 1 November 2010).
176. J.L. Mico, J. Canavilhas, P. Masip and C. Ruiz, “La ética en el ejercicio del periodismo: Credibilidad y autorregulación en la era del period-
ismo en Internet” (Ethics in journalism: Credibility and self-regulation in the era of internet journalism), Estudos em Comunicaçao 4 (2008), 
pp. 15–39.
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4.2 Investigative Journalism
4.2.1 Opportunities
According to the above-mentioned editors, digital tools (Twitter, search engines, etc.) present an opportunity 
for journalists to improve their research methods, but they are not yet widely used. Only journalists with a 
strong interest in new technology use them on a regular basis. 
While professional working practices remain largely unchanged, there are new ways of compiling, storing, 
indexing, and recovering information. Th e quantity of data has increased. Information needs to be collated 
and sorted by relevance, and stored in new digital servers. A good index system is important for fi nding 
information and also for speedy data recovery. Digital tools allowing for storing and searching information 
are indispensable. Integrated news content management software, such as Dalet177—used at RNE—makes 
it possible to have a networked newsroom, with an archive and a mechanism to retrieve any previously 
broadcast radio program. According to an RNE journalist Rosa Cervantes, “When I have to make a report on 
any topic, the pre-production time is now reduced by a quarter. In my terminal I can locate within a very few 
minutes all the reports, interviews, and news items that have already been produced on that same topic.”178
4.2.2 Threats
Th e interviewees for this report also asserted that digitization can give rise to new problems for journalistic 
working practice.
First, there is an overabundance of sources and resources. Investigative journalists need to deal with the 
challenges of news selection and verifi cation amidst the explosion of sources and nformation. Only training 
in the use of search engines and experience in news selection makes a journalist into an eff ective researcher. 
Antoni Novella, a journalist on the program “Espai Internet” (Internet space), with the Catalan Broadcasting 
Corporation fl agship channel TV3, explains: “In one day you can visit more than 100 pages and you are sure 
that you’re missing one that is truly good—apart from the hundreds of email messages from people off ering 
their website or blog to be in our program. Th ere is not enough time to evaluate everything, you have to trust 
your instinct, your ability as a journalist to do the news selection.”179 
Integrated digital newsrooms grant editors real-time access to the overall work in progress. Th ey can use this 
access to improve production routines and supervise contents in development. Moreover, when someone 
reads or modifi es a colleague’s output—whether a superior or a peer—this person leaves a digital print. Th is 
change in production routines has a direct eff ect on self-censorship. 
177. See http://www.dalet.com/ (accessed 1 April 2012).
178. Interview with Rosa Cervantes, RNE journalist, Bellaterra, 20 January 2011.
179. Interview with Antoni Novella, TV3 journalist, Sant Joan Despí, 20 January 2011.
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Time becomes very important in in-depth journalism. Digital newsrooms require constant news updates, 
which can make the journalist lose perspective and make it nearly impossible to research topics in any 
depth. Th e story of a Dutchman who supposedly fl ew with mechanical wings was covered by many Spanish 
media outlets on 20 March 2012.180 Headlines such as “Leonardo’s dream” (Antena 3 TV) or “A Dutchman 
becomes fi rst man to fl y like a bird” (La Vanguardia) showed how fake but cleverly edited online video could 
evade professional fi lters due to the lack of time to verify and the urgency to publish fi rst.
Finally, there is the problem that an audience with more information may not be better informed. Th e 
provision of rapid and plentiful news may result in the public being unable to assimilate and understand the 
information, and thus be truly well informed.
4.2.3 New Platforms
As far as we know, no new entrants in digital media are doing investigative journalism in Spain. One explanation 
for this may be the established tradition of journalism being manipulated by political and economic elites, 
which limits journalistic independence. Th ere are further possible causes: the lack of resources and fear of 
legal consequences encourage opinions instead of investigation. It promotes superfi cial news treatment—by 
hinting on the basis of fi nancial or political gossip—or news based on alleged leaks from offi  cial sources. 
Some of these digital online news media include: El Confi dencial digital, La información, El plural digital, 
Libertad Digital, Nació Digital, and E-Notícies.181 
4.2.4 Dissemination and Impact
In Spain, legacy media outlets are the only ones still generating investigative journalism, due to three 
fundamental elements: budget, staff , and contacts. Th ey can be the fi rst to get a scoop and the fi rst in 
audience share, but television news is consumed hastily, and the print press stories, despite the social prestige 
they retain, are quickly forgotten. It is in this context that the online-only news outlets have concentrated not 
on producing original news, but on selecting and spreading stories from the traditional media. 
4.3 Social and Cultural Diversity
4.3.1 Sensitive Issues
Sensitive matters have changed with social evolution itself. Ten years ago, homosexuality, AIDS, abortion, or 
same-sex marriages were sensitive matters, but reports about these topics are nowadays everyday occurrences. 
Other sensitive issues are terrorism, languages, and religion. With regard to terrorism, it should be recalled 
180. See http://www.antena3.com/noticias/ciencia/ingeniero-holandes-consigue-volar-como-pajaro-alas-impulsadas-sus-brazos_2012032000168.
html (accessed 1 April 2012); http://blogs.lainformacion.com/futuretech/2012/03/20/un-ingeniero-holandes-hace-realidad-el-sueno-de-volar-
como-un-pajaro-con-unas-alas-impulsadas-por-su-fuerza-muscular/ (accessed 1 April 2012); http://www.entitulares.com/news/un-holandes-se-
convierte-en-el-primer-hombre-en-volar-como-un-pajaro (accessed 1 April 2012).
181. See http://www.confi dencialdigital.com; www.lainformacion.com; http://www.elpluraldigital.com; http://www.libertaddigital.com; http://
www.naciodigital.cat; http://www.e-noticies.com (all accessed 26 January 2011).
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that since 1968 Spain has been engaged in a separatist confl ict with the Basque terrorist group, ETA. Th e 
only media shutdowns since the return of democracy have been those that have explicitly backed ETA’s 
principles.182
With respect to the language issue, online digital media have been the preferred setting for the nationalist 
debate between the supporters of Castilian as the sole state offi  cial language and sectors defending the use of 
all the so-called autonomous (regional) languages in nationwide institutions.183 Th e latest example has been 
the controversy over the appointment of regional language translators in the Senate Chamber.184
Immigration has introduced new religious practices thus far unknown in a society that mostly declares itself 
as Roman Catholic. Topics such as the building of new mosques for the Muslim community have given rise 
to controversy and have required a particular level of accuracy in news reporting. Th e Catholic religion was 
the subject of such concern on the occasion of Pope Benedict XVI’s visits to Barcelona in 2010 and to Madrid 
in 2011. Th e CCMA, offi  cially appointed for the media coverage, set up training sessions for journalists 
jointly with Barcelona’s archdiocese before the event. In these sessions, professionals were taught the correct 
terminology, along with the hierachies and customs of Catholic protocol.
Th e Basque Country confl ict also had a coercive impact on journalism. Some national media outlets banned 
left-wing, pro-independence voices, which in turn boycotted certain outlets. For example, in 2007, “pro-
Spanish” media were refused access to events of the left-wing pro-independence group, Basque Nationalist 
Action (Acción Nacionalista Vasca, ANV), which was outlawed the following year by the Spanish Supreme 
Court.185 On similar lines, elected municipal members of the Basque pro-independence group Bildu refused 
to allow journalists from certain Spanish media to access council assemblies.186
4.3.2 Coverage of Sensitive Issues
Spain is the only country in the EU that does not have a country-wide independent regulatory authority (IRA) 
for the communications sector. Th ere are currently two regional media regulators: the Catalonia Audiovisual 
Council (Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya, CAC), set up by the Catalan parliament in 2000, and the 
Andalusian Audiovisual Council (Consejo Audiovisual de Andalucía, CAA) set up in 2005. Th ese bodies issue 
recommendations on sensitive matters and warn the media if there is a possible case of breach of audience 
182. Eguin was closed in 1998 because of its links with ETA; Egunkaria (Th e Daily) was closed in 2003 but its managers were eventually absolved in 
April 2010. Although Egunkaria never reopened, it reappeared under a new name, Berria, in 2003. 
183. Autonomous languages are those recognized as such by law in Galicia, Euskadi, Catalonia, Valencia, Asturias, Aragon, and the Balearic Islands. 
184. See http://www.lne.es/opinion/2011/02/06/confuso-reino-pinganillo/1029930.html; http://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/v/20110202/opinion/
pinganillos-senado-babel-20110202.html; http://www.elpais.com/articulo/portada/precio/pinganillo/elpepusoceps/20110220elpepspor_2/Tes 
(all accessed 24 February 2011).
185. El Mundo, “Lizarta veta a El Mundo y otros medios por haber manipulado la realidad del país” (Lizarta vetoes El Mundo and other media be-
cause they have manipulated the country reality,” 11 June 2011, at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/06/11/paisvasco/1307776489.html 
(accessed 10 July 2012).
186. Diario Vasco, “Bildu impide a los periodistas acceder al Pleno de Lizarta” (Bildu impedes journalist to access to the town council,” 11 November 
2011, at http://www.diariovasco.com/rc/20110611/mas-actualidad/nacional/bildu-impide-periodistas-acceder-201106112126.html (accessed 
10 July 2012).
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rights. So far, the CAC has released three guides on information standards to be applied to immigration, 
violence against women, and teenagers,187 while the CAA has launched guidelines on the news treatment of 
immigrants, youths, child advertising, sports violence, political news during electoral periods, media literacy, 
and news treatment of child murders.188
Overall, most Spanish media outlets respect the limits of political correctness in their editorial policies. 
Th ey do not direct oppose particular groups, although debates are raised on controversial topics, such as 
the regulation of abortion, state aid to religious institutions, linguistic identity, and the question of political 
independence for certain regions of Spain.
Th ere is a certain media unanimity in relation to sensitive social topics which transcend political ideologies, 
such as domestic violence, racism, and youth gang culture. However, positions are more radical on political, 
moral or religious issues, and online outlets are more likely to adopt or cover controversial positions than 
traditional outlets.189
4.3.3 Space for Public Expression
Th e web has become a space for public expression, although it is not necessarily a space for activism. In the 
fi eld of political independence, for supporters in Catalonia or the Basque Country the internet and social 
media provide an easy opportunity to communicate and spread their ideas to citizens and social groups that 
might otherwise be out of reach.190 Th e anonymity that the web off ers or the impunity when voicing any type 
of opinion makes it possible for the most radical or even violent ideas to fl ourish in the comments sections of 
news sites, blogs, fora or social networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter. For instance, the live broadcast 
of a football match between teams representing antithetical nationalist positions gives rise to vitriolic and 
hateful speech online between respective supporters.
4.4 Political Diversity
4.4.1 Elections and Political Coverage
Th e Constitution’s fi rst article protects political pluralism, and the state has the exclusive responsibility for 
establishing basic media rules. Th is notwithstanding, a Central Electoral Committee (Junta Electoral Central), 
made up of eight magistrates from the Supreme Court and fi ve law professors,191 regulates political pluralism 
in the public media during electoral periods.
187. See http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/docs/2010/07/12/11/55/d63a40d6-baee-48fd-8a2a-b4dfc7a14051.pdf; http://www.cac.cat/pfw_fi les/
cma/recerca/quaderns_cac/Q12recomanacions.pdf (accessed 10 December 2010); http://www.observatorioviolencia.org/noticias.php?id=1130 
(accessed 11 December 2010).
188. See http://www.consejoaudiovisualdeandalucia.es/actividad/actuaciones/recomendaciones (accessed 11 December 2010).
189. See http://www.ara.cat/; http://www.naciodigital.cat/; http://www.vilaweb.cat (all accessed 4 April 2012).
190. See http://www.racocatala.cat/; https://www.plataforma-llengua.cat/ (both accessed 4 April 2012).
191. See http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/portal/page/portal/JuntaElectoralCentral/JuntaElectoralCentral/NormElec#campana (accessed 24 Feb-
ruary 2011).
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Th e law sets out the criteria to broadcast free electoral messages as a right of political parties, but it does not 
establish criteria on the organization of information in public media newscasts. It is the Central Electoral 
Committee that decides which political news is propaganda and, as such, must fi t so-called “blocks,” their 
time length being strictly measured depending on the number of votes and seats that each political party 
obtained in the previous elections. Th is legal interpretation can be explained by the political parties’ traditional 
uniform distrust of the public media.192 Th e rule of proportion has been recently extended to commercial 
broadcasters by the Central Electoral Committee, in the face of stiff  opposition from media fi rms.193 
Th ere is no specifi c legislation pertaining to online media regarding political information or propaganda, not 
even during election campaigns, although proportional media coverage according to number of votes or seats 
is inevitably replicated in news sites that depend on public service media for their material. Nor is there any 
legal provision regulating political pluralism on the web. Ease of internet access and low production costs have 
favored the appearance of digital news media linked to all political options. In this way, non-parliamentary 
ideologies, like republicanism,194 anarchism195 or separatism,196 which do not have any traditional news media 
close to their standpoints, have an abundant presence on the web. Online news has also become increasingly 
polarized along parliamentary political lines in recent years, with the emergence of several news sites explicitly 
for or against particular parties. Th is is the case for Libertad Digital,197 blatantly opposing the PSOE party, or 
El Plural Digital,198 which attacks the PP party currently in offi  ce.
4.4.2 Digital Political Communications
Th e extensive use of new technologies by political parties in recent years has modifi ed the way journalists 
access political information. Following “Obama’s model,” imposed by the team of the Democrat candidate 
in the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, all Spanish politicians have plunged into using digital tools such as 
blogs, Twitter or Facebook to support their electoral campaigns.199 Th e online presence of politicians and 
parties has increased since the 2009 regional Basque elections, through the Catalan election in November 
2010, to the latest Spanish general election in 2011.200 In many cases, however, these sites are simple electoral 
strategies, dying out the day after the elections. 
192. N. Almirón, “Els blocs electorals als mitjans públics de l’Estat espanyol: una excepció a Europa” (Election slots on public media in Spain: an 
exception in Europe), Quaderns del CAC 34, XIII(1) (June 2010).
193. El Mundo, “Las TV privadas recurrirán la imposición de los bloques electorales” (Private broadcasters will appeal against mandatory election 
slots,” 5 May 2011, at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/05/05/comunicacion/1304594897.html (accessed 15 July 2011).
194. See http://www.larepublica.es (accessed 15 January 2011).
195. See http://www.kaosenlared.net (accessed 15 January 2011).
196. See http://www.racocatala.cat (accessed 15 January 2011).
197. See http://www.libertaddigital.com (accessed 15 January 2011).
198. See http://www.elpluraldigital.com (accessed 15 January 2011).
199. P. Oriol-Costa, “La utilització d’internet per part de Barack Obama transforma la comunicació política” (Th e use of internet by Barack Obama 
transforms political communication), Quaderns del CAC 33, XII (December 2008).
200. See http://cronicasmallorca.com/cuanto-como-y-de-que-escriben-nuestros-politicos-en-sus-blogs; http://www.escolar.net/wiki/index.php/Blogs
_pol%C3%ADticos; http://periodistas21.blogspot.com.es/2005/09/polticos-en-el-blog.html (all accessed 4 April 2012).
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Among the Spanish political elite there is a widely held belief that those who are not online do not exist. 
However, the incorrect use of new technologies has caused grave errors of judgment in some political careers, 
such as the socialist deputy’s Juan Luis Rascón, who criticized his own party on his blog in December 2010;201 
or that of Miguel Ángel Martín, of the Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, PSC) 
and holding a post in Barcelona’s municipality, who seriously insulted the director general of the CCMA202 
in March 2010. 
Other than the bad usage of particular politicans’ profi les, we also fi nd errors in Web 2.0 campaigns themselves: 
social network users were angry in October 2011 when the PP asked its affi  liates and sympathizers to hand 
over their Facebook personal pages and Twitter profi les to the party to publish corporate news. Within just a 
few hours, a movement against that proposal, identifi ed by the hashtag #prostituit, hit thousands of Twitter 
users. Th e PP thus achieved the unintended contrary eff ect: a negative online reputation. Another similar 
mistake was made by the team in charge of the campaign of PSOE’s candidate in the November 2011 general 
election, Pérez Rubalcaba. In order to boost traffi  c on the candidate’s social networking pages, a reward 
system was established: points were given to users who registered on the website Rubalcaba.es and shared 
information on the candidate through Facebook and Twitter. Using the hashtag #puntos Rubalcaba, social 
media users succeeded in publicly protesting at what they saw as bad ethical practice online.203 
In spite of this, politicians’ and political parties’ blogs or Twitter and Facebook accounts have become an 
indispensable source in newsrooms. A recent example has been the coverage of the November 2011 general 
election campaign, when several online media were set up to collect and arrange all party-generated data, 
agenda events or comments.204 During the election evening, TVE’s website traffi  c was 20 times higher than 
on an average day. El País set up the initiative @Resultados20N, a Twitter profi le with the paper’s headlines. 
Th e state-owned press agency EFE created its own electoral TV channel on YouTube.205
Th e news avalanche triggered by the online presence of Spanish politicians, especially during election periods, 
has also been covered by traditional media in their digital sections. A good example was Lavanguardia.es, 
from the old broadsheet title La Vanguardia, during the last Catalan elections in November 2010. Th e site 
collected and constantly updated online pieces of news and comments. 
201. See http://www.diputadorascon.com (accessed 15 January 2011).
202. See http://www.racocatala.cat/noticia/22287/allau-critiques-insults-psc-terribas-lentrevista-montilla (accessed 16 January 2011).
203. See http://www.juanjoibanez.es/2011/10/06/el-prostituit/; http://fernandezdelcampo.wordpress.com/2011/10/25/nuestros-politicos-en-la-red-
del-prostituit-a-puntosrubalcaba/ (all accessed 4 April 2012).
204. See http://electoralia.cat; http://es.eleccions-2010.com; http://www.eleccionsdosmildeu.cat; http://www.elecciones.es/ca; http://www.tuiter.net/
ca/u/28n; http://electweet.cat; http://twitter.com/Eleccions28N# (all accessed 28 November 2010).
205. See http://www.rtve.es/noticias/elecciones/generales; http://www.elmundo.es/elecciones/elecciones-generales; http://resultados.elpais.com/elec-
ciones/generales.html; http://www.abc.es/especiales/elecciones-municipales-autonomicas; http://www.publico.es/elecciones-generales-2011; 
http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/elecciones-generales-2011/index.html; http://www.youtube.com/elecciones2011?feature=inp-pr-elecc 
(all accessed 4 April 2012).
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4.5 Assessments
Digitization has changed journalists’ working practices, but it has not brought about an improvement in 
quality. We face a professional paradox: technologies and resources are available to journalists, but they cause 
a deterioration in their conditions of employment, which puts quality at risk. Salaries are lowered to cut 
down on production costs, and multi-tasking professional profi les are in demand instead of those permitting 
specialization. Th e process overloads journalists’ work practices and allows the exercise of more editorial 
pressure.
Th ere are more online media, both traditional and originating from digital-only media, which has resulted in 
a proliferation of opinions, the representation of social minorities, and greater political pluralism.
However, digital media from digital-only origins promote superfi cial news treatment, limited by an ideological 
partisanship shared with the audience. In the Spanish online media world, interpretation and opinion are 
more important than facts and data.
However, internet user trends only refl ect that part of Spanish society which has access to the technology 
required and uses social media. Spain has a real digital divide in online media consumption, and there is a 
substantial diff erence in the number of readers of the big media press online and that of digital dailies with 
a low market penetration.
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5. Digital Media and Technology
5.1 Broadcasting Spectrum
5.1.1 Spectrum Allocation Policy
Th e radio spectrum is planned and managed by the Department of Telecommunications and Information 
Society (Secretaría de Estado de Telecomunicaciones y para la Sociedad de la Información, SETSI), which in 
turn is controlled by the Ministry of Industry. After 2003, however, the law provided for a specifi c spectrum 
regulator, the State Radiocommunications Agency (Agencia Estatal de Radiocomunicaciones).206 Although 
included again in LGCA 2010, this regulator was fi nally discarded and its functions were assumed by SETSI 
in 2012.207 
Th e regime of broadcasting spectrum frequency assignments mirrors the country’s decentralized political 
structure. Licenses are granted through public tenders by governmental authorities at two levels: country-
wide (by the central government) and at regional/local level (by Autonomous Communities). Th is principle 
was extended from analog television to DTT regulation from the very beginning, when a budgetary law 
fi rst mentioned it in 1997.208 Two qualifi cations should be noted: fi rst, state-wide analog broadcasters have 
been automatically recognized by law as digital licensees, and their licenses are indeed automatically renewed 
according to LGCA 2010. Second, regional authorities are limited by the technical spectrum plans fi xed by 
the central state government.
Prior to 2005, the conservative PP government had given preference to a subscription DTT model as a means 
to develop digital television. Under the framework set up in 1998 by the fi rst DTT Technical Plan (Plan 
Nacional de la Televisión Digital Terrenal),209 the newly established subscription television platform Quiero 
TV was favored. Licensed in 1999, it was awarded three and a half multiplexes (14 digital channels). It started 
206. Law 32/2003 on Telecommunications, BOE no. 264, 4 November 2003, Art. 47.
207. Royal Decree-Law 13/2012, transposing electricity and gas internal market directives and the electronic communications directive, and adopting 
measures for the correction of deviations due to diff erences between costs and revenues in the electric and gas sectors, fi nal provision no. 6. BOE 
no. 78, 31 March 2012. 
208. Law 66/1997 on fi scal, administrative and social measures, BOE no. 313, 31 December 1997, additional provision 44.
209. Royal Decree 2169/1998, on the Digital Terrestrial Television National Technical Plan, BOE no. 248, 16 October 1998.
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operations in 2000 and disappeared in 2002, because of a highly competitive subscription television market 
dominated by satellite platform Canal Satélite Digital, controlled by PRISA’s Sogecable, and a strong second 
player, Via Digital, backed by Telefónica and RTVE. 
Two newer FTA players, Net TV and Veo TV, were also awarded one digital channel each in 2000. At that 
time, few television sets were ready to receive these new channels, and their audience impact was symbolic. 
Th ey were both controlled by print press groups. Net TV was owned by Prensa Española, which in 2002 
merged with Correo to form Vocento, one of the big Spanish multimedia groups. Veo TV was owned by El 
Mundo-UNEDISA and Recoletos, which merged in 2007 to form Unidad Territorial and became part of the 
RCS media group. Finally, RTVE and the private analog operators Telecinco, Antena 3, and Canal+ had to 
share the same multiplex. RTVE obtained two digital channels for its general-interest channels TVE 1 (now 
La 1) and La 2, and the others were allocated one for each of their fl agship channels: FTA Telecinco and 
Antena 3 and premium Canal+, respectively. For FTA operators, this situation was highly unsatisfactory (see 
section 7.2.3 for comments on political clientelism in Spanish broadcast licensing since 2000).
In 2005, the new PSOE government shifted to a FTA DTT model, notably improving RTVE’s status, but 
also allowing for the expansion of digital programs for all private operators due to the channel reallocation 
of the failed digital subscription television platform Quiero TV. Th e new DTT Technical Plan, passed in 
July (hereafter DTT 2005) established an interim and a post-switch-off  scenario:210 it accorded one exclusive 
multiplex to RTVE, to be extended to two after the switch-off  deadline, while private operators could obtain 
up to two additional digital channels on condition that they promoted DTT by fi nancing Impulsa TDT (see 
section 1), investing in technology and publicity, and developing innovative and interactive content.211 In 
November,212 the number was thus raised to: three channels for each historical operator (Antena 3, Telecinco, 
and Canal+) and two for late entrants Net TV and Veo TV. Th e Government also decided to give a sixth 
license (two more digital channels) to a new analog player, La Sexta, having as its main stakeholder a group 
of independent production television companies led by Mediapro and Globomedia.
Finally, DTT 2005 allowed private broadcasters to manage one multiplex each after the switch-off  in April 
2010.213 A Royal Decree passed immediately before the switch-over deadline (hereafter RD 2010) fi nally 
confi rmed this.214
As far as regional and local DTT markets are concerned, RD 2010 set aside two multiplexes for each 
Autonomous Community. In the case of local markets, digitization was seen as an opportunity to regulate 
a sector functioning (and growing) illegally despite the introduction of the fi rst local television statute in 
1995 (see section 2). Following the 2002 budgetary law that laid the foundations for local DTT regulation, 
210. Royal Decree 944/2005 on the Digital Terrestrial Television National Technical Plan, BOE no. 181, 30 July 2005, additional provisions 2 and 3.
211. Royal Decree 944/2005, transitory provision 4.
212. Th rough an agreement of the Council of Ministers, issued 25 November 2005 and published as a resolution in BOE, 5 December 2005.
213. Royal Decree 944/2005, additional provision 3.
214. Royal Decree 365/2010 regulating the assignment of digital terrestrial television multiplexes after the end of analog terrestrial television broad-
casts, BOE no. 81, 3 April 2010.
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the mandatory technical plan was fi nally introduced in 2004 (National Technical Plan for Local Terrestrial 
Television, Plan Técnico Nacional de la Televisión Terrestre Local, hereafter DTT 2004). Th rough these, more 
than 200 local areas were specially designated for the allocation of multiplexes.215
Licensees can be public, private, or TS entities. But they do not operate under equal conditions. At least one 
channel in each multiplex is set aside for public service broadcasters managed by municipalities.216 And, as 
Ángel Badillo reminds us, spectrum allocation must prioritize commercial exploitation.217 In this way, Mr 
Badillo argues, DTT regulation has made life almost impossible for TS media because they have to compete 
on equal terms with local commercial candidates.218
Almost all the Autonomous Community governments have allocated their licenses. Overall, according to the 
data from Mr Badillo, as of January 2011 the number of licensed DTT channels amounted to 804 at regional 
and local levels in Spain: 37 were regional public broadcasters’ channels, 33 regional private, 92 local public, 
and 642 local private ones.219 However, not all local licensees are operating, and some small operators linked 
with TS entitites or underground movements are broadcasting digitally in Spanish major cities without a license.
Th is crowded and confused DTT market explains why in May 2008, a few months after the European 
Commission fi rst announced the need for a common EU approach to allocating the digital dividend, the 
Government said this would have little if any impact on the Spanish economy:220 DTT 1998 and DTT 2004 
set the 470–862 MHz band exclusively for broadcast purposes, and the freed frequencies would be exploited 
mainly by TV broadcasters claiming their license rights. 
But, in the midst of the economic crisis, local markets have witnessed some operators returning their licenses, 
PRISA being the most striking example.221 Th e Government has also had to face lobbying by telecoms 
and mobile operators, along with persistent criticism by CMT. Th e former claimed a quarter of the digital 
dividend,222 whereas in a 2009 report on RTVE’s new fi nancial regime, the regulator urged that the dividend 
215. Following Art. 109 of Law 53/2002 on fi scal, administrative, and social measures, the plan was adopted through Royal Decree 439/2004 on the 
Local Digital Television Technical Plan, BOE no. 85, 8 April 2004. It was amended by Royal Decree 2268/2004, BOE no. 292, 4 December 
2004.
216. Law 10/2005 on urgent measures to foster digital terrestrial television, on the liberalization of cable television and on the promotion of plural-
ism), BOE no.142, Art. 3, section 3. It amends Law 41/1995.
217. Law 56/2007 on measures to promote the information society, BOE no. 312, 29 December 2007, provision 18.
218. A. Badillo, Modelos de clivaje público-privado en la televisión subnacional en España (Models of public private cleavage in regional television in 
Spain), pp. 13, 79 (hereafter Badillo, Modelos de clivaje público-privado).
219. Badillo, Modelos de clivaje público-privado, p. 76.
220. Expansión, “El gobierno no dará más frecuencias a las operadoras” (Th e government will not give more frequencies to telecoms), 30 May 2008, 
at http://www.expansion.com/2008/05/30/empresas/telecomunicaciones/1129335.html (accessed 2 April 2011). 
221. ABC, “PRISA se desprende de todas sus licencias de TDT, tanto locales como autonómicas” (PRISA gets rid of all its DTT licenses, both lo-
cal and regional), 31 December 2009, at http://www.abc.es/20091231/medios-redes-radio-tv/prisa-desprende-todas-licencias-20091231.html 
(accessed 2 April 2011).
222. Expansión, “Los móviles y las TV quieren ocupar el mismo espacio” (Mobile operators and TV broadcasters want to occupy the same space), 10 
June 2008, at http://www.expansion.com/2008/06/10/empresas/medios/1133337.html; Cinco Días, “Telefónica y la industria del móvil recla-
man el reparto del ‘dividendo digital’” (Telefónica and mobile industry demand the distribution of the “digital dividend”), 18 February 2009, 
at http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/empresas/Telefonica-industria-m...eclaman-reparto-dividendo-digital/20090218cdscdiemp_7/?view=pri
nt (accessed 2 April 2010).
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should be used for advanced mobile broadband services, not only to improve Spain’s “information society” 
indicators but also to compensate telecoms operators for the tax to fi nance RTVE.223 
In June 2009, the Minister of Industry fi nally announced the freeing up of a 800-MHz sub-band for advanced 
wireless telecoms services224—the digital dividend waveband. RD 2010 subsequently published the need for 
a DTT frequency reallocation before 1 January 2015 (sub-band 790–862 MHz).225 Under a new Decree 
Law226 (hereafter the Radio Spectrum Decree 2011), the digital dividend licenses were auctioned for the 
most part in two phases during 2011. Th ey were part of a frequency package of 310 MHz in diff erent bands: 
800 MHz (where the digital dividend lies), 2.6 GHz, 900 MHz, and 1,800 MHz. 
Th e PSOE government expected to obtain up to €2,000 million in a process that culminated in November 
2011 and benefi tted the three most important telecom operators (Telefónica, Vodafone, and France Telecom). 
Th e aim was to use €800 million to fi nance the cost of the changes to be made in transmission and reception 
equipment due to the forcible reallocation of digital dividend frequencies. 
However, in the middle of the economic crisis, the new PP government decided to use the bulk of the 
proceeds to fi nance the growing public defi cit.227 In order to reduce the new migration costs for broadcasters 
no longer covered by the state, the Ministry of Industry proposed in 2012 that commercial television 
operators should relinquish half their frequencies. Faced with UTECA’s radical opposition, a second off er 
softened the Government’s proposal and was eventually accepted. Made public in late August, the agreement 
consists of reducing the broadcasting spectrum while retaining one multiplex for each commercial operator. 
According to the Government, progress in DTT compression techniques made this spectrum reduction 
possible. Broadcasters and policymakers have given assurances that the number of channels will not be 
aff ected, and that UTECA remains committed to developing HD television and interactive services. Th e 
Government announced this would form part of a new DTT plan, which as of early October 2012 had not 
been published, and negotiations continue in fi ts and starts.228
Th e Government has assured consumers that the agreement reduces the number of residential buildings 
aff ected by frequency relocation from 1.5 million to 1.2 million. Th is notwithstanding, the actual cost of 
the change has not been revealed yet. Consumers’ associations are unwilling to pay more on account of 
223. CMT, Informe no. RO 2009/747, “Informe a la vicepresidencia primera del gobierno y ministerio de la presidencia sobre el anteproyecto de 
ley de fi nanciación de la corporación de radio y televisión española” (Report to the fi rst vice-president’s offi  ce and the prime minister’s offi  ce on 
RTVE Funding Bill), Barcelona, 21 May 2009, at http://www.cmt.es/es/resoluciones/18-2009/PRO_4758472/RE-2009-5-21-8-1.htm (ac-
cessed 2 April 2010).
224. Parliamentary Commission on Industry, Tourism and Commerce, record of proceedings no. 161, 2 June 2009, at http://www.congreso.es/
public_ofi ciales/L9/SEN/DS/CO/CS0161.PDF (accessed 2 April 2010).
225. Royal Decree 365/2010, Art. 2.
226. Royal Decree 458/2011 on measures on radio spectrum aimed at the development of the digital society), BOE no. 5936, 2 April 2011.
227. Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Agriculture, “El gobierno cierra la licitación del espectro radioeléctrico con unos ingresos de 2000 millones 
para el tesoro público” (Th e government closes the radio spectrum tender with 2,000-million revenue for the Treasury), press release, at http://
www.minetur.gob.es/es-es/gabineteprensa/notasprensa/documents/npcierrelicitacion101111.pdf (accessed 21 August 2012).
228. Lamoncloa.gob.es, “Aprobado el plan de impulso de la TDT y de la Innovación tecnológica” (Th e government approves the plan for the 
promotion of DTT and technological innovation), press note, 24 August 2012, at http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ConsejodeMinistros/Referen-
cias/_2012/refc20120824.htm#TDT (accessed 27 August 2012).
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the low quality and little diversity of the DTT off er. Installers, represented by the National Federation 
of Telecommunications Installers (Federación Nacional de Instaladores de Telecomunicaciones, FENITEL), 
estimate that each building would have to pay €400 on average, €20 per home.229
Th e reduction of DTT frequencies is backed by the main satellite operator, SES Astra, which, as of November 
2012, maintained a three-year confl ict with the Government at EU level for having allegedly favored the 
DTT platform. More specifi cally, in May 2009 the satellite operator’s Spanish subsidiary had submitted a 
complaint to the EC’s Directorate-General for Competition. Th e central government had granted loans to 
the Autonomous Communities so they could put to tender the provision and installation of digital television 
broadcast equipment covering a further 2.5 percent of the Spanish population, that is, the increase from 
96 percent to 98.5 percent. Astra argued that these loans constituted illegal state aid because they had not 
been notifi ed to the European Commission. It further argued that Abertis, the monopolistic operator in the 
television signal distribution market (see section 5.2.3), won the majority of the tenders, and this distorted 
competition with satellite operators. In response, the central government argued, among other things, that 
these loans were not to be considered state aid because they had been off ered in competitive public tenders, 
and that digitizing existing analog platforms was—thanks to economies of scale—more effi  cient than using 
satellite platforms.230
5.1.2 Transparency
Th e Spanish radio spectrum allocation results from international agreements and the latest EU recommen-
dations and decisions on spectrum management.231 Consequently, mobile communications and television 
frequency bands are established by supranational entities. It is true, however, that there is a margin of 
discretion left to the national authorities, especially over terms and allocation methods. Th is margin is wider 
when the frequencies are distributed in certain bands among commercial operators.
Th e allocation of television and telecoms spectrum licenses has traditionally been made through public 
tenders. Th is system is less transparent than auctions, which make it possible to know the market valuation 
of spectrum. However, auctions do not take account of other social realities, namely the social side-eff ects of 
the industrial activity to be taken up. In the Spanish case, both television and mobile communications public 
tenders have been denounced as lacking transparency and taken to court, normally by those excluded. Even 
so, Spanish courts have confi rmed the majority of allocations.232 
229. See El País, “El descontrol de la TDT” (Th e Lack of DTT) 14 July 2012, at http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/07/14/actuali-
dad/1342291401_125658.html (accessed 10 October 2012)
230. “STATE AID—SPAIN. State aid C23/10 (ex NN 36/10)—Aid for the deployment of digital terrestrial television (DTT). Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Art. 108(2) of the TFEU,” Offi  cial Journal of the European Union, C337/17, 14 December 2010.
231. European Commission Recommendation 2009/848/EC, on “Facilitating the release of the digital dividend in the European Union,” Offi  cial 
Journal of the European Union, L308/24, 24 November 2009; European Commission decision of 6 May 2010 on harmonised technical condi-
tions of use in the 790–862 MHz frequency band for terrestrial systems capable of providing electronic communications services in the Euro-
pean Union, Offi  cial Journal of the European Union, L117/95, 11 May 2010. 
232. El País, “La Audiencia rechaza suspender de forma cautelar el concurso del móvil UMTS” (Spanish National High Court refuses to suspend as 
a precautionary measure the UMTS public tender), 10 March 2001, at http://elpais.com/diario/2001/03/10/economia/984178801_850215.
html (accessed 10 April 2012).
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Television broadcasters that participate in the license tenders regard spectrum issues as secondary to other 
priorities in their business models, such as editorial content and scheduling. For telecoms operators, 
the possession and management of certain frequencies and their specifi c use are key factors determining 
profi tability, and hence they also determine the scale of the off er that they can make in a public tender. 
Diff erences continue in the fi scal policy applied to each sector. Telecoms operators pay an initial fee when 
submitting their off ers for a mobile telephony license, and they also have to pay an annual tax for radio 
spectrum usage. Th e latter, they complain, is excessive and discriminatory in comparison with broadcasters. 
According to sources in the telecoms sector, 90 percent of the €315 million levied by the state through the 
radio spectrum tax comes from telecoms operating in the mobile telephony market, and only 10 percent 
from television broadcasters. Th ey maintain that the mobile telecoms industry has paid disproportionately 
for a segment of spectrum that is less valuable than the one used by TV operators.233
As mentioned above, some radio spectrum frequencies were auctioned in 2011 for the fi rst time in Spain, 
even though auctioning has been a popular system in other Western European countries since the spread of 
3G telephony in the mid-1990s. Prior to the auctions, a series of frequency blocks were apportioned; starting 
prices and minimum revenues to be obtained by the state were established, and a list of the accepted bidders 
drawn up. In the case of the band including the digital dividend (800 MHz), six blocks were auctioned, 
each with two 5 MHz sub-bands. Th e starting price per block was €170 million and the minimum expected 
revenue was €1,020 million. Th e obligations for the winning bidders are such that before the end of 2014 
these frequencies must be operative, although they have a 2020 deadline to guarantee a 90 percent coverage 
of areas with less than 5,000 inhabitants with a speed of at least 30 megabits per second.234 It is in this band 
that 4G mobile telephony or long-term evolution (LTE) will be deployed. 
In the 900 and 1,800 MHz bands, the Radio Spectrum Decree 2011 also provided that technological 
neutrality should be respected, upholding freedom for operators to use diff erent transmissions technologies 
(GSM or UMTS in diff erent bands, a process known as refarming) or another system that allows for the 
coexistence with GSM systems. In the 2.6 GHz any technology can be used for electronic communications 
services.
Th e new decree additionally provides for the possibility of reselling the spectrum, so long as the operation 
takes place two years after the acquisition and establishes some limits to the concentration of spectrum 
ownership. 
233. V. Sanchidrián, “Las ‘telecos’ pagan 200 veces más que las ‘teles’ por el uso de frecuencias” (Telcos pay 200 more than TV stations for the use of 
frequencies), Vozpopuli, 23 June 2012, at http://vozpopuli.com/empresas/10569-las-telecos-pagan-200-veces-mas-que-las-teles-por-el-uso-de-
frecuencias (accessed 10 July 2012).
234. Royal Decree 458/2011, Art. 6.
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5.1.3 Competition for Spectrum
Th e confl ict between the audiovisual and the telecoms sectors over the best bands in the spectrum has been 
already described (section 5.1.2). However, the lobbying power of telecoms operators and the the cash-strapped 
state’s need for extra revenues point to a possible weakening of the broadcasters’ position. An expert group has 
recommended to the Government that the 700-Mh band should be aimed at a new digital dividend, taking 
into account a range of issues including the investment plans of potential bidders; technological neutrality; 
and the homogenization of spectrum fees paid by broadcasters and telecoms operators.235
In order to avoid possible confl icts internal to the broadcast industry, most national TV operators have 
assigned the management of their multiplex to a third-party telecoms operator. However, some confl icts 
have risen between local TV operators in the Canary Islands and Madrid, usually because TV operators had 
not agreed on the third party responsible for the management of the multiplex.236 In these cases, the CMT 
has mediated to protect the rights of minority TV operators within the multiplex. Th e CMT believes that 
if no agreement can be reached on who should manage the multiplex, recruitment should be transparent 
and follow a procedure that allows diff erent off ers from interested parties. In addition, the CMT considers 
that bids submitted must be transparent and non-discriminatory, diff erentiating prices for diff erent services 
off ered and not discriminating between TV operators. Furthermore, if the multiplex manager is a company 
owned by any of the TV operators that share the multiplex, the CMT will monitor compliance with these 
principles more closely, and may exert more control over the prices of tenders and supervise transfers within 
the group. Finally, in order to safeguard competition the CMT holds that contracts signed between the 
multiplex manager and the TV operator should not exceed fi ve years.237
Overall, broadcasters are much more concerned about the costs related to frequency reallocation, as part of 
the Government’s digital dividend strategy (see section 5.1.2). Some state-wide smaller broadcasters, such 
as Intereconomía, started to change frequencies a second time in September 2012, after an initial change 
in June 2012. Some commentators have predicted a loss of 20 percent of their audience as a result of the 
imminent change.238 Further costs are associated with the simulcast in two diff erent frequencies during the 
transition period before freeing the 800-Mhz band. 
235. High Level Expert Group on the Spanish Digital Agenda (Grupo de Expertos de Alto Nivel de la Agenda Digital para España), “Informe de 
recomendaciones” (Recommendations Report), 18 June 2012, p. 11, at http://www.ontsi.red.es/ontsi/sites/default/fi les/informe-recomenda-
ciones-ade.pdf (accessed 10 July 2012).
236. CMT resolution of 14 February 2008, at http://www.cmt.es/c/document_library/get_fi le?uuid=224a6c46-9636-4bd9-9070-bd581d6bd-
0c0&groupId=10138 (accessed 10 July 2012).
237. CMT, Informe anual 2011, p. 167.
238. Bloggin Zenith, “Entrevista a Merche Moreno, Directora de Compra Medio Televisivo en Zenith” (Interview with Merche Moreno, Zenith’s 
Manager of Broadcasting Media Purchases), 24 July 2012, at http://blogginzenith.zenithmedia.es/entrevistas/la-resintonizacion-no-tendra-ni-
ngun-benefi cio-para-los-telespectadores-solo-perjuicios-entrevista-a-merche-moreno-compra-medio-television-en-zenith (accessed 25 July 
2012). 
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5.2 Digital Gatekeeping
5.2.1 Technical Standards
As one of the countries with a presence in the Digital Video Broadcasting Project239 from its beginnings in 
the early 1990s, Spanish digital broadcasters have adopted DVB transmission standards for cable (DVB-C), 
satellite (DVB-S), and terrestrial (DVB-T) platforms. In combination with DVB, the MPEG-2 compression 
standard is in use for standard defi nition (SD) television. Since the process has been industry-led, there has 
been no broad public debate on standards. DVB Project consultants put forward three main supporting 
arguments: fi rst, they are approved by European standardization bodies; second, they respond to broadcasters’ 
needs; and third, the economies of scale due to their worldwide expansion allows for attractive retail prices.240 
Th e public interest is then addressed on the grounds of better options for people considered as consumers.
Spanish legislation only specifi ed high defi nition (HD) television standards in May 2010, with the HDTV 
Decree: it established DVB-T for transmission and H.264/MPEG-4 AVC for signal compression, subject 
to modifi cations according to technological evolution. In line with DTT 2005,241 the decree does not make 
HD broadcasts mandatory,242 but it does make it compulsory for manufacturers to include HDTV receivers 
in sets with screens over 21 inches.243 Th is lack of legal obligation has contributed to the privilege given by 
Spanish broadcasters to standard defi nition channels, concerned about both the loss of channels and high 
HD costs.244 Consumers, however, have been very attracted by HD equipment, despite the confusing and 
scanty public information about which sets were truly prepared; the market research company GfK predicted 
11.5 million HDTV sets in Spain by the end of 2011.245 (According to an AIMC survey, 33.6 percent of 
Spanish households—over 5 million—owned an HD TV set by the end of 2011.)246 However, the quality 
of HD broadcasts is quite low due to a low bit rate caused by crowded DTT multiplexes. Th is low quality is 
acute in commercial broadcasts, whereas quality levels are generally considered acceptable in public service 
broadcasts.247 Th e later Plan approved by the Government in August 2012 (see section 5.1.1) might mark the 
start of a shift in favor of HD television, although the economic crisis remains a hindering factor.
239. Th e Digital Video Broadcasting Project is an industry-led consortium of around 250 broadcasters, manufacturers, network operators, software 
developers, regulatory bodies, and others, aimed at designing technical standards for the delivery of digital television and data services.
240. Telephone interview with Jesús Seseña, Doctor in Radiocommunications, 13 April 2011.
241. Royal Decree 944/2004, additional disposition 5.
242. Royal Decree 691/2010, Arts 2 and 3. 
243. Royal Decree 691/2010, additional provision.
244. A. Casero and J. Marzal, “Las políticas de comunicación ante la implantación de la TDT en España. Balance crítico y retos pendientes” (Com-
munication policies before the introduction of DTT in Spain. Critical assessment and challenges ahead), Sphera Pública, No. 9, 2009, Univer-
sidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia, p. 110.
245. Silicon News, “La HDTV se está convirtiendo en una commodity” (HDTV is turning into a commodity), 11 November 2010, at http://www.
siliconnews.es/2010/11/11/hdtv-convirtiendo-commodity (accessed 13 April 2011).
246. AIMC, Marco General de los Medios en España 2012, p. 64.
247. V. Navarro, “Midiendo la calidad de la TDT en alta defi nición en España” (Assessing HD DTT quality in Spain), 12 June 2012, at http://www.
vicente-navarro.com/blog/2012/06/12/midiendo-la-calidad-de-la-tdt-en-alta-defi nicion-en-espana/ (accessed 10 July 2012).
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Th e second generation of the DVB standard for terrestrial television (DVB-T2) is not a priority for the 
Ministry of Industry in the short run, on the grounds that all broadcast networks being deployed use DVB-T 
and there is no spectrum capacity left for new television services.248 Th e DVB Project takes the opposing view 
that it will be needed for more effi  cient spectrum exploitation when HDTV broadcasts grow. Meanwhile, 
DVB’s second-generation standards are available to Spanish pay-TV subscribers: PRISA’s satellite platform 
Digital+ uses DVB-S2 in its HD off er and cable operator Ono plans to use DVB-C2 in the near future.249
As far as interactive television services are concerned, there is agreement among experts on the Spanish 
failure of DVB’s Multi-Home Platform (MHP) standard. Unlike HDTV, the Spanish law has not supported 
it. Neither has the legislation suffi  ciently promoted additional information society services, other than its 
development being considered a condition set in DTT 2005 for commercial broadcasters to obtain more 
digital channels following digital switch-over (see section 5.1). But responsibility, media analysts say, is 
shared by retail sellers not putting suffi  cient MHP decoders on the market, along with interactive content 
producers and consumers not having the motivation to either design or use applications.250 Again, the new 
Plan approved in August 2012 might be the fi rst step towards relaunching interactive services in Spain (see 
section 5.1.1). 
Th e DVB-H standard has been used in more than 20 pilot tests on mobile television, Spain being the Europe-
an country with the highest number of mobile television devices, according to Impulsa TDT Observatory.251 
Th e standard was explicitly included in DTT 2005252 and removed a year later,253 although LGCA 2010’s 
reference to mobile television states the need to comply with EU standards.254 Its progress is being thwarted 
by the uncertainty surrounding the mobile television business model255 and the ensuing scarce spectrum de-
mand; mobile phone operators are already off ering access to internet television through their 3G networks, 
and broadcasters are focussed on their current SD or in the roll-out of HD broadcasts.256 
248. Panorama Audiovisual, “DVB-T2 is not on Spanish agenda” (EL DVB-T2 no está en la agenda en España), November 2010, at http://www.
panoramaaudiovisual.com/es/2010/11/12/el-dvb-t2-no-esta-en-la-agenda-en-espana (accessed 13 April 2011).
249. Mundoplus.tv, “DVB-T2 prosigue su implantación en diversos mercados europeos y mundiales” (DVB-T2 continues its implementation in 
several European and international markets), September 2010, at http://www.mundoplus.tv/noticias/?seccion=tv_digital&id=8157 (accessed 13 
April 2011).
250. R. Franquet and X. Ribes, “Los servicios interactivos: Una asignatura pendiente de la migración digital” (An unresolved matter of digital migra-
tion), Telos 84 (June–September 2010).
251. See http://www.televisiondigital.es/Movil/EnEspana/Paginas/TVMovilEspana.aspx in Impulsa TDT site (accessed 13 April 2011).
252. Royal Decree 944/2005, additional provision 2.
253. Royal Decree 920/2006, approving the general rules on cable radio and television services provision, BOE no. 210, 2 September 2006, fi nal 
provision 2.
254. LGCA 2010, Art. 34.
255. M. Roel, “Mobile DTT in Spain: certainties and uncertainties in a changing scenario” (TDT en movilidad en España: certezas e incertidumbres 
en un escenario cambiante), Razón y Palabra 75 (February–April 2011).
256. Expansión, “Government shelves mobile TV frequencies due to lack of demand” (El Gobierno aparca las frecuencias para TV móvil por fal-
ta de demanda), 22 May 2010, at (http://www.expansion.com/2010/05/12/empresas/medios/1273674055.html?a=b25bcd4454803cde-
78c91a4849f34cdf&t=1302980082 (accessed 13 April 2011).
7 5O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 2
5.2.2 Gatekeepers
Proprietary systems in the Spanish subscription television market were a trigger for a political fi ght in the 
1990s. In 1996, PRISA’s Sogecable anounced the launch of the fi rst digital satellite platform in Spain, Canal 
Satélite Digital. It was to use a proprietary conditional access system (CAS). Th e same year, the PP government 
encouraged the creation of a competitor, Vía Digital, led by Telefónica, whose main stakeholder at the time 
was the Spanish state (with 17 percent of Telefonica’s shares),257 and with private and public service regional 
broadcasters as other stakeholders. It chose an open CAS (multicrypt), yet to be standardized at that time by 
European bodies. In January 1997, Canal Satélite Digital started operating. Th e PP government immediately 
afterwards approved a Royal Decree, which later became law, mandating the multicrypt system for all satellite 
platforms. After facing opposition by the European Commission on the grounds that it damaged the free fl ow 
of products and services in the EU, the Government had to amend the law so as to permit open standards, 
either through technical specifi cations, or through an agreement on decoders’ operability among diff erent 
operators. Th is meant that simulcrypt and multicrypt CAS could coexist.258
According to a CMT board member, A. García Castillejo, CAS providers have not threatened access to 
content by consumers from the end of the 1990s. Indeed, the Ministry of Industry intervened in 2009 to 
force manufacturers to reach an agreement on subscription DTT decoders, immediately before regulating 
the new DTT business model.259
With regard to multiplex management, under the DTT 2005 framework, private broadcasters sharing 
multiplexes have agreed to delegate their management to network operator Abertis Telecom, the dominant 
player in the signal distribution market (see section 5.2.3). RTVE did the same, despite being endowed with 
the power to manage two multiplexes. With the planned reallocation of frequencies before 2015, broadcasters 
will have access to their own multiplex which they are set to manage on their own. Access-related problems 
have emerged mainly at the regional and local levels in the Canary Islands and Madrid, usually because TV 
operators had not agreed on the third party responsible for managing the multiplex, as already noted (see 
section 5.1.3).
Finally, the provision of the Electronic Programming Guide (EPG) has not posed any access problems. In a 
vertically integrated market, broadcasters currently manage their own EPGs in FTA DTT. Th ey are regulated 
by the Telecommunications Act, which states that “to the extent necessary to ensure end-user access to certain 
digital broadcasting services, the CMT may impose [...] obligations on operators that operate application 
program interfaces (APIs) and electronic programme guides (EPG) to facilitate access to these resources on 
257. El País, “El gobierno decide privatizar el 15% de Telefónica este año y el 10% en 1996” (Government decides to privatize 15% of Telefonica this 
year and 10% in 1996), 19 April 1995, at http://elpais.com/diario/1995/04/19/economia/798242428_850215.html (accessed 15 May 2012). 
258. C. Llorens, “European Responses to Bottlenecks in Digital pay-TV: Impacts on pluralism and competition policy,” Cardozo Arts and Entertain-
ment Law Journal (July 1998), pp. 557–586, at http://www.cardozoaelj.net/issues/98/Llorens-Maluquer.pdf (accessed 14 October 2012).
259. El Economista.es, “Ministry of industry achieves an agreement between operators and TV manufacturers and there will no be a new set-top-
box war” (Industria pone de acuerdo a fabricantes y operadores y no habrá nueva guerra de los sintonizadores), at http://ecodiario.eleconomista.es/
sociedad/noticias/1343648/06/09/Tdt-industria-pone-de-acuerdo-a-fabricantes-y-operadores-y-no-habra-nueva-guerra-de-los-sintonizadores.
html (accessed 15 April 2011).
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reasonable, fair and nondiscriminatory terms.”260 Th is prevents the existence of closed EPGs, but does not 
defi ne their content and functionalities. Some policy proposals to clarify the obligations of EPGs have been 
made on offi  cial technical forums, but so far they have not resulted in any form of regulation.261
5.2.3 Transmission Networks
In the signal distribution market (from broadcast station to homes), Abertis Telecom, a division of the 
leading transport and communications infrastructure company Abertis, holds the dominant position (an 86.3 
percent share, according to CMT).262 It is also signifi cant in the signal transport market, from broadcaster 
to broadcast station: it is the second-largest operator with over 30 percent of the business, but it controls the 
leading actor, Overon (47.5 percent)263 jointly with Mediapro (La Sexta). In recent years, it has diversifi ed its 
television business and indeed has led investment in broadband and mobile television.
Abertis’ telecoms activities have caused problems only in the signal broadcast market, where it is considered 
by the CMT to be an SMP (signifi cant market power) operator, and therefore subject to specifi c obligations 
to preserve competition. In May 2009, it was sanctioned (without precedent) for imposing exploitative 
conditions on commercial broadcasters, preventing them from contracting out to another network operator. 
Abertis was fi ned with the second-highest penalty ever imposed by the National Competition Commission 
(Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, CNC), nearly €22.7 million for demanding high penalties in case of 
early cancellation of contracts signed in 2006 with the broadcasters Sogecable, Telecinco, Antena 3, Net TV, 
and Veo TV. It was also penalized for imposing excessively long contracts signed with Veo TV in 2006, and 
with Sogecable, Telecinco, and Net TV in 2008.
Likewise, the CNC censored the discounts off ered by Abertis in the negotiations prior to the contracts signed 
in 2006 that would enable broadcasters to get lower prices if they contracted signal broadcasting jointly in all 
possible regional subdivisions. Abertis appealed against the decision. At the moment, another inquiry is still 
ongoing for impeding other network operators from accessing Abertis’s broadcast stations network, following 
a claim by the satellite operator SES Astra Ibérica.264
260. Law 32/2003 on Telecommunications, BOE no. 234, 4 November 2003, 7th additional provision. Paragraph 2. 
261. See Eladio Gutiérrez, “Herramientas de información y control en manos de padres, educadores y ciudadanos en general en el ámbito de la tele-
visión digital” (Information and control tools in the hands of parents, educators and general public in the fi eld of digital television), in ICMedia, 
La protección del menor tras la ley general de la comunicación audiovisual: perspectivas y retos (Child protection under the general law of audiovisual 
communication: prospects and challenges), May 2012, at http://www.icmedianet.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Proteccion-Menor1.
pdf (accessed 20 June 2012); Carmen Fuente y Raquel Urquiza, “Las EPG como herramientas de información y control” (EPG as information 
and control tool), Telos 84 (July–September 2010), at http://sociedadinformacion.fundacion.telefonica.com/DYC/TELOS/SOBRETELOS/
Nmerosanteriores/DetalleAnteriores_84TELOS_DOSSIER4/seccion=1268&idioma=es_ES&id=2010083109410001&activo=6.do (accessed 
8 October 2012).
262. CMT, Informe fi nal 2009, 2010, p. 156.
263. CMT, Informe fi nal 2009, 2010, pp. 154–155.
264. For access to CNC’s resolutions, see web pages http://www.cncompetencia.es/TabId/105/Default.aspx?contentid=254045 and http://www.cn-
competencia.es/Inicio/Noticias/tabid/105/Default.aspx?Contentid=263138&Pag=12 (accessed 10 April 2011).
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5.3 Telecommunications
5.3.1 Telecoms and News
At the moment, telecoms operators act in the media market through subscription television multichannel 
portfolios. As seen in section 1.1.2, this is a highly concentrated market with three main Spanish nationwide 
players: Digital+ (satellite), Ono packages (cable), and Imagenio (IPTV). Telecoms operators hold controlling 
stakes in Ono and Telefónica (the latter’s commercial brand was recently renamed Movistar after its mobile 
division brand). Telefónica also holds nearly a quarter of Digital+, controlled by PRISA TV, formerly 
Sogecable. It is true that Telefónica held signifi cant stakes in television and radio broadcasters and cinema 
and video production companies under the presidency of Juan de Villalonga, a friend of the former Prime 
Minister Aznar in the late 1990s. Th e aim was to search for business convergence and vertical integration. 
However, his successor, César Alierta, disappointed with the business results of that integration, started to 
remove investment in order to refocus on mobile, broadband, and IPTV. 
At present, neither Telefónica nor Ono operates in the FTA television market or produces its own content. 
Only Digital+, 22 percent of which is owned by Telefónica, provides self-produced live football and 
bullfi ghting broadcasts for its Canal+ brand channels, and is now engaged in contracting out good-quality 
series to Spanish production companies. 
In parallel with this, a second notable trend is the bundling in IPTV and cable supply off ers, which has been 
constant since 2005—both dual and triple play—stabilizing since 2009.265 Analysts note that television is 
the second most preferred option of subscribers after fi xed telephony, although the internet is soon likely 
to overtake television.266 Satellite platform Digital+, the platform off ering only television services, has been 
suff ering from this triple-play competition, as its stagnant subscription and revenue fi gures reveal.267
Th ese trends are not seriously damaging the news content off ered because this is not a strategic product for 
subscription television market players. Th is is confi rmed by their channel packages, advertising campaigns, 
and latest strategic moves, which are focused on football, cinema, and good-quality international drama 
series. In April 2011, Digital+, Ono, and Imagenio started off ering news content in their packages via the 
following diff erent channel types.
 Spanish general-interest channels. Th ere are at least 12 state-wide general-interest channels, half of which 
(La 1, La 2, Antena 3, Cuatro, Telecinco, and La Sexta) are shared by the three main platforms, and 
between four (Digital+) and 27 (Imagenio) regional channels, most of these public service channels. 
Channels from the Catalan, Canarian, Madrilenian, and Andalusian corporations are repeated across the 
three platforms.
265. CMT, Informe anual 2011, pp. 129–130.
266. J.F. Fondevila, “El peso de la televisión en el triple play” (Th e weight of triple-play television). Zer 14(27) 2009, p. 28.
267. S. Beceiro, “Tendencias de la televisión de pago en Europa. Las plataformas de televisión digital por satélite (2004–2007)” (Trends in subscriber 
TV in Europe. Digital satellite TV platforms (2004–2007)), Telos 83, 2010. 
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 Spanish all-news channels. State-wide RTVE’s 24 Horas appears on all three platforms, and the Valencian 
public regional channel 24/9 only on Imagenio.
 International all-news channels. BBC World, CNN International, and Euronews are available on all 
three platforms. Other channels on off er are Al Jazeera, France 24, and Fox News.
 International general-interest channels. Th ere are almost 20 channels, mainly appearing on Ono, and 
only one is shared by all packages (TV5 Monde).
Th e must-carry regime in force since the 2003 Telecoms law268 has changed with digital switch-over. Telecoms 
were obliged to off er general-interest channels in their portfolios, whereas broadcasters could not receive 
any payment in return. Under LGCA 2010, commercial broadcasters will be paid,269 a condition telecoms 
operators have opposed since the relaunch of DTT in 2005.270 Cable operators are now tempted to realize 
long-standing threats to get rid of general-interest channels if they are made to pay for them. Again, this will 
not seriously damage the news supply on off er, since commercial broadcasters are focussing their schedules 
on entertainment (see section 1.2.2).
5.3.2 Pressure of Telecoms on News Providers
As far as we know, and for the reasons explained in section 5.3.1, no pressure has been exercised by telecoms 
operators on news providers. In fact, quite the contrary: commercial and public-owned broadcasters have 
been lobbying for payment in return for their channels.
5.4 Assessments
Overall, the digitization of analog television has not eliminated two main features of the broadcasting 
spectrum license allocation policy: it has developed under a decentralized political structure, one of its 
key points being the respect assigned to the Autonomous Communities’ constitutional prerogatives. And 
government authorities assigning broadcasting spectrum frequencies in public tenders are suspected of biased 
party political criteria. Th is is especially the case at the Autonomous Communities’ level, where the situation 
has been framed as a “democratic defi cit” by media scholar Enrique Bustamante.271 Ironically, allocation 
objectives in the hyped up, new DTT seem to be replicating the tendencies of Francoist radio: to reward 
political loyalties rather than to preserve a healthy market. 
268. Law 32/2003 on Telecommunications, BOE no. 234, 4 November 2003, 7th additional provision.
269. LGCA 2010, Art. 31.
270. Cinco Días, “Ono y R se negarán a emitir los 20 canales de TV digital si se les obliga a pagar por ello” (Ono and R will reject broadcasting the 
20 DTT channels if forced to pay for them), 31 March 2006, at http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/empresas/Ono-R-negaran-emitir-cana-
les-TV-digital-les-obliga-pagar/20060331cdscdiemp_8 (accessed 15 April 2011).
271. E. Bustamante, “La comunicación en las Comunidades Autónomas: un défi cit democrático fuerte” (Communication in Autonomous Com-
munities: a strong democratic defi cit), in Informe sobre la democracia en España 2010 (Report on Democracy in Spain 2010), Fundación Alter-
nativas, Madrid, 2010, p. 219, at http://www.falternativas.org/content/download/16565/479715/version/7/fi le/IDE+2010Baja.pdf (accessed 9 
April 2012) (hereafter Bustamente, “La comunicación en las Comunidades Autónomas”).
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So far, its sustainability has been a secondary issue. Nevertheless, media scholarship, the commercial state-
wide broadcasting sector, and the regulator CMT have all warned against the lack of viability of such an 
infl ated Spanish DTT market.272 Only now, with the economic crisis, is the market resizing, with the giving 
back of licenses in the regional and local markets and consolidation at national level (see section 6). 
Th e digital switch-over, as a policy solution, could have served as an opportunity to redesign the television 
market with equal opportunities for all players, and to improve television quality through competition. 
Th is opportunity was missed. Instead, the traditional commercial analog broadcasters were privileged. As 
seen, only in late 2012 and pressed by the rising public debt crisis did commercial operators commit to the 
development of HDTV and interactive services. Th e realization of this pledge is yet to be seen.
Th e DTT media policy has thus been reactive in the absence of an independent state-wide regulator focussed 
on the public interest. 
Other challenges concern the eff ects of freeing up the digital dividend to media, telecoms operators, and 
consumers. To date, commercial television broadcasters have been the most powerful industry actors regarding 
the allocation of spectrum. But their infl uence is set to decline due to the reduction of their multiplexes and 
the allocation of digital dividend licenses to the three global telecoms operators in the mobile telephony 
market. Th is power will only be confi rmed if the generational change in consumers fi nally privileges mobile 
broadband internet to the detriment of traditional, home television consumption. 
In the short run, though, and in the context of a serious public debt crisis, DTT consumers will have to pay 
most of the cost in adapting their residential reception equipment to frequency relocation, a situation that 
associations have labeled with the derogatory expression “second switch-off ,” more than two years after the 
offi  cial one in April 2010. 
272. Among scholars, see Villanueva et al., La TDT: ¿un negocio imposible?; R. Zallo, “La política de Comunicación Audiovisual del gobierno social-
ista (2004–2009): un giro neoliberal” (Th e Socialist Government audiovisual communications policy (2004–2009): a neoliberal turn), Revista 
Latina de Comunicación Social, 65 (2010), p. 18, at http://www.revistalatinacs.org/10/art/880_UPV/02_Zallo.html (accessed March 2011). 
Th e president of Antena 3 Group said in March 2010 that “in no other European country is there a competition level like the one in Spain. 
Th e whole system must be economically sustainable.” See El Mundo, “La TDT, un escenario de nuevas oportunidades para el sector” (DTT, a 
scenario of new opportunities for the sector), 28 March 2010, at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/03/25/comunicacion/1269538989.
html (accessed 2 April 2011). In 2008, the powerful PRISA group blamed the lack of viability of the Spanish model when it shut down its local 
TV network: El País, “PRISA acuerda el cierre de la red de televisión Localia” (PRISA agrees to shutting down Localia television network), 14 
November 2008, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/PRISA/acuerda/cierre/red/television/Localia/elpepisoc/20081114elpepisoc_4/Tes 
(accessed 10 March 2011).
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6. Digital Business
On top of the structural crisis of the media business model, there is a deep economic recession, the direct 
impact of which is a very signifi cant reduction in advertising investment in Spain. Th e data show that 
advertising investment in conventional media fell by 31 percent between 2007 and 2011, which, in absolute 
fi gures, represents almost €2.5 billion less for the sector in the space of three years. Th e evaporation of a third 
of advertising revenue has aff ected each medium diff erently. Th e press has been aff ected the most, with a fall 
of 49 percent. Television’s advertising revenue fell by 24 percent in three years, which, in absolute fi gures, 
represents around €1.2 billion. Radio has been able to hold up better, but it has still lost 22.7 percent of its 
advertising investment. In contrast, the internet has experienced an 86 percent rise in advertising expenditure 
(see Table 13).273 
Th e 2010 data indicated a tendency towards overall stabilization, and even a slight increase in advertising 
spend, from which television and the internet particularly benefi tted. However, a second dip in the advertising 
recession became clear in 2011 data. Looking to the future, the prospects could be more positive for television 
broadcasters because the main national commercial operators have merged: Telecinco took over Cuatro in 
late 2010, and Antena 3 took over La Sexta in September 2012. Added to this is the ban on advertising on 
RTVE since 2010, as mentioned above. All these factors allow the books of these companies to be balanced 
so that, in the not too distant future, they can return to their pre-recession profi tability. 
However, the economic viability of new entrants following switch-over remains to be seen. Th is is particularly 
the case for regional and local channels, although it also applies to certain national channels like Veo TV or 
Net TV. In the future, it is more than likely that some of these minority television operators will merge, in 
order to achieve economies of scale and to reduce costs, or continue to rent their channels to other content 
providers such as Disney, Paramount, Sony, Discovery Communications, or Intereconomía274 (see Figure 9 
and Table 12).
273. Infoadex, “Resumen. Estudio Infoadex de la inversión publicitaria en España 2012” (Summary. Infoadex study on advertising spending in Spain 
2012), Infoadex, Madrid, 2012, at http://www.infoadex.es/RESUMEN%202012.pdf (accessed 20 July 2012).
274. Villanueva et al., La TDT: ¿un negocio imposible?.
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Th e fall in revenue for the press and radio forced a deep-seated restructuring that has yet to be completed. For 
the moment at least, this has led to a reduction in costs, mainly by making employees redundant. Th e growth 
of advertising in online media has not kept pace with the growth of users, and a viable business model for 
online news businessses in particular remains largely elusive.
Th is situation of deep recession has fostered two takeovers among the major Spanish groups: Telecinco’s buy-
out of Cuatro and Antena 3’s buy-out of La Sexta. Th e companies have made their adjustments by closing 
unprofi table media or cutting back on the workforce. According to data from FAPE, from November 2008 to 
September 2012, the total number of media-sector employees who lost their jobs was 7,877.275 Other sources 
put that fi gure at around 4,800, of whom 1,700 were journalists until 2011.276 
6.1 Ownership
6.1.1 Legal Developments in Media Ownership
Media concentration laws in Spain have traditionally diff ered from those in other Western countries: there 
are no rules to prevent press concentration or to impede cross-media concentration. Th e reasons are historic. 
Most of the Spanish press played an important and positive role in the country’s democratization, so any 
control over ownership was considered a form of unlawful state control over freedom of expression. In 
addition, the fi nancial interests of Spanish press groups in developing private television in Spain conspired 
against the powers that be, in order to impede any attempt to place limits on press and television cross-
media ownership. Consequently, the only regulation existing in Spain to limit media concentration applies 
to television and radio. 
Th e absence of such cross-media legislation has profoundly shaped the media sector in Spain because it has 
facilitated the existence of six or eight medium-sized multimedia groups that compete against each other in 
the television, radio, press, and internet sectors. As a consequence, the media sector in Spain presents itself as 
being relatively diverse in monomedia terms, but has a high degree of cross-media concentration of ownership. 
However, the economic downturn has precipitated a wave of consolidation across media industries that could 
threaten media diversity in the near future.277 
Th e main changes to media concentration regulation in Spain in recent years have been generated, to a great 
extent, by the process of television digitization, and the breakthrough can be dated to 2005. In that year, 
the socialist government of Rodrí guez Zapatero passed another important reform of media concentration 
275. Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas de España (FAPE), “Observatorio Profesional” (Professional Observatory), Madrid, 2011, at http://
fape.es/fi le/44787/observatoriocrisis24septiembredoc (accessed 1 October 2012).
276. B. Díaz-Nosty, Libro negro del periodismo en España (Black book of Spanish journalism), Asociación de la Prensa de Madrid-Cátedra Unesco 
Universidad de Málaga, Madrid-Malaga, 2011 (hereafter Díaz-Nosty, Libro negro).
277. C. Llorens, “Spain’s Media Concentration Policy: A Patchwork Crucial to the Understanding of the Spanish Media System,” International Jour-
nal of Communication 4 (2010), pp. 844–864, at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/791/462 (accessed 10 March 2011).
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regulation through Law 10/2005 on Urgent Measures for the Promotion of Digital Terrestrial Television, 
Cable TV Liberalization and Promotion of Media Pluralism. Th e new act revoked Art. 4.3 of Law 10/1988, 
which had limited the number of private national analog terrestrial television broadcasting licenses to only 
three. As a result, the Government became able to grant new national analog terrestrial television licenses if 
frequencies were available. And indeed, a fourth such license was granted in 2006 to a new multimedia group 
(La Sexta), created by Mediapro and Globomedia, along with the Mexican media group Televisa. 
Simultaneously, another important change in the Spanish television landscape took place. In 2006, 
the socialist government approved a change in the license-holding conditions for Canal+, until then a 
subscription television channel, to allow it to become a commercial FTA channel. Canal+ became Cuatro, a 
new commercial channel (see section 1.1.2 and Figure 9).
Th e television advertising market was still buoyant in 2006, and PRISA, Spain’s biggest media group, saw a 
new opportunity to increase its revenue. Moreover, as a main shareholder in Sogecable, it already had a digital 
subscription television platform, Digital+. It realized that there was no need to waste an FTA analog television 
broadcasting license on a subscription television model that left the whole television advertising market to 
the other two operators, Antena 3 and Telecinco. Consequently, since 2006, the two new channels (Cuatro 
and La Sexta) have been trying to break down the duopoly formed by Telecinco (owned by Mr Berlusconi’s 
Mediaset fi rm) and Antena 3 (owned by the main Spanish publisher, Planeta). Th e arguments for enlarging 
the number of operators were based on pluralism rhetoric, as the title of the law itself suggests. However, the 
opposition parties claimed that the two regulatory changes were made to help multimedia groups like PRISA 
and Mediapro, both of which were ideologically aligned with the governing party, PSOE. 
However, the most profound reform of Spanish media concentration regulation since 1989 took place when 
the Government issued the Royal Decree-Law 1/2009 on Urgent Measures on Telecommunications in February 
2009 (validated by Parliament in March 2009), which amended Private Television Law 10/1988. Th e use of 
a decree was criticized as a tactic to avoid a broad parliamentary debate on audiovisual matters. Finally, the 
whole new media concentration regulation was incorporated in LGCA 2010, approved in April 2010.
With regard to media pluralism, the new regulation retained the principle whereby a corporate or physical 
person directly or indirectly holding 5 percent or more of the share capital or voting rights of a broadcasting 
license-holder cannot have a signifi cant shareholding in any other company within the same coverage area. 
However, there is an important exception for national broadcasting license-holders: they are allowed to hold 
various and simultaneous shares in several national television stations as a result of a merger, so long as their 
average audience is no higher than 27 percent of the total audience over the 12 consecutive months prior to 
an acquisition. Th is percentage fi gure was carefully chosen because it only prevented a merger between the 
two dominant commercial operators in Spain, Telecinco and Antena 3.
As an external pluralism safeguard, the regulation mentions that no corporate or physical person directly or 
indirectly holding rights in a national broadcasting license-holder can acquire a signifi cant shareholding or 
voting rights in other broadcasting license-holders, where such an acquisition would involve negating the 
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presence of at least three national broadcasting license-holders. Th erefore, a minimum threshold of three 
independent operators was established. As another safeguard, this one for the future, the new regulation 
restricts the number of DTT multiplexes that can be owned by a single operator. Of six national digital 
commercial multiplexes in 2010, it established that no corporate or physical person could acquire signifi cant 
shareholding or voting rights in a broadcasting license-holder if it involved controlling more than two multi-
plexes of the public spectrum. Again, a minimum of three multiplex operators had to be present in the market. 
Th e regulation for ownership in the radio sector is based on LGCA 2010. It establishes that a corporate or 
physical person may control up to 50 percent of the radio broadcasting licenses available in a certain area, so 
long as the total number of overlapping radio broadcasting licenses controlled in that area is no higher than 
fi ve. A person can also control up to a third of the radio broadcasting licenses with total or partial coverage of 
the state. Where there is only one frequency available in a particular area, no corporate or physical person may 
control more than 40 percent of radio broadcasting licenses of that kind in the same region or Autonomous 
Community. Th ese percentages are calculated by excluding public radio stations, and the limits are applied 
separately to analog and digital radio stations. Th e limits are established in line with the market status quo, 
with a high dominance of frequencies owned by PRISA’s radio group, PRISA Radio (former Unión Radio). 
Regarding local terrestrial television, according to Law 41/1995, which was amended in 2002 and 2003, 
broadcasting license-holders cannot create a network or enter into networking agreements with other 
license-holders. Th ey may do so only after the government of the region where they are located has given its 
authorization. 
Constraints on non-EU nationals have been in place since the establishment of Law 10/1988. Th e latest 
reform (LGCA 2010) established that non-EU nationals can buy new shares only if a reciprocal agreement 
with the country of origin is acknowledged. It also states that non-EU nationals or fi rms can directly or 
indirectly hold a maximum of 50 percent of broadcasting license-holder share capital.
6.1.2 New Entrants in the News Market
At fi rst sight, it might seem that the entry of new operators into the Spanish media market since 2005 
has been very signifi cant, especially in the television sector, taking advantage of the introduction of DTT. 
However, if the nature and origin of these new actors is analyzed in depth, it turns out that the situation 
has not substantially changed because the majority of new television operators belong to consolidated press 
groups that have accessed national DTT licenses.
Indeed, only one really new player has made a powerful entrance in the sector from the audiovisual production 
business. Th is is the Mediapro Group, a production company based in Barcelona, which was founded in 
1994 by Jaume Roures and Tatxo Benet, two sports producers from the Catalan regional public broadcaster 
TV3. Th ey started producing sports broadcasts for Spanish pay-TV channels and renting retransmission 
facilities. Later, Mediapro grew and diversifi ed its operations. It began to produce its own programs and 
thematic channels, acquired sports rights, and even produced some international movies. It merged with 
Globomedia, another succesful Spanish independent producer, and WPP, the UK advertising company, to 
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create an audiovisual holding called Imagina in 2006. Th is company created and controlled the generalist 
channel La Sexta. However, huge fi nancial diffi  culties and the advertising crisis forced La Sexta to agree to 
merge by means of a takeover by Antena 3 at the end of 2011. Th e group’s prospects are gloomy as some of 
the Imagina companies are experiencing serious fi nancial difi culties.
In the press sector, the situation has followed the economic cycles. With economic growth, revenues and 
circulation were high, free newspapers expanded and a new national left-wing newspaper owned by Mediapro, 
Público, appeared in 2007. Th e appearance of free dailies is a relevant factor. Th e fi rst to appear and become 
sector leader was 20 minutos (in 2000). Qué emerged in 2005 and a year later, ADN and Metro. As a result of 
intense competition and abundant advertising investment, the free dailies’ circulation peaked in 2006 with 
a 58 percent share of the overall Spanish dailies’ circulation. Even in the context of recession, 20 minutos, 
Qué, and ADN circulated an overall average of 1.9 million daily copies in 2010. Before the crisis, in 2007, 
the fi gure was 3.8 million.278 However, as the economic crisis deepened, the sector was acutely aff ected by 
the decline in advertising, its sole funding mechanism. In 2010, the free press circulation share decreased to 
41 percent, also due to the disappearance of several titles. Metro was shut in 2009, ADN in 2011, and Qué! 
in 2012. 
Nevertheless, free dailies remain circulation leaders: 20 minutos distributed on average 710,000 copies in 
2010, clearly overtaking El País, which leads the pay market (see section 1). Th e free dailies have extended 
press readership to new users not buying papers before, for example young readers and medium- and low-
income people with a standard secondary education. 
Th e paid-for newspaper market was also heavily aff ected by the economic crisis. Publico went into 
administration at the beginning of 2012 and rumours of an ABC and El Mundo merger were frequent in 
2012. Nevertheless, a new title in Catalan, Ara, emerged in 2010. 
In the radio sector, the entry of new actors has been minimal, so the ownership of radio by large Spanish 
networks has remained stable in recent years. However, as the advertising market shrinks, merger activity 
between the three right-oriented national networks (COPE, Onda Cero, and ABC Radio) is more likely. 
6.1.3 Ownership Consolidation
Concentration levels in the media sector generally were in decline up until 2010, and started to increase 
again in 2011 (see Table 11). Circulation fi gures were collected for all Spanish newspapers apart from sports, 
fi nancial, and free newspapers. Th e four newspapers with the highest circulation fi gures experienced a minor 
decrease relative to the total Spanish press circulation between 2005 and 2010, but the concentration level 
grew in 2011. Th ese four newspapers, El País, ABC, El Mundo, and La Vanguardia, account for 40.3 percent 
of total circulation, up from 39.7 percent in 2005. 
278. AEDE, Libro Blanco de la Prensa diaria 2010; circulation data from OJD.
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In radio, concentration was analyzed on the basis of the combined audience for the four most important 
generalist stations. Th e resulting data show a similar trend to the press sector. Th e concentration level fell 
slightly from 88.5 percent in 2005 to 83.3 percent in 2010 and began to rise again to 85.2 percent in 2011. 
Table 11 shows two indicators for television, advertising investment revenue concentration and audience 
concentration for the four leading companies. Th e situation shows a high audience concentration, with a 
downward trend over the period 2005–2009, and greater advertising investment concentration, also with a 
downward trend, in the same period. However, it should be noted that in the last two years analyzed (2010–
2011), this trend reversed because of the merger between Telecinco and the FTA channel Cuatro. 
In addition, concentration in the television sector was expected to be even more pronounced in 2012 due 
to the merger between La Sexta and Antena 3, although the eff ects of this were not noticeable until late 
2012. Audience data for October 2012 showed that rankings for Spanish television groups are as follows: 
Mediaset obtained 28.8 percent of the audience share, followed closely by Antena3-LaSexta with 26.9 
percent, then RTVE with 17.6 percent, Vocento with 4.5 percent, and Unedisa with 3.6 percent. Th e fi rst 
four groups account for the 77.8 percent of the total audience, meaning an increase of 4.5 points over the 
2011 concentration data and an increase of 9.3 percentage points over the 2005 data (see Table 11).279 
Consequently, 2013 is expected to bring a repeat or an increase in the high levels of advertising and audience 
concentration found in 2005, before the Spanish television market was opened up to the entry of the analog 
channels Cuatro and La Sexta, and the expansion of digital channels by the DTT switch-over in 2010.
Table 11.
Media concentration based on market share of the top four fi rms (%), 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005/2011 
Quality press 39.7 39.1 39.1 38.9 38.7 38.3 40.3 +1.5
Non-thematic radio 88.5 88 88.4 86.7 86.7 83.8 85.2 –3.8
TV advertising 90.6 86 85.4 83 79.5 84.8 89.8 –0.9
TV audience 68.5 70.1 68.8 64.1 62.3 64.4 73.3 +7
Sources: Quality press fi gures based on the number of issues eff ectively distributed according to OJD: see AEDE, Libro Blanco de 
la Prensa diaria, 2012, 2010, 2009, 2007, and 2006; radio data based on audience fi gures provided by AIMC, Marco Gen-
eral de los Medios en España, Madrid, 2012; TV advertising data based on advertising revenue provided by CMT, Informe 
anual 2006, 2007, 2008–2009, 2010, and 2011; TV audience data provided by Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis 
Televisivo 2011” 
Generally speaking, media ownership in Spain has swung back and forth over the last fi ve years, especially in 
the television sector, which is where anti-trust regulation is mainly focussed. In 2005, the Spanish television 
viewer could tune in to two private national channels (Antena 3 and Telecinco), two public channels (La 1 and 
La 2), plus one or two public regional channels and one or two local channels. In total, a viewer could tune 
279. Barlovento Comunicación, Nota Octubre (October note), p. 2. at http://www.barloventocomunicacion.es/images/publicaciones/NOTA_OC-
TUBRE_2012_BARLOVENTO_COMUNICACION__AUDIENCIAS.pdf (accessed 25 November 2012).
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in to between six and eight analog channels. When analog television was switched off  in 2010, the number 
of channels multiplied by fi ve, in what was referred to as the “media bubble,” facilitated by digitization and 
engulfed in political clientelism. 
Such a high multiplication of operators was fi nancially unsustainable, even outside the context of recession. 
Consequently, the “media bubble” has burst, mostly at regional and local levels, yet also at national level for 
new national television operators with unknown brands such as Veo TV and Net TV.280 Th e viability crisis 
has reduced the number of agents in the market due to mergers between television channels (Cuatro and 
Telecinco, La Sexta and Antena 3), and has forced some operators to rent out frequencies to other operators 
(Disney Channel, MTV, Intereconomía, AXN, 13TV). It has even led to licenses being surrendered by some 
regional and local operators (see section 5.1).
Even before Parliament validated new and more fl exible media ownership thresholds in the Private Television 
Law 10/1988 in 2009, some commercial operators were already in merger talks. Soon after, PRISA sold 
Cuatro to Mediaset’s Telecinco in December 2010 and the CNC approved the merger in October 2010, 
subject to commitments by Telecinco to limit its power in the television advertising, FTA terrestrial and 
audiovisual content markets.281 La Sexta and Antena 3, for their part, reached a fi nal agreement in December 
2011 after two years of talks. Th e CNC merger review in July 2012 imposed tougher conditions than the 
merger between Telecinco and Cuatro.282 As a consequence, La Sexta and Antena 3 announced their decision 
to abandon the merger because of the low profi tability envisaged. Shortly after, on 24 August 2012, the 
Government decided to relax the requirements imposed by the CNC on general interest grounds.283 Plans 
for the merger have since been revived.284
Th erefore, as there are eight national digital multiplexes, two of them are owned by public broadcaster RTVE 
with six channels, Mr Berlusconi’s Mediaset España manages 10 channels, Antena 3-La Sexta 10 channels, 
four channels are owned by Net TV, and fi ve more by Veo TV (see Table 12).
280. Díaz-Nosty, Libro negro.
281. CNC, “La CNC aprueba con compromisos la operació n de concentració n Telecinco/Cuatro” (Th e CNC approves Telecinco/Cuatro con-
centration with compromises), 29 October 2011, at http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/Noticias/tabid/105/Default.aspx?Conten-
tid=281957&Pag=1 (accessed 10 July 2012).
282. CNC, “La CNC condiciona la adquisición de La Sexta por Antena 3” (CNC conditions the acquisition of La Sexta by Antena 3), press release, 
13 July 2012, at http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/GestionDocumental/tabid/76/Default.aspx?EntryId=149433&Command=Core_Down-
load&Method=attachment (accessed 15 July 2012).
283. Government of Spain, “Acuerdo por el que se autoriza la operación de concentración económica Antena 3/La Sexta y se imponen condiciones a 
la misma” (Agreement authorizing the economic concentration between Antenna 3/La Sexta and where conditions are imposed), at http://www.
lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/_2012/refc20120824.htm#Concentracion (accessed 20 September 2012).
284. R.G. Gómez and I. Gallo, “Antena 3 absorbe la Sexta” (Antena 3 takes over La Sexta), El País, 14 December 2011, at http://sociedad.elpais.com/
sociedad/2011/12/14/actualidad/1323858005_357878.html (accessed 15 December 2011).
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Table 12.
National DTT channels by media group
 Antena 3 Televisión Mediaset España Net TV Veo TV RTVE
Antena3 La Sexta Telecinco Cuatro Intereconomía Discovery Max La 1
Nitro La Sexta3 FDF Divinity Disney 
Channel
13TV La 2
Nova Xplora Boing Energy MTV Marca TV Clan
Neox La Siete Paramount 
Channel
Mundo 
Interactivo
Teledeporte
Antena 3HD La Sexta HD Telecinco HD Cuatro HD AXN (pay-TV) TVE-HD
GolTV 
(pay-TV)
LTC (shopping 
channel)
24 Hours
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by companies and the Government
Th e international presence in the Spanish media sector has historically focussed on private television, and is 
mostly Italian, even if the presence of U.S. specialized TV content providers is growing. Th us, the leading 
private television channel in Spain is Telecinco, which has been run by the Italian group Mediaset since 2002, 
the time when it managed to become the majority shareholder in the company. Only Telecinco’s December 
2009 merger with the broadcasting activities of PRISA reduced this fi gure to 41 percent in 2011.285 
Th e PRISA-Telecinco merger may have reduced news diversity by leading to the closure of CNN+, a 24-
hour news channel launched on satellite in 1999 as a Turner-PRISA joint venture, then relaunched in 2008 
as an FTA DTT channel. (Its initial annual audience share of 0.2 percent trebled to 0.6 percent in 2010.)286 
Telecinco, well known for its reality and celebrity shows and drama series, replaced CNN+ with a round-the-
clock “Big Brother” broadcast, and later on with Divinity, a women-oriented channel. PRISA declared that it 
would launch a new news channel on subscription satellite and cable.287 Th is has not happened. RTVE’s 24 
Hours remains the sole news channel on nationwide free-to-air DTT.
Along the same lines, the second most signifi cant television channel in terms of audience and advertising 
revenue, Antena 3, was acquired from Telefónica by the Planeta-DeAgostini group in 2003, a company 
jointly owned, with equal shareholdings, by the owners of the main Spanish publishing company, Planeta, 
and the Italian publishing company DeAgostini. Th ey currently control 44 percent of the Antena 3 group, 
which, besides owning the television channel of the same name, owns Onda Cero, the second most popular 
285. Gestevisión Telecinco, Informe 2010 (2010 Report), Gestevisión Telecinco, Madrid, 2010, p. 60, at http://www.gente5.telecinco.es/videosinv/
pub_ieconomia/pdf/TELECINCO_INFORMES_2010_CUENTAS_ANUALES_Y_GOBIERNO_CORPORATIVO.pdf (accessed 26 June 
2011).
286. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis televisivo 2010, pp. 13–15.
287. El País, “CNN+ dice adiós por su inviabilidad” (CNN+ says goodbye due to its unviability), 27 December 2010, at http://www.elpais.com/
articulo/gente/tv/CNN/dice/adios/inviabilidad/elpepugen/20101227elpepuage_3/Tes (accessed 19 June 2012).
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radio station. Th e German company UFA, an audiovisual subsidiary of the Bertelsmann group, also owns 20 
percent of the Antena 3 group.288
Th e Italian presence is also signifi cant in the Spanish press. In 2007, RCS, the Italian multimedia group that 
publishes Corriere della Sera, became the controlling shareholder (96 percent) of the Spanish media group 
Unidad Editorial, which owns the newspaper El Mundo, the second best-selling generalist newspaper in 
Spain; the sports newspaper Marca, the leader of the sports press in Spain; and the digital television group 
Veo TV, with a minimal audience share of 0.4 percent with its Veo 7 channel, and 0.8 percent for Marca TV 
in 2011. Veo 7 was closed in late 2011 and has since been replaced by Discovery Max.289
As mentioned earlier, the presence of new national and international actors in the Spanish media sector has 
increased thanks to the DTT development process. Th is dual characteristic—the advent of new national and 
international actors—can be observed, for example, when analyzing the shareholders of the analog channel 
La Sexta in 2006. Th e principal shareholders of Grupo Audiovisual de Medio de Producción (GAMP), the 
company that managed the channel, were a group of independent Spanish producers, Imagina, holding 51 
percent of the shares, and the Mexican television group Televisa owned 40 percent of the company. 
So far, Televisa’s investment has been purely fi nancial; it has not participated in content management or in 
the editorial line of the group’s channels. However, the Mexican group has been the party most interested 
in promoting a merger of the group’s stations with Antena 3’s, in order to make a return on an investment 
that so far has not been as lucrative as expected. In 2011, La Sexta had 7.6 percent of the national audience 
across all the group’s channels, and occupied fourth place among Spanish television groups, after the RTVE 
group, Telecinco, and Antena 3.290 In late 2010, La Sexta’s diffi  cult fi nancial situation led to a takeover buy-
out by Antena 3, as explained earlier. Televisa has given up its shareholding in GAMP’s La Sexta in exchange 
for a 14.5 percent shareholding in the bigger mother company, Imagina. Consequently, Imagina controls 92 
percent of La Sexta and Televisa is now represented on the board of directors of Imagina, a more production-
oriented company than GAMP. 
Th e DTT implementation process also saw the launch of Cuatro in 2006, a new generalist channel, because 
the Government allowed the broadcast of subscription television channel Canal+ to be replaced by an FTA 
channel (see section 1.2.2). Th e channel was owned by the PRISA group, the main media group in Spain at 
that time, and shortly after its launch it became the Spanish audience’s fourth choice after RTVE, Telecinco, 
and Antena 3. However, the PRISA group’s excessive indebtedness caused by an off er to acquire shares of 
its digital subscription television subsidiary, Sogecable, in 2008, forced that group to seek fi nancial partners 
that could provide capital to prevent it from going bankrupt.291 In December 2011, a deal with the U.S.-
288. Grupo Antena 3, “Informe anual y de responsabilidad corporative” (Annual and corporate responsibility report), Grupo Antena 3, Madrid, 
2011, p. 15, at http://www.grupoantena3.com/nuevaa3tv/doc/InformeAnual2010.pdf (accessed 19 June 2012).
289. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis televisivo 2011,” p. 14.
290. Barlovento Comunicación, “Análisis televisivo 2011,” p. 14.
291. N. Almirón, “El deute de Sogecable i PRISA: anàlisi i gènesi d’una estratègia empresarial global d’alt risc” (Th e debt of Sogecable and PRISA: 
Analysis and genesis of a high risk global business strategy), Quaderns del CAC 29 (2008), pp. 105–116, at http://www.cac.cat/pfw_fi les/cma/
recerca/quaderns_cac/Q29_Almiron_EN.pdf (accessed 26 June 2011).
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based Liberty investment fund was approved, whereby Liberty investors own 57.7 percent of the company, 
although its management continues to remain in the hands of the founding family and its CEO, Juan Luis 
Cebrián (see section 1.3.1). 
Consequently, the main media group in Spain, which owns the leading newspaper El País, the main radio 
broadcasting group Unión Radio (SER, C40, Cadena Dial, etc.), the main subscription television platform 
Digital+, and several other media outlets, fell under the control of U.S. fi nancial interests. Th e fi nancial need 
was so pressing that PRISA decided to sell its FTA television channel Cuatro and 22 percent of its subscription 
television platform Digital+ to Telecinco, owned by Mr Berlusconi. In exchange, PRISA received 17 percent 
of the newly merged company, called Mediaset España. In practice, the deal means that Cuatro has been sold 
to Telecinco. In the same way, this Spanish group sold another 22 percent of the leading digital subscription 
television platform in Spain, Digital+, to Telefónica in late 2010. 
Th e switch-over to DTT has also led to the entry of international content providers into the FTA television 
market. Many of them were already operating in Spain through subscription television platforms. However, 
with DTT they have managed to secure a bigger audience and higher advertising revenue. Th e operators with 
the greatest fi nancial diffi  culties and inexperience of audiovisual production such as Veo TV and Net TV have 
rented out some of their channels to international groups. For example, Sony has rented a channel from the 
multiplex of Veo TV, which is owned by Unidad Editorial, to broadcast its subscription television channel 
AXN. Discovery Network has rented another channel from Veo TV to broadcast its entertainment channel 
Discovery Max. For its part, Net TV, owned by the press group Vocento, has ceded two of its four digital 
channels to the international companies Disney and Viacom, which have decided to broadcast the Disney 
Channel and MTV respectively. While Viacom has remained on the sidelines of Net TV’s ownership, Disney 
Channel struck a deal to have a 20 percent shareholding in Net TV (see Table 12).292
Simultaneously, the explosion of channels brought about by the switch-over to DTT has also facilitated the 
entry of new national content suppliers. Th e Unidad Editorial group, the owner of the Veo TV multiplex, 
has rented out one of its channels to a group of shareholders connected with the Catholic Church, 13TV. For 
its part, the Net TV group has ceded one of its channels to the media group Intereconomía, whose ideology 
is very conservative, in exchange for an increase in its participation in the shareholding of Net TV of up to 
25 percent (see Table 12).
In short, the internationalization of the media sector is a signifi cant and growing reality and, for some 
experts, foreign infl uence in the media, and particularly the Italian infl uence, is worrying.293
293. Vocento, “A la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. Comunicación de hecho relevante” (To the national stock market commission. 
Relevant facts), Vocento, Madrid, 2008, at http://www.vocento.com/pdf/hechos_relevantes/2008/080212HechoRelevanteDisneyCastellano.
pdf (accessed 26 June 2011).
293. Díaz-Nosty, Libro negro.
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Th e fi gures of the four media groups with a foreign controlling interest in their shareholdings—PRISA (United 
States), UNEDISA (Italy), Mediaset España (Italy), and Grupo Antena 3 (Italy-Germany)—show that 70 
percent of the quality press, 80 percent of the commercial television audience, and 70 percent of generalist 
commercial radio are in non-Spanish hands.294 But it should be noted that in most cases the management 
and the content continues to be led by Spanish shareholders, as is the case with PRISA and Grupo Antena 3. 
Th e only group with a Spanish controlling interest is Vocento, the owner of ABC, which is the third-largest 
newspaper in terms of circulation, and Net TV. Th e Imagina group, owned by the independent producers 
who used to manage La Sexta, also had a Spanish controlling interest, but its integration into Grupo Antena 3 
has caused its “Spanishness” to become diluted in the new Antena 3-La Sexta group. And even more so if we 
consider that Mexico’s Televisa now has a 14.5 percent shareholding in Imagina.
Regarding pluralism, while DTT has allowed the number of actors and content to expand, the recession 
has caused a contraction, so the situation is now back to where it was originally in 2005. A very good 
example of this is the fusion of Cuatro’s digital channels with Telecinco’s, and of Antena 3’s with La Sexta’s. 
In the fi rst case, besides involving the destruction of 89 employment contracts,295 it involved the loss of the 
all-news channel CNN+ in December 2010 and its replacement by the entertainment channel Divinity, 
which is aimed at a female audience. Th e merger has also involved the integration of the staff , equipment, 
and IT systems of the news services of Cuatro and Telecinco. However, diff erent news services are off ered 
at alternative times on each channel in order to reach diff erent audiences because, while Telecinco’s news 
audience is more generalist, Cuatro’s is more urban and male.296 
Looking to the future for Spanish television, it is more than likely that the diversity of actors and content will 
decrease in light of the economic recession, which will lead to a fall in advertising investment. Th e present 
scenario is a return to the situation prior to the launch of DTT: an oligopoly with two major commercial 
operators dominating the advertising market (Telecinco-Cuatro and Antena 3-La Sexta), three dominating 
audience share (RTVE, Telecinco, and Antena 3), and a group of small channels with tiny and niche audiences 
managed by Net TV and Veo TV, which have decided to rent out their channels to the highest bidder.
Ownership confl icts have aff ected the practice of journalism. In 2011, the sports journalist José Antonio 
Abellán was dismissed from the Catholic radio network COPE due to the hiring of a new journalist. Fears 
that he might reveal details and information about his contract and his position inside the radio station led 
the managers of COPE to put pressure on the television channel Telecinco to ensure that Mr Abellán would 
not be able to take part in one of the late-night shows with the highest audiences in Spain, “La Noria.”297
294. Díaz-Nosty, Libro negro.
295. Gestevisión Telecinco, Hecho Relevante (Relevant fact), Gestevisión Telecinco, Madrid, 24 March 2011, at http://www.telecinco.es/inversores/
es/documentacion/Hecho_11_24032011.pdf (accessed 26 June 2011).
296. P. Gosálvez, “Dos telediarios, una redacción” (Two newscasts, one newsroom), El País, Madrid, 6 April 2011, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/
Pantallas/telediarios/Redaccion/elpepurtv/20110406elpepirtv_3/Tes (accessed 26 June 2011).
297. Vanitatis, “José Antonio Abellán: ‘La Iglesia sugirió mi veto en Telecinco’” (Th e Church suggested I should be banned from Telecinco), Vanitatis, 
Madrid, 17 August 2011, at http://www.vanitatis.com/television/2011/jose-antonio-noria-telecinco-vasile-iglesia-abellan-iglesia-cope-sugirio-
telecinco-20110817-15451.html (accessed 26 June 2011).
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Th e economic impact of sport often means that commercial interests confl ict with the interests of journalism. 
In 2007, the Real Madrid football club decided to sell its television rights up until 2014 to Mediapro instead 
of PRISA, which had been the main audiovisual partner of the club. Since then, Real Madrid and PRISA have 
had a hostile relationship: PRISA’s media outlets have often criticized the directors, players, and managers 
of Real Madrid, while Real Madrid has often not allowed access to or facilitated the work of the group’s 
journalists.298 
Another recent case of confl ict between the interests of journalism and business is the Catalan newspaper 
La Vanguardia’s non-publication of an op-ed article by Mónica Terribas, head of Catalonia’s regional public 
service television and radio, in which she defended the public service and accused certain private groups of 
wanting to see its demise, with an implicit reference to the Godó group. Th e letter was published in every 
newspaper in Catalonia except the one with the biggest circulation, La Vanguardia, owned by the Godó 
group.299
6.1.4 Telecoms Business and the Media
Th e infl uence of telecoms operators over the media sector is scant and basically limited to relationships 
connected with content and channel buying for their respective IP or IPTV and mobile television distribution 
networks, and to agreements for the development of new technological proposals connected with television. 
Th e reasons for this distance between sectors reside in part in the unsuccessful experience of Telefónica, which 
tried to become a convergent company by buying Antena 3 in the mid-1990s, as described in section 5.3.1. 
Telefónica’s strategy was redirected towards new opportunities in its traditional business of mobile telephony 
and broadband.
Its current strategy in the media sector has a greater focus on preserving its interests in the subscription 
television platform sector, since it is one of the elements of the triple-play service it can off er to telecoms 
consumers. In this respect, it made its highest investment in late 2010, when it acquired 22 percent of the 
PRISA platform Digital+ after paying €488 million.300 Finally, it should be pointed out that Telefónica has 
reached an agreement with RTVE to produce entertainment content, which, for the moment at least, is 
limited to three culturally and socially oriented television programs, with the intention of experimenting 
with new distribution and interactivity formulae.301 
298. El Economista, “Nuevo veto del Real Madrid y Mourinho a periodistas críticos con su trabajo” (Real Madrid and Mourinho once again ban 
journalists critical of their work), Madrid, 3 March 2011, at http://ecodiario.eleconomista.es/futbol/noticias/2873481/03/11/Nuevo-veto-del-
Real-Madrid-y-Mourinho-a-periodistas-criticos-con-su-trabajo.html (accessed 26 June 2011).
299. Espai Foundation for Catalan Culture and Communication (Fundació privada Espai Català de Cultura i Comunicació, ESCACC), “Terribas 
respon a l’ofensiva dels mitjans privats” (Terribas responds to private media attack), ESCACC, Barcelona, 11 October 2011, at http://www.
escacc.cat/ca/contingut/terribas-respon-a-l-ofensiva-dels-mitjans-privats-2937.html. (accessed 13 October 2011).
300. Telefónica, “ 2010 Informe Annual” (2010 Annual Report), Telefónica, Madrid, 2011, p. 113, at http://www.telefonica.com/es/annual_report/
pdf/telefonica_ia10_esp.pdf (accessed 26 June 2011).
301. Telefónica-RTVE, “Telefónica colabora con RTVE para crear contenidos de entretenimiento para la Televisión” (Telefonica collaborates with 
RTVE to create entertainment content for television), press release, Telefónica, Madrid, 6 October 2011, at http://saladeprensa.telefonica.com/
documentos/nprensa/Nota_Telefonica_RTVE_061011OK.pdf (accessed 10 October 2011).
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One of the specifi c features of the sector is that most of the media group owners have the media sector as 
their core business. Th erefore, the confl ict between journalism and other fi nancial or industrial interests of 
the owners is not as acute as it is in France and Italy, where major industrial groups are media owners. As a 
result, it is not unusual to fi nd that the pressures on journalists are usually external to the organizations within 
which they work, and mostly come from public authorities. Th us, according to a survey carried out in early 
2008 among directors of daily Spanish newspapers, 86.5 percent acknowledged that they had been subjected 
to external pressures, mostly from public organizations.302
Some cases have highlighted confl icts of interest between telecoms operators and journalism, albeit some 
years ago. Th e best known instance occurred from 2001 to 2002 between the company Telefónica—then 
the owner of Antena 3 and the radio station Onda Cero—and Pedro J. Ramírez, director of El Mundo, the 
second largest generalist newspaper in Spain. In 2001, this newspaper began to publish an investigative report 
on the president of Telefónica, César Alierta, and accused him of using insider information on the stock 
exchange, a criminal charge from which he was fi nally absolved in 2009. 
In retaliation, Telefónica cut its advertising in El Mundo and exerted pressure to get Mr Ramírez dismissed as 
a speaker on Antena 3’s television chat show program “El Primer Café” (Th e First Coff ee). Th e newspaper’s 
response was to draw more attention to the case. A short while later, the program’s director and journalist 
Isabel San Sebastián, was dismissed for opposing the ban on Mr Ramírez.303 
Another case that is very much related to this one, though with interests that were rather more political than 
business-related, took place at the same time. Certain journalists from the radio station Onda Cero, owned 
by Telefónica, who were against the ideology of the conservative government at that time, were banned by 
the company in a bid to appease the Government.304
6.1.5 Transparency of Media Ownership
Media ownership transparency has increased in recent years thanks to the inclusion of the sector in current 
fi nancial trends publication. Until recently, the majority of media companies in Spain were family businesses 
that zealously kept their own fi gures and accounts to themselves. With the expansion into the audiovisual 
world, the need for funding forced companies to be more transparent. Th e fi nal stage of this evolution has 
been the entry into the stock market of the great majority of media groups operating in Spain: Gestevisión 
Telecinco, Antena 3, PRISA, and Vocento.
302. Díaz-Nosty, Libro negro, p. 105.
303. El Mundo, “Cronología del caso Alierta” (Timeline of the Alierta case),14 October 2003, at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/06/11/
economia/1055337264.html (accessed 26 June 2011).
304. El País, “Enric Sopena se siente ‘objetivamente vetado’ y renucia a participar en las tertulias de Onda Cero” (Enric Sopena feels “objectively 
banned” and gives up participating in the Onda Cero debates), Madrid, 9 October 2001, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/Pantallas/Enric/
Sopena/siente/objetivamente/vetado/renuncia/participar/tertulias/Onda/Cero/elpepirtv/20011009elpepirtv_1/Tes (accessed 26 June 2011).
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From that moment on, these groups were forced to publish their data every three months and to be extremely 
careful about the veracity of the information provided. However, the growing infl uence of fi nancial institutions 
over media ownership consolidation makes management structures more complicated and obscure for the 
non-specialized public. Managers are more attentive to loan renegotiation, stock market entries, and debt 
control than to content management. All in all, they are more oriented towards economic profi t in the short 
run than to social benefi t in the long run.305 On the other hand, it remains to be verifi ed whether ownership’s 
infl uence on media content has grown or rather been reduced with digitization. In any case, it is clear that 
there exists a greater contact between political authorities and broadcasters’ lobbies, so as to infl uence the 
country-wide arrangement of the sector.
6.2 Media Funding
6.2.1 Public and Private Funding
In the last fi ve years, the evolution of the annual income of the media operating in Spain has been a 
rollercoaster: rapid growth followed by steep decline. Th e reason for this is simple: until 2007, the press, 
radio, internet, and television sectors experienced a signifi cant growth of advertising revenue thanks to the 
economic boom nurtured by the housing bubble and easy access to fi nancial credit. For instance, in 2005 the 
Spanish television sector was the most profi table in Europe, with a profi t margin of 41.2 percent, according 
to European Audiovisual Observatory data.306 However, since the 2008 crisis, the decrease in advertising 
revenue has been equally steep. Th is ebb and fl ow has to be taken into account when analyzing overall fi gures. 
As such, although advertising expenditure declined by 18 percent during the seven years from 2005 to 2011, 
as Table 13 shows, it has actually declined by 31 percent since 2007. A sector which loses almost a third of its 
most important source of income in only three years calls the whole commercial media system into question.
In radio, revenues decreased by almost 14 percent between 2005 and 2011, but if they are compared with 
those of 2007, the fall would approach 22 percent. Th is is especially acute, because advertising is almost the 
only source of revenue available to radio. Competition for audiences from public service stations and infl ated 
competition among private stations contribute to a very precarious situation. Th is has been overcome so far 
by adjustments in staffi  ng, as the fi gures for Catalonia show,307 without resorting to a restructuring of the 
radio market through mergers or takeovers.
Th e internet, on the other hand, presents a much more positive example, since it has grown so impressively 
as a new advertising platform, with a 554 percent increase between 2005 and 2011 and replacing radio as the 
third-highest advertising earner after television and print. Th is notwithstanding, its growth has been slowed 
down in recent years by the economic crisis and its coming of age as an advertising window. Between 2007 
and 2011, growth was much lower, at 86 percent. 
305. N. Almiron, Journalism in Crisis. Corporate media and fi nancialization, Hampton Press, Cresskill, NJ, 2010.
306. European Audiovisual Observatory, Audiovisual Yearbook 2008, Strasbourg, 2009. 
307. C. Llorens, “La Radio”(Radio), in “Informe de la Comunicació a Catalunya 2008–2010” (Report on Communication in Catalonia 2008–2010), 
Institut de la Comunicació-UAB-Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, 2011, p. 69, at http://incom.uab.cat/informe/content.asp?id_seccio=20 
(accessed 10 June 2011).
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Table 13.
Advertising investment (€ million), 2005–2011 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Change (%), 
2005–2011
Radio 609 636 678 642 537 548 524 –13.96
Television 2,950 3,188 3,468 3,082 2,377 2,471 2,237 –24.17
Press + Sunday 
supplements
1,785 1,913 2,027 1,612 1,243 1,196 1,034 –42.07
Magazines 674 636 678 617 401 397 381 –43.47
Internet 162 310 482 610 654 798 899 +554.94
Others 540 623 652 539 418 448 430 –20.37
Total 6,720 7,306 7,985 7,102 5,630 5,858 5,505 –18.08
Note: data in constant prices seasonally adjusted
Sources: Infoadex, Estudio Infoadex de la inversión publicitaria en España 2012, Infoadex, Madrid, 2011. 
Th e printed press is the medium with the greatest fall in advertising revenues: 42 percent between 2005 and 
2011, and 49 percent since 2007. However, the impact of the recession on the sector has been cushioned 
slightly by the existence of alternative revenue streams. As Table 14 shows, the decline in retail sale revenues 
(per item) is lower than the decline in advertising. As such, retail sales have proved more resistant to decline 
and remain a more stable source of income. Nevertheless, the print press in Spain lost 28 percent of its overall 
income between 2005 and 2010. As in radio, adjustments in staffi  ng have been the main instrument for 
adapting to the new scenario of meager revenues, as detailed at the beginning of this section. 
Th e disappearance of certain titles or their consolidation with other publications has accelerated. Among 
the mergers, that between the Catalan language dailies Avui and Punt Diari (2009) stands out, and among 
the disappearances are the free papers Metro (2009) and ADN (2011), along with regional dailies such as La 
Tribuna de Cuenca (2009), La Opinión de Granada (2010), Galicia Oxe (2010), La Tribuna de Salamanca 
(2011), El Día de Guadalajara (2012), and La Voz de Asturias (2012). In spite of this, it is worth noting that 
new titles have also emerged, such as Ara (2010), in Catalan, and Público (2007), although the latter went 
into administration at the beginning of 2012. 
Table 14.
Newspaper revenues (€ million), 2005–2010 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2010 Change (%), 
2005–2010
Sales 1,391 1,331 1,300 1,266 1,192 1,170 –15.8
Advertising 1,328 1,427 1,461 1,103 873 827 –37.7
Others 343 334 219 194 196 206 –39.9
Total 3,062 3,092 2,980 2,563 2,261 2,203 –28.5
Source: AEDE, Libro Blanco de la Prensa diaria, 2010, p. 224
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Finally, the funding of Spanish television has experienced substantial changes. At fi rst sight (Table 15), 
revenues appear to have increased by 13.7 percent in the seven years from 2005 to 2011. But to a great extent 
this growth can be explained by the simultaneous growth of subsidies for public broadcasters. Th ese rose 
from €660 million to €2,334 million, representing a 353 percent increase. Th e reason for this is the need to 
stabilize the fi nancial accounts of public service broadcasters and get rid of unlimited recourse to indebtedness 
as a normal system of funding—a system used thus far by both national and regional government authorities 
to avoid subsidies and disguise public defi cit. Th is has been particularly necessary since the Government 
banned advertising on public service television in 2010. However, the economic crisis has made it impossible 
to sustain current levels of subsidy, with substantial reductions planned for all public broadcasters in 2012.308
Th e general advertising crisis has also aff ected television. Between 2005 and 2011, advertising spending in 
television fell by 24 percent. However, since television is the preferred advertising medium in Spain, absolute 
fi gures have been higher compared with other sectors. As Table 15 shows, advertising revenues reached 
approximately €3,500 millon in 2007 and dropped to around €2,300 million in 2010, meaning that a total 
of €1,200 million disappeared from the market in three years. Moreover, the lower advertising investment has 
had to be distributed among more operators with the expansion of DTT after 2009. Again, between 2009 
and 2010, advertising investment stopped falling, but dropped again in 2011.
Table 15.
Audiovisual services revenues (€ million), 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Change (%), 
2005–2011
Advertising 3,066 3,290 3,582 3,250 2,585 2,589 2,328 –24.07
TV subscriptions 1,216 1,309 1,393 1,419 1,377 1,431 1,471 +20.97
Pay per view 151 184 227 243 129 61 42 –72.19
Subsidies* 660 1,190 1,026 1,277 1,450 2,288 2,334 +353.63
Other** 584 547 564 597 427 339 283 –51.54
Total 5,679 6,523 6,795 6,788 5,970 6,711 6,459 +13.73
Notes:  Subsidies are received by RTVE and regional public broadcasting services
 ** Others include SMS, phone calls, merchandising, etc.
Source: CMT, Informe Anual 2011, pp. 144–145
 
Th e main change in the sector’s funding has been due to the decision of the social democrat government to 
eliminate advertising from the public service broadcaster, RTVE, in 2010. As a consequence, other sources 
of income have been implemented to fund RTVE: an increase in direct subsidies; a tax of 3 percent on 
commercial television broadcasters’ gross income; another 1.5 percent tax on subscription television operators 
and 0.9 percent tax on telecoms operators; fi nally, 80 percent of the tax on radio spectrum use goes to RTVE. 
308. ABC, “Las radiotelevisiones autonómicas costarán este año más de mil millones de euros” (Th e regional PBS cost this year more than 1 billion 
euros), at http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hemeroteca/madrid/abc/2012/07/27/020.html (accessed 1 October 2012).
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As a result, in 2010, the corporation had a revenue of € 1,140 million: €579 million in state subsidies, €250 
million from the radio spectrum tax, €187 million from telecoms, €90 million from commercial broadcasters, 
and €32 million from other private activities (see section 2.1.3).309 
With the elimination of advertising from RTVE in 2010, an estimated €422 million—the corporation’s 
advertising turnover in 2009—was freed up for the commercial DTT market.310 Th is fact, together with 
the mergers around the two largest commercial broadcasters, Mediaset and Antena 3, have engendered an 
eff ective duopoly in the DTT advertising market (see section 6.1). Th ese two companies will control the 
television advertising market and will thus be able to raise prices from 2012 onwards. In 2010, advertising 
revenues for all their channels made up 84.8 percent of all investment.311 
Since we only possess the aggregated fi gure of state investment in institutional advertising, we are not able to 
conclude if there is any type of discrimination or favoritism. In any case, if the fi gures are analyzed, they show 
a considerable decline in investment. Th is has fallen from €209 million in 2006 to €80 million in 2010, that 
is, €129 million in fi ve years—a 61.5 percent fall.312 If this is compared with the overall fi gure on advertising 
investment in 2010 of €5,849 million, the percentage of state investment in institutional advertising is 
small (1.3 percent). Th erefore, market distortion by state advertising is not signifi cant. Table 16 shows the 
distribution of institutional advertising by media type.
Table 16.
Distribution of institutional advertising by media type (%), 2010
€ million % of total state advertising spending
TV 25.9 37
Radio 9.3 13.3
Press 11.8 16.9
Magazines 1.3 1.9
Internet 7.3 10.5
Other 14.3 20.4
Total 70.1 100
Source: Ministry of the Presidency, “Informe de Publicidad y Comunicación Institucional 2010” (Report on advertising and 
institutional communication 2010), Madrid, 2010
309. R. Gómez, RTVE cuadrará sus cuentas tras la revisión de las tasas (RTVE will balance its fi nancial accounts after tax revision), El País, 4 Novem-
ber 2011, at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/RTVE/cuadrara/cuentas/revision/tasas/elpepisoc/20111104elpepisoc_6/Tes (accessed 12 
July 2011).
310. CMT, Informe Anual 2010, p. 164; PRNoticias, “El 93% de la publicidad liberada por TVE se queda en los cuatro grandes” (93 percent of 
the advertising freed by TVE will go to the big four), 28 February 2011, at http://www.prnoticias.com/index.php/home/730-crisis-publicitar-
ia/10064805-el-93-de-la-inversion-publicitaria-liberada-por-tve-se-queda-en-los-cuatro-grandes (accessed 12 July 2011).
311. CMT, Informe Anual 2010, p. 163.
312. Ministry of the Presidency, “Informe de Publicidad y Comunicación Institucional 2010” (Report on advertising and institutional commu-
nication 2010), Madrid, 2011, at http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/6F9F7C99-80EE-40C9-862B-9534075E3128/160589/In-
forme2010.pdf (accessed 10 January 2012).
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However, this is not the complete picture. Th e total investment is much higher if regional and local governments 
are included. Each Autonomous Community and municipality has its own institutional advertising budget. 
For example, the Catalan government invested €53 million, although the crisis has forced the reduction of 
this amount to €21.5 million in 2011, a cut of 59.6 percent in just one year.313
With regard to media subsidies, direct allocations to commercial television and radio operators have not been 
made. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, a system of direct and indirect subsidies to the printed press was set 
up for the sector to change from Linotype typesetting to modern printing systems. At the end of the 1980s, 
all kinds of direct and indirect fi nancial aids where eliminated, except for those related to postage and the 
reduced 4 percent VAT. Th e state has left this activity to the governments of the Autonomous Communities, 
which can design specifi c subsidies to promote their linguistic presence, although there are also subsidies in 
Communities with no specifi c language other than Spanish, and there are Communities where there are no 
aids despite having two offi  cial languages.314 
Figures are signifi cant for some regions. For instance, in Catalonia, €90 million was granted to the printed 
press in the Catalan language between 1995 and 2004, and €107.3 million between 2005 and 2010 for any 
media in the Catalan language. If we break this fi gure down, in 2010 there were grants of €19.8 million. But 
due to the economic crisis, the amount fell to €6.8 million in 2011, a drop of 70 percent compared with the 
previous year.315 
Th ese investments in institutional advertising and regional aids interfere in the market by allowing for the 
survival of local and regional media that would otherwise not be sustainable. Th ey produce relationships of 
dependence between the regional or local political power and the media, since the advertising investments 
and subsidies are aimed at media outlets that are fi nancially weaker than the large nationwide companies. 
Finally, the majority of the regional media subsidies are not automatic, and there is no independent authority 
in charge. Th us, regional and local authorities can use their discretion in allocating them.
6.2.2 Other Sources of Funding
Th ere are two opposing trends in pay-TV (see Table 15). While revenues from pay-per-view (PPV) services 
are decreasing, revenues from subscriptions are rising steadily. However, this growth does not make up 
for PPV losses, and the sector as a whole is experiencing a signifi cant decline. In 2008, pay-TV operators 
obtained €1,662 million for both PPV and subscriptions, while in 2011 that fi gure was reduced to €1,532 
313. I. Fernández, J.A. Guimerà, and A. Fernández, “Impacto de la crisis económica en las políticas de comunicación de la Generalitat de Cataluña 
(2011)” (Impact of the economic crisis on Catalonia Regional Government communication policies (2011), Derecom 8 (December 2011–Feb-
ruary 2012) (hereafter Fernández et al., “Impacto de la crisis económica en las políticas de comunicación de la Generalitat de Cataluña”).
314. J.J. Blasco, “Las ayudas públicas a la prensa de las Comunidades Autónomas españolas en 2007: Tipología, cuantía de las subvenciones y siste-
mas de adjudicación” (Public subsidies to the print press in Spanish Autonomous Communities in 2007: Typology, quantity and allocation 
systems), Telos 75 (April–June 2008), pp. 95–103, at http://sociedadinformacion.fundacion.telefonica.com/telos/cuadernoimprimible.asp@
idarticulo=3&rev=75.htm (accessed 10 January 2012).
315. Fernández et al., “Impacto de la crisis económica en las políticas de comunicación de la Generalitat de Cataluña,” p. 12.
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million. Th e diff erence of €130 million almost corresponds to the fall in PPV revenues. Th is is explained by 
the expansion of premium DTT, which was introduced in 2009 and has imposed a change in the exploitation 
of the broadcast rights for the main football competitions. Before that time, football was exploited through 
PPV. Since 2009, profi ts are made mainly through specialized channels (Gol Televisión and Canal+ Liga).316 
Consequently, the situation of operators is broadly stable with respect to revenues, although with a certain 
downward trend.
6.3 Media Business Models
6.3.1 Changes in Media Business Models
Th e business models of the media operating in Spain are aff ected by the same trends as other Western 
countries: the development of free print and online media and fragmentation of audiences and advertisers 
alike. Th ere are two particularly Spanish features: fi rst, the deep economic crisis with a subsequent greater 
fall of advertising revenues; and second, infl ated competition resulting from the strong presence of public 
service media in radio and television at three levels of local, regional, and state. As shown above, the printed 
press has been the media sector that has suff ered the most, whereas television presents a more solid business 
model, mainly because of the oligopoly commanded by established broadcasters. In brief, the economic crisis 
has had a greater eff ect on paid media off ering a stronger news content than those media more targeted at 
entertainment, such as television.317
With respect to other potential fi nancial resources created through online digital technologies, the eff orts of 
broadsheets to make their contents profi table through closed payment systems should be noted. Th ese are 
editions accessible to all types of electronic devices, but especially tablets and computers. Two main online 
platforms group the great majority of Spanish papers: ORBYT, launched in 2010 and managed by the 
UNEDISA group; and Kiosko y Más, controlled by the Vocento and PRISA groups, launched a year later. 
Here, prices are a third cheaper than subscriptions to print editions. Due to the novelty of these platforms, 
there are no offi  cial records of revenues and subscribers and their share of overall media income. Th e Spanish 
media prefer to off er smartphone applications (apps) free, as such users demand breaking news and not 
analysis. If no smartphone app is available, or one is available only for payment, users can freely access 
content through the media web version.
It is also worth highlighting the diversifi cation of products and services off ered, especially in the printed press: 
a trend that pre-existed the downturn. Th is process sought to take advantage of the distribution network that 
papers have in Spain through newsagents, and to deliver all type of products—pull-out sections, collectibles, 
and special off ers—along with the newspapers themselves. Revenues for these have been signifi cant, especially 
before the Spanish economic crisis and among audience leaders. El País had a turnover of €115 million for 
316. CMT, Informe Anual 2010, p. 160.
317. P. Farias and S. Roses, “La crisis acelera el cambio del negocio informativo” (Crisis accelerates the change in news business ), Estudios sobre el 
Mensaje Periodístico 15 (2009), pp. 15–32.
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these special sales in 2005. Another aim is to maintain circulation fi gures so as to sell advertising for a higher 
price.318 Finally, apart from products used in special off ers, Spanish papers have for years been off ering a whole 
assortment of other services: specialized and professional training, insurance, dating services, bookselling, 
and organization of events. Th is notwithstanding, as can be seen from Table 14, revenues for these products 
have also decreased substantially with the economic crisis.
Television, however, has preferred to adapt to a digital scenario and to the economic crisis, rather than to 
devise new business models. Th e larger media groups Mediaset and Antena 3 have aligned the new digital 
channels according to well-defi ned socio-demographic profi les: a young urban woman (Divinity, Nova), 
a young urban man (Nitro, Energy), teenagers (Neox), etc. Moreover, Antena 3 has innovated with the 
bundling of advertising airtime by airing adverts across all its channels at the same time, thus off ering a larger 
audience to advertisers, and for a price lower than channel-based advertising. In response to the economic 
crisis, broadcasters have begun to outsource general services and rationalize costs as far as possible through 
restructuring and staff  redundancies.
During the last four years, new service providers have appeared, and these have allowed broadcasters to 
delegate some of their activities. According to one Antena 3 manager, outsourcing has made it possible 
to eliminate 650 people from the broadcaster’s staff  along with 14 services, among them administrative 
functions, IT equipment operation, post-production, graphic and art design, and even the channel’s archive. 
According to this model of outsourcing policy, commonly used by Gestevisión Telecinco, the conditions 
demanded of service providers are: fl exibility, lower costs, and fi nancial capacity. Antena 3 says that the aim of 
outsourcing is not only grounded on an economic rationale but also on the need to improve service quality.319 
6.4 Assessments
Th e digital transition in Spanish television, radio, the internet, and print has considerably increased the 
media off ering, and more broadcasters have come into being. However, some of this rise in external pluralism 
is questionable, since the majority of the new operators are owned by already existing analog broadcasters or 
press groups. Moreover, the benefi ts of this abundant off ering have been short-lived. Th e excessive optimism 
of managers and politicians, and, above all, the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, have caused this 
media bubble to burst. As a consequence, in the television sector there is a consolidation process under way, 
which puts the sector back in the situation prior to digital transition: two large private operators controlling 
the advertising and the audience market. Th is notwithstanding, the present situation presents two new traits 
when compared with 2005: a public service broadcaster with no advertising, and an array of small DTT 
channels that are mostly rented to foreign media groups.
318. J. Pérez Dasilva and L. Iturregui, “La promoción de ventas en la prensa diaria española: el caso del Grupo Prisa” (Special off ers in the Spanish 
dailies: the PRISA group case study), Textual & Visual Media: revista de la Sociedad Española de Periodística 3 (2010), pp. 199–216.
319. Fernando Costi, Antena 3’s manager of internal auditing and processes’ control, speaking at the IV Daily Conference of the Audiovisual Sector, 
IESE, Barcelona, 26 October 2011, at http://www.iese.edu/es/fi les/Resum IV Jornada Audio_tcm5-72849.pdf (accessed 11 December 2011).
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Digitization has not allowed the print sector to skip its own economic crisis due to the strong fall in advertising 
revenues. As a result, external pluralism has been damaged by the closure of several titles. Equally, lay-off s 
and the ensuing employment instability may have had a negative impact on journalistic quality. Th e radio 
sector has remained stable, highly concentrated on the PRISA group, and with no new actors or losses. Since 
radio digitization is blocked, the media bubble has been far less intense, and takeovers and mergers have been 
scarce. All in all, the initial positive assessment of digitization with respect to pluralism in Spain has been 
strongly undermined by the economic crisis in the media.
In television, if the public service broadcasting model is undermined and its funding reduced, one of the 
pillars of good-quality news content in Spain could be threatened. Th e other source of good-quality news 
is the print press. Th e profound crisis it is undergoing will directly aff ect the quality and quantity of its 
content. New strategies are being explored, such as an increase in retail prices and attempts to monetize 
online readership through an array of devices. 
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7. Policies, Laws, and Regulators
7.1 Policies and Laws
7.1.1 Digital Switch-over of Terrestrial Transmission
Access and Aff ordability
In Spain, television signals are received mainly through terrestrial airwaves. In 2010, 86.8 percent of the 
population switched on their televisions this way every day.320 Consequently, the analog switch-off  in April of 
that year was a challenge for the television industry, telecoms operators, and citizens alike. Th is was especially 
so, since the initial situation in 2005 was troubling. In spite of Spain having pioneered the DTT launch 
in 2000, by 2005 only 3.6 percent of Spaniards had a DTT decoder, either integrated into or external to 
the television set.321 Within fi ve years, DTT spread to cover the whole country in what turned out to be a 
technological transition with hardly any mishaps. From a technological point of view, the completed process 
can be qualifi ed as successful.
Th e regulation of DTT licensing was analyzed in section 5.1. Th is section will deal with regulatory actions 
other than the granting of licenses, including: coverage deadlines during the DTT transition processes, 
provisions for securing DTT access to citizens under risk of exclusion, the program for the distribution of 
decoders, citizens’ participation in the design and implementation of DTT public policy, and how the public 
interest was protected, among other things.
Spain was one of the European pioneers in broadcasting DTT in 2000 after the UK (1998) and Sweden 
(1999). A new legislation and a new national spectrum plan were developed by the PP government from 
1997 to 1999. DTT policy strategy was to open the market to new operators, to foster platform competition 
and to diminish the power of the three existing commercial operators: Telecinco, Antena 3, and Canal+. 
Th erefore, the fi rst public tender awarded 14 digital channels to a pay-DTT platform, Onda Digital, a 
fi rm whose main shareholder was Retevisión (a telecoms company specializing in broadcasting transmission 
320. INE, “Encuesta sobre equipamiento y uso de las TICs 2010.”
321. AIMC, Marco General de Medios en España 2012, p. 64.
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services). Th e three commercial broadcasters already in operation were awarded only one digital channel 
each. Another digital channel was given to Veo TV and one more to Net TV. Finally, two digital channels 
were reserved for RTVE.
Th e pay-DTT platform was renamed QuieroTV and started to broadcast in 2000. However, the competition 
from digital satellite operators such as Canal Satélite Digital and Vía Digital was too strong. Satellite off ered 
more channels and better content. In addition, the coverage of DTT and DTT household equipment 
was still too poor to foster a massive take-up of the service. QuieroTV obtained a maximum of 200,000 
subcribers in 2001. It fi nally ceased operations in 2002 with only 72,000 subscribers. From then until 2005, 
DTT continued in Spain but with little growth, as it off ered essentially the same channels as the analog 
counterparts (with the exception of two new channels, VeoTV and Net TV).322
After the failure of Quiero TV, the social democrat government decided to relaunch DTT as an FTA service 
through the participation of existing analog operators, Telecinco and Antena 3; the transformation from a 
premium to an FTA channel of former Canal+; and the addition of a new operator, La Sexta, in addition to 
the two digital broadcasters already in operation, Veo TV and Net TV. Th ey were off ered an increase in their 
channel number on condition that they fulfi lled some minimal requirements regarding program scheduling 
and DTT development. A detailed migration calendar was fi nalized, and eff orts focussed on the adaptation 
of collective antennas. Finally, it was also considered to be of prime importance to design a DTT publicity 
campaign addressing the general public. 
Th is action plan found its fi rst regulatory expression in January 2005 with Law 10/2005 on urgent measures 
for the development of DTT, the liberalization of cable television, and the promotion of pluralism.323 Th is 
reorganized the licensing stystem at national, regional, and local levels (see section 5.1). Soon afterwards, 
Royal Decree 944/2005324 established the Digital Terrestrial Television National Technical Plan, which 
detailed the diff erent legal measures to facilitate digital transition: the analog broadcast deadline was moved 
forward from 2012 to 3 April 2010; the structure of licenses both during the transition period and after the 
analog switch-off  was settled, along with how multiplexes should be managed; the characteristics of DTT 
receivers were defi ned; and an ambitious agenda of deadlines was set up for public and private operators to 
comply progressively with DTT coverage: the public service channels were required to expand coverage from 
80 percent in January 2006 to 98 percent by April 2010, while the commercial channels were required to 
grow from 80 percent to 95 percent over the same period.
322. R. Suárez, “Las políticas públicas de la televisión digital terrestre en la UE. Estudio comparado de Suecia y España” (Digital terrestrial television 
public policies in the EU. A comparative study of Sweden and Spain), PhD dissertation at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2009, p. 425, at http://
hdl.handle.net/10803/7263 (accessed 1 June 2011) (hereafter Suárez, “Las políticas públicas de la televisión digital terrestre en la UE”).
323. Law 10/2005 on urgent measures to foster digital terrestrial television, on the liberalization of cable television and on the promotion of plural-
ism, BOE no. 142, June 2005.
324. Royal Decree 944/2005 on the National Technical Plan for Digital Terrestrial Television, BOE no. 181, 30 July 2005, at http://www.boe.es/boe/
dias/2005/07/30/pdfs/A27006-27014.pdf (accessed 14 September 2011).
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It is worth highlighting that Spain started from a favorable position, since DTT coverage was already 80 
percent in 2005, thanks to the eff orts of Quiero TV.325 However, the diffi  culty of achieving the high coverage 
levels required by law in such a mountainous country required greater eff orts to extend digital transmitters, 
relay stations, and reception antennas. 
Th e DTT transition scheme concerned three diff erent geographic areas. First, Area I, covering 96 percent of the 
population (98 percent for the public service state-wide broadcaster). Within Area I, broadcasters and platform 
operators had to fi nance the (compulsory) switch-over by themselves; no public fi nancing was made available. 
In Area II, covering 2.5 percent of the population, digitization was not privately profi table, and the Government 
designed an aid plan of approximately €196.3 million. According to the Spanish authorities, in the absence of 
any such measure, a viewer in this area would not have access to terrestrial broadcasts. Finally, an area with 1.5 
percent of the population was considered so remote that it could only be reached by satellite technology. 
Th e Government provided for a must-carry obligation on the broadcasters to ensure that they made their 
channels available to the satellite operator, Abertis. Th e problem with this platform is that it works under 
conditional access, and as such, it is not free, it does not allow HD, nor does it include premium or regional 
channels. For this reason, the plan concentrated on supporting DTT provision in area II. All the Autonomous 
Communities, except Castilla-La Mancha, which granted monetary aid directly to the platform operator, 
launched tenders for the provision and installation of hardware to digitize existing transmission centers or 
build digital emission centers ex novo. Th e regions provided €136.1 million from their direct budgetary 
funds, while the central government contributed €60.2 millions in the form of interest-free loans to the 
regions. Th ey are repayable in a number of years (usually 15) with a three-year latency period.326
In 2010, Astra denounced the plan in its application to the European Commission as illegal aid to a DTT 
platform operator in a de facto monopoly held by Abertis. In Astra’s view, to meet the objective of off ering 
digital FTA television to viewers in Area II, the Government had to make a choice between investing in the 
digitization of the analog terrestrial network and making funds available to broadcast such services via already 
existing alternative digital platforms. According to Astra, it would be in a position to broadcast FTA channels 
via satellite at a fraction of the amount spent on the terrestrial switch-over. Th e European Commission has 
yet make a statement on the legality of this aid. 
Th anks to the fi nancial support and the collaboration among the central and regional governments and the 
network operator Abertis, expectations were far exceeded at the end of the process in April 2010: public 
service channels reached a coverage of 98.79 percent and commercial channels 98.36 percent. Th e population 
without coverage was 1.21 percent and 1.64 percent, respectively (about 660,000 people). DTT coverage was 
at that time higher than that of France (88 percent), the UK (80 percent), and Italy (80 percent).327
325. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, pp. 50–51.
326. European Commission, “Procedures relating to the implementation of competition policy. State aid C23/10—Aid for the deployment of digital 
terrestrial television (DTT),” Offi  cial Journal of the European Union C 337/17, 14 December 2010.
327. Impulsa TDT, Informe mensual Marzo 2010 (Monthly Report March 2011), no. 38, Madrid, 2011.
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It is also worth noting that the analog switch-off  was made gradually, in four phases. Several distinct technical 
projects were grouped for the transition to digital technologies, and these in turn were distributed in diff erent 
geographical areas. Th e strategy was to verify the viability of the technology and to foresee any possible 
diffi  culties before the main part of the switch-off  took place at the beginning of April 2010 (see Table 17). 
Except for some specifi c problems, the deadlines were met.
Table 17.
Phases of the DTT transition process (no. of technical projects and people aff ected)
Phase no. Deadline Population affected Total population
0—Projects 31 December 2008  447,000 (1%)  447,000 (1%)
A—32 projects 30 June 2009  5,181,000 (11.6%)  5,628,000 (12.6%)
B—25 projects 31 December 2009  8,847,000 (19.8%)  14,475,000 (32.4%)
C—33 projects 03 April 2010  30,230,000 (67.6%)  44,705,000 (100%)
Source: Ministry of Industry, press release, 7 July 2009328 
Consequently, from the coverage perspective, the Government considered that the risk of discrimination or 
exclusion in DTT reception was small, since the overall coverage was high. Th e key question lay in citizens’ 
reception equipment. If households lacked antennas, decoders or built-in digital tuners, the eff ort to increase 
coverage to the maximum extent possible would be in vain. In this sense, the situation was not hopeful in 
2005: only 3.5 percent of Spanish households had a DTT decoder at this time.
However, the economies of scale achieved by producers and the natural replacement of television sets, which 
was accelerated by the demand for fl at screens, made prices go down signifi cantly, both for independent 
decoders (a 57.9 percent fall between 2005 and 2009) and for sets with a built-in decoder (a 62.1 percent 
drop).329 Th is, together with the establishment of a switch-off  deadline, explains why DTT reception 
equipment spread so quickly among the population and reached 77.4 percent coverage by December 2009.330 
With regard to the checking of antennas needed for the change of frequencies, households and professional 
installers renewed equipment at a fast pace. By 31 December 2009, 97.5 percent of collective antennas and 
76 percent of household antennas had been adapted to receive DTT.331 
Subsidies for Equipment
In spite of the excellent coverage and the increase in appliances and equipment able to receive DTT, a 
signifi cant percentage of the population risked being excluded from access. To avoid this, two main actions 
were taken: an aid plan based on free distribution of DTT receivers, and specifi c regional plans to fund 
328. Cited by Suárez, “Las políticas públicas de la televisión digital terrestre en la UE”, p. 521.
329. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, p. 80.
330. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, p. 92.
331. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, pp. 56, 58.
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the installation of satellite equipment for the reception of DTT by people living in sparsely populated or 
mountainous areas.
Th e aid plan for people at risk of social exclusion consisted in the free distribution by the central government 
of 150,000 decoders to people aged over 80, to people over 65 but having a high level of dependency, and 
to people with a visual or auditory disability of or above 33 percent. Moreover, this group could claim free 
installation if they could justify that they were unable to do it using their own resources.332 Th e distribution 
of decoders was made gradually, following the various phases of the analog switch-off . In Spain, contrary to 
other states, the funding of decoders for the population at large was not an option (with the exception of 
some Autonomous Communities such as Navarre).333 Th e decrease in the decoders’ price and the replacement 
of television sets actually made it unnecessary to allocate public funds for this.
As for the 1.5 percent of the population with no DTT coverage, the law favored the satellite broadcast 
option.334 Th e individual cost of installing such equipment was about €400–500. In partnership with 
industry (private and public television outlets and the state-wide network operator), the government set up 
Impulsa TDT, to foster DTT take-up among all stakeholders. Grouping the main television broadcasters 
along with the network operator Abertis, Impulsa TDT supplied the Autonomous Communities with 2,400 
tuners via satellite, for distribution among all those households left out of terrestrial coverage. Moreover, 
the Autonomous Communities announced subsidies for these satellite installations in Navarre, Asturias, 
and Catalonia (fi nancing around €175–250 of the individual cost). It is diffi  cult to assess whether these 
measures have been eff ective and suffi  cient, since no data on their social impact have been found. In any case, 
there have been no public protests about the planning and payment of subsidies, or their lack or scarcity. In 
contrast to this, there are frequent protests about the reception diffi  culties that people living on the coast or 
in the mountains still experience. 
In a separate plan to subsidize ICT equipment and internet subscriptions, another program, Plan Avanza, 
allocated €6,500 million between 2005 and 2009 for—among other things—loans at low interest rates and 
long repayment terms for consumers to access terminals and internet subscriptions.
Legal Provisions on Public Interest
Law 10/2005 provided for specifi c actions to promote DTT as a condition for obtaining digital licenses (see 
Table 18). Th ese conditions sought to protect the public interest. Th e problem is that they were imposed on 
existing commercial broadcasters—the transition was designed with them in mind. Promotional measures 
were relatively easy to implement, except for the expansion of coverage, which came at high cost in a country 
with such a complicated terrain. Th is notwithstanding, this cost had to be absorbed by Abertis, the most 
important signal transport company, as seen in section 5.
332. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, pp. 195, 207.
333. Impulsa TDT, Informe Final 2010, p. 65.
334. Law 7/2009 on urgent measures regarding telecommunications, Art. 1, BOE no. 161, 4 July 2009.
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Table 18.
DTT-related conditions for digital licenses
To obtain an additional channel To obtain two additional channels
Start DTT broadcasts 
before 30 November 2005
Offer an innovative program schedule: original content, 16:9 format, 
subtitling, and dual system
Supply the information 
needed for confi guring an EPG 
Promote DTT on all channels: at least one advertisement on prime time 
per month per quarter
Participate in a new association 
to promote DTT
Provide interactive applications in fi rst year of service
Achieve a 1 percent rise in coverage 
of the digital multiplex to be assigned 
in the second phase
Achieve gradual shut-down of analog broadcasts according to the migration 
plan, or broadcast at least 30 percent of drama, animation, 
and documentaries in two offi cial languages
Source: Royal Decree 944/2005, transitory provision 4
In order to obtain new digital programs, each broadcaster had to prepare a detailed plan for the implementation 
of these measures and submit it to the Government three months after the publication of the Technical Plan. 
Commercial broadcasters accepted these measures and asked for an increase in their digital channels through 
the renewal of their license contracts. Since this process was at best opaque, new entrants were precluded 
from joining the digital television market. According to the researcher Roberto Suárez, the available evidence 
pointed to the existence of:
a close cooperation between the sector agents and the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and 
Commerce. Despite the result being positive, it is worth asking about the transparency of the 
process. It is questionable that the new Technical Plan [DTT 2005] already defi nes the post-
switch-off  setting, in which the door has been closed to new broadcasters. Perhaps it was the 
price that the Government had to pay to ensure the collaboration of analog broadcasters.335
As he explains, it is obvious that among these conditions the most important for the public interest was 
to ensure an innovative program schedule, because it could have made a very positive contribution to the 
development of the DTT off ering and thus made way for more diversity and quality. However, since no precise 
criteria exist to assess whether the conditions have actually been met, and in the absence of an independent 
regulatory authority that could have controlled the process, the submitted plans have not been implemented. 
Th is has also been the case with regard to interactive applications. Th e majority of broadcasters present 
a minimal off ering of interactive services, aimed only at compliance with the law. Equally, there is low 
utilization of the possibilities of EPGs, dual sound and subtitling are rarely off ered, and parental control is 
practically non-existent, as is audio description for people with visual disabilities.336 In a September 2011 
survey, four out of 10 television viewers said that DTT had frustrated their expectations; the main weak 
points were poor-quality programming, the excessive repetition of broadcasts, and tuning diffi  culties. Among 
335. Suárez, “Las políticas públicas de la televisión digital terrestre en la UE,” p. 480.
336. Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación (AUC), “Balance de la AUC sobre la TDT tras el apagón analógico” (AUC’s Assessment of 
DTT after the analog switch-off ), 24 May 2010, at http://www.auc.es/Documentos/Comunicados Prensa/docnot2010/may04.pdf (accessed 15 
October 2011).
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the main positive points were the growth in the number of channels and programs on off er and their variety, 
along with improvements in image and sound.337
Public Consultation
Public interest was thus set aside in favor of private operators and the industries providing the equipment. 
In fact, citizen participation has been practically non-existent throughout the whole process. Civil society 
organizations have not been engaged in the drafting of public policy for DTT implementation and assessment 
because the Government preferred to coordinate with media industry agents to ensure the success of the 
digital transition. Only Catalan cultural associations from the Valencian Autonomous Community and the 
Balearic Islands asked their respective authorities to make Catalan regional public service channels available 
in their territories. Th is eventually happened in the Balearic Islands, in exchange for broadcast reciprocity, but 
it did not happen in the Valencian community. Th ere, relay stations broadcasting the Catalan public service 
corporation channels were shut down. Th ese closed relay stations were funded not by Government but by the 
Catalan cultural associations mentioned earlier.
Another instance of the Government’s preference for industry over public interest was the DTT instalment 
association. Th e Government was aware that DTT success depended mainly on the participation of media 
sector agents, and it was for this reason that membership of such an organization was among the compulsory 
requirements for an operator to obtain an additional digital channel (see Table 19). Consequently, on 18 
October 2005 RTVE, Telecinco, Antena 3, Sogecable, Net TV, Veo TV, La Sexta, FORTA (including all the 
public service regional broadcasters), and the network operator Abertis Telecom set up the Association for 
the Instalment and Development of DTT in Spain (Impulsa TDT). It set up a specialized website for the 
media industry and the general public; published reports on DTT penetration; set up a phone helpline; ran 
advertising campaigns, along with information sessions for professional groups; and fostered collaboration 
with reception equipment producers and installers.338 But there was hardly any participation by civil society 
organizations in Impulsa TDT.
7.1.2 The Internet
Regulation of News on the Internet
Freedom of expression is regulated in Spain by Art. 20 of the Constitution of 1978, democratically passed 
after 40 years of Franco’s dictatorship. Article 20.a recognizes “the right to freely express and spread thoughts, 
ideas and opinions through words, in writing or by any other means of reproduction.” Th e last part, “by 
any other means of reproduction,” thus includes the internet as a reference for the diff usion of ideas and 
opinions. Art. 20.d defi nes “the right to freely communicate or receive truthful information by any means of 
dissemination whatsoever.”
337. Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación (AUC) and iforTV, “Informe: ¿Cómo valoran los espectadores la implantación de la TDT?” 
(Report: How do TV viewers regard DTT implementation?), September 2011, at http://www.auc.es/Documentos/Documentos AUC/
Docum2011/2011_09_INFORME_COMO_VALORAN_LOS_ESPECTADORES_LA_IMPLANTACION_DE_ LA_TDT.pdf (accessed 
15 October 2011).
338. Suárez, “Las políticas públicas de la televisión digital terrestre en la UE,” pp. 469–470.
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Again, we see a cautious approach, since the Constitution does not make this right dependent on any 
particular medium. Consequently, the regulation of online news content is no diff erent from that of the print 
press, radio, or television. Equally, the Constitution specifi cally declares that “the exercise of these rights may 
not be restricted by any form of prior censorship” (Art. 20.2); hence, prior internet censorship is explicitly 
prohibited. However, there are some limits to these rights: the rest of the fundamental rights established 
in the Constitution, and especially, the “right to reputation, to privacy, to the [preservation of the good] 
own image and to the protection of youth and childhood” (Art. 20.4). Th us, there is no specifi c regulation 
for the spread of information beyond that enshrined in the Constitution and the various laws limiting the 
freedom of information and expression that aff ect any type of media. Th is means that in Spanish law, freedom 
of expression and the right to impart or receive information are identical, regardless of the media used to 
exercise them, be this, for example, access through a mobile or a fi xed internet connection.
Legal Liability for Internet Content
With respect to responsibility for content published on the internet, the Government applied the European 
Commission Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/CE) through the Law on Information Society 
Services and Electronic Commerce (Law 34/2002).339 Th is law has two guiding principles: fi rst, real-world 
laws must be applied to the online virtual world; and second, collaboration between telecoms operators and 
authorities to achieve an eff ective application of these laws. Th e defi nition of information society services 
under the law is suffi  ciently ample to include the spread of news and facts through specifi c webs and blogs. 
As for responsibility for content, Art. 13.1 provides that “Information Society Service operators are subject to 
civil, penal and administrative responsibility, established with general character in the legal system, without 
prejudice from the dispositions of this law.”
Consequently, these websites are regulated according to the general law and their limits are the same as 
those applying to offl  ine media, that is, fundamental constitutional rights and the laws underpinning them. 
Th ey are absolutely responsible for their own content, unlike internet service providers, off ering for instance 
hosting or simple content transmission.
Law 34/2002 establishes the “notice and take down” principle, that is to say, it does not consider those 
intermediaries responsible for the presence of illegal content on the web, so long as the internet service 
providers, telecoms operators, web hosting companies, and any other intermediary do not actually know 
about the existence of the illegal content. Once they are made aware of them, they should then eliminate 
them. Behind this principle is the assumption that the service provided by these intermediaries is passive in 
terms of content-production.340
339. Law on Information Society Services and Electronic Commerce 34/2002, BOE no. 166, 12 July 2002, at http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.
php?id=BOE-A-2002-13758 (accessed 10 September 2012).
340. M. Peguera, “Internet Service Providers’ liability in Spain. Recent case law and future perspectives,” Journal of Intellectual Property, Information 
Technology and E-Commerce Law 1(3) (2010), p. 151, at http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-3-2010/2823 (accessed 18 December 2011).
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With regard to the online propagation of extremist ideas and ideologies, involving incitement to xenophobia, 
racial hatred, religious intolerance, terrorism or, indeed, anorexia:341 special police units at state or regional 
level342 are authorized to investigate such sites, which may be shut down by legal order for breaching the 
Penal Code. 
Th ere are other indirect limits on media that use websites as a technical vehicle for the publication of their 
information, due to strict data protection legislation, which allows no exceptions for journalism relating 
to the treatment of personal data. Th is is in spite of the EU Directive regulating personal data protection 
(95/46/CE), which provides some exceptions in the case of journalistic work (Art. 9). As a result, confl icts 
between journalists and issues of data protection must be settled in the courts, with a high cost in time and 
money for both journalists and media companies.
According to Organic Law 15/1999 on the the Protection of Personal Data,343 a blog or website is not 
considered an “accessible public source” from which data can be extracted, classifi ed, and given meaning. In 
this way, the law prevents and penalizes the publication of personal data on the internet even if these are on 
a press or broadcast website which their offl  ine versions are entitled to publish. For instance, if a journalist 
uses “accessible public sources” recognized by law—such as the census, phone books, professional lists, offi  cial 
gazettes, and/or the media themselves—and publishes on his or her web or blog a list with the names of 
politicians, union leaders, or lawyers judged for corruption in their region, he or she can be fi ned €300,000. 
According to the Data Protection Agency (Agencia de Protección de Datos), the internet must be considered 
as a group of automated fi les regulated by the law, and not “an accessible public source.” As such, journalism 
based on socio-demographic data or lists of names cannot be published without the knowledge of the people 
aff ected. 
According to several authors, here, current case law limits the freedom of information and provokes legal 
uncertainty in the fi eld of online written journalism, because the courts understand that in principle a third 
party must be denied access to personal data not available from “accessible public sources” when they are not 
authorized by the people aff ected or the law.344
Consequently, journalism is harmed. A paradigmatic case is the magazine OCU Salud, fi ned €6,000 in 2005 
for publishing in its online issue (no. 48) research in which it showed, with all the relevant names, how 
certain doctors prescribed unnecessary antibiotics and some chemists sold these same antibiotics without 
341. See http://www.marketingdirecto.com/actualidad/digital/350-paginas-web-clausuradas-por-incitar-a-la-anorexia-y-a-la-bulimia; http://inter-
spain.net/el-racismo-y-la-xenofobia-en-internet-es-delito-a-veces-parece-que-no.html (accessed 15 January 2011).
342. See https://www.gdt.guardiacivil.es/webgdt/home_alerta.php; http://www.gencat.cat/mossos/serveis/consells/InternetSegura/Contacte.html 
(bothaccessed 15 January 2011).
343. Organic Law 15/1999 on the the Protection of Personal Data, BOE no. 298, 14 December 1999, at http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.
php?id=BOE-A-1999-23750 (accessed 12 October 2012).
344. P. Rodríguez, “Periodismo y datos publicados en internet: el concepto de ‘fuente accesible al público’ y otras restricciones de la Ley de Protección 
de Datos Personales” (Journalism and data published on the internet: the concept of ‘public accessible source’ and other restrictions of Personal 
Data Protection Law), Textual & Visual Media 3 (2010), pp. 217–238. 
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prescription.345 Th e punishment was ratifi ed by the Constitutional Court, which found that the list was an 
“intrusion in the right to informative self-determination of the doctors and pharmacists that had violated the 
legislation currently in force and although that intrusion follows a legitimate objective … it could have been 
reached by other means.”346
Content and news distribution by mobile devices are not explicitly regulated; as such, they remain under 
general legislation. If this type of content consists of radio and television transmissions for mobile devices, 
the regulation applicable is LGCA 2010. Under this law, a “mobile television audiovisual communication 
service” (servicio de comunicación audiovisual televisiva en movilidad) is defi ned as one off ered for watching 
content using a mobile device (Art. 2.2). Since it is an “audiovidual communication service,” there is editorial 
responsibility for the contents and services provided.
Contrary to this, if the news content transmitted does not belong to television or radio services and circulates 
through telematic networks, then they are regulated by Law 34/2002 on information society services and 
electronic commerce. Th is law provides for the obligation to identify the site, keep traffi  c data, and inform 
users on security and the use of illegal content. For any other question, information society service providers 
are subject to general civil, penal, and administrative responsibility (Art. 13.1).
7.2 Regulators
7.2.1 Changes in Content Regulation
Th e lack of a Spanish IRA in broadcasting at state level has been an exceptional case in Europe. Since the 
mid-1990s, several civil society groups have asked successive governments to set up such a body. However, 
governments’ reluctance to release broadcasting power to an independent authority and the partisan, party 
political use of this power have made it very diffi  cult. Right-wing parties and media companies feared this 
body would become a censorship body, putting at risk media freedom and free enterprise. In accordance with 
this view, they saw their fears confi rmed by the Catalan broadcasting authority. Th e CAC issued a report 
opposed to the content of the Catholic conservative radio network, COPE, in 2005,347 and decided not to 
grant them two licenses in Catalonia in 2008, despite the fact that they had already been operating through 
a pilot project since 2000. Th ese two actions were publicly debated and used as a tool of national (Catalonia 
vs. Spain) and ideological (left vs. right) confrontation. Among the left parties, there was some opposition as 
well: they feared an independent body would prevent a strong state from using the media and licensing to 
make social change possible. 
345. AEPD sanction decision 5 September 2005, confi rmed by the 12 January 2007 judgment of the First Section of the Administrative Litigation 
Division of the National Court. 
346. Auto 155/2009 of 18 May 2009 of the Th ird Section of the Constitutional Court.
347. Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya (CAC), Acord 192/2005 (Agreement 192/2005), 19 December 2005, at http://www.terra.es/personal3/
miquel_iceta/cac_cope.pdf (accessed 12 July 2011).
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Th ese factors also explain the short life of Madrid’s regional audiovisual authority (2001–2006). Th e rightist 
regional government decided that nobody could regulate freedom of expression. Only regions with a special 
sensitivity towards audiovisual matters, or keen to be politically progressive, created independent regulatory 
authorities for their broadcasting sector, such as Catalonia (1996), Navarre (2001, but closed in 2011), and 
Andalusia (2004). Valencia has stated its intention to set up an IRA, whereas Galicia has a consultative body 
on telecoms and audiovisual matters.
Th e situation changed when PSOE’s social democrats won the 2004 election. One of their main stated 
policy goals was to develop a new and more neutral broadcasting model. One of the elements of this strategy 
was to create an IRA as a key step to changing the traditional political instrumentalization and clientelism 
of the Spanish broadcasting sector. Other steps were to change the management, funding, and structure of 
the public, nationwide broadcasting corporation, RTVE, and fi nally group and organize a thus far patchy 
regulation system into a new general broadcasting law, LGCA 2010. Even if the reform process has not been 
without a certain amount of delay and disorder, RTVE has changed fundamentally since the law was enacted 
in April 2010, and it has provided for the eff ective creation of a new IRA. Th e State Audiovisual Media 
Council (Consejo Estatal de Medios Audioivisuales, CEMA) was to be given large powers, enough resources, 
and independence. Th is new body was to adopt the distinction between linear and non-linear content already 
established by the EC’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD),348 including video on demand. 
LGCA 2010 provides that CEMA would have two organs: the Directive Council, with one president, 
two vice-presidents, and seven councillors, appointed by a parliamentary majority of three-fi fths, and the 
Consultative Council, a representative organ in which the president, with no voting power, would participate 
together with representatives from the media, producers, advertisers, media users, and consumer associations.
However, the lack of consensus between the two main political parties blocked the creation of this independent 
authority in 2011, and the new government decided to shelve this unborn body. A new, big cross-sector 
independent regulatory authority is planned: the National Authority for Markets and Competition (Comisión 
Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia). Audiovisual matters are supervised by the Minister of Industry 
until this new body becomes operational.349
7.2.2 Regulatory Independence
Th e CAC and the CAA are currently the only independent audiovisual authorities, with the peculiarity that 
both of them are regional. A third one, the Audiovisual Council of Navarre, was shut down in 2011 by the 
government of the Autonomous Community for fi nancial reasons. Th erefore, media content regulation at 
the national level is still in the hands of the Ministry of Industry—just as it was 20 years ago. 
348. Directive 2010/13/eu of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Ser-
vices Directive), Offi  cial Journal of the European Union, L95/1, 15 April 2010, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O-
J:L:2010:095:0001:0024:EN:PDF (accessed 20 June 2012).
349. Presidency Press Offi  ce Press Release, “Informe sobre la reforma de los organismos supervisores” (Report on reform of independent authorities), 
24 February 2012, at http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ConsejodeMinistros/Enlaces/240212-enlacesupervisores.htm (accessed 10 October 2012).
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Regarding the new non-linear services, LGCA 2010 incorporated the AVMSD, and provided a set of 
defi nitions of audiovisual media services based on the European approach. Th e CEMA was to supervise and 
control both linear and non-linear services, but as CEMA is now off  the agenda, this duty has passed to the 
Ministry of Industry. Th e Catalan CAC regulates these services in Catalonia, in accordance with the 2005 
regional audiovisual law. Th e latter was passed prior to the AVMSD, but it followed the main principles 
already being debated in the Directive’s drafting process, including content control of non-linear services. 
However, no such principles apply to the CAA.
Th e most important elements for safeguarding the independence of the regulatory bodies in Spain are 
common to both authorities (CAC and CAA):
 Large majorities in Parliament to appoint board members (two-thirds for CAC and three-fi fths for CAA). 
Th ese large majorities require a consensus.
 Terms of offi  ce longer than electoral periods. Th e normal electoral cycle in Spain lasts four years. CAC 
board members enjoy at least six years in offi  ce, fi ve years for CAA board members.
 A member’s dismissal requires the same parliamentary majority as that of his or her appointment (CAC), 
or a long internal procedure to prove that a member has failed to fulfi ll his or her obligations in a serious 
way (CAA). 
 Financial, organizational, and human resources autonomy. 
 No governmental intrusion into decisions made by the councils. A council’s fi nal statement can only be 
appealed against in the courts. 
However, we can fi nd bad and good practices in Spanish IRAs. Th e CAA’s chair resigned in May 2008, 
claiming that political parties were unwilling to respect the independence of the council. Parties were 
introducing their own agendas through certain members of the board who had been chosen following the 
parliamentary quota principle. Just before the resignation date, the CAA approved a decision concerning 
the lack of pluralism of the regional public broadcaster RTVA in an electoral period, thanks to the deciding 
vote of the president.350 As a consequence, the pressure on the president mounted and he eventually decided 
to resign when it became clear that there was no will to protect the independence of the council. Another 
bad practice in the CAA is the thwarting by the majority of the board members, appointed by the social 
democrats in the regional parliament, of particular issues that do not concur with the majority opinion. 
Recently, the Andalusian Supreme Court has judged this procedure to be illegal.351
350. CAA, “Decisión del Consejo Audiovisual de Andalucía sobre el cumplimiento de la misión de servicio público por la RTVA durante el periodo 
electoral para las elecciones generales y autonómicas de 9 de marzo de 2008. (Incluye votos particulares y explicación de voto)” (Audiovisual 
Council Decision of Andalusia on the fulfi llment of the of public service mission by RTVA during the electoral period for general and regional 
elections, 9 March 2008. (Includes individual votes and explanations of the vote)), at http://www.consejoaudiovisualdeandalucia.es/sites/de-
fault/fi les/decisiones/Decision_2008_01_SP RTVA.pdf (accessed 10 January 2012).
351. Andalucíainformación.es, “La Guerra vuelve al Consejo Audiovisual” (War comes back to the Audiovisual Council), at http://www.andaluciain-
formacion.es/portada/?a=111624&i=1&f=0 (accessed 10 January 2012).
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A growing bad practice in the CAC is the fact that many of its board members are more connected with political 
parties than with independent experts, contrary to offi  cial eligibility requirements. Th e former president, 
Josep Carbonell, was a Catalan social democrat MP before his appointment. Th e current president, Ramon 
Font, used to be a journalist and media manager, but in 2006 was the head of the regional government’s 
press offi  ce. Th e vice-president, Domènec Sesmilo, was a regional MP before his appointment; Santiago 
Ramentol, CAC’s secretary, was head of the Audiovisual Media Offi  ce of the regional government. Other 
former regional MPs and current CAC board members are Dolors Comas, Josep Micaló, Esteve Orriols, 
Josep Pont, and Fernando Rodríguez, and Elisenda Malaret was a former state MP. It has to be noted, though, 
that the law does not forbid this situation, on condition that party allegiances no longer formally apply: no 
member of the board can be part of the top regional government staff  or a regional MP, or hold a senior or 
management position in a political party, labor union, or business organization.
A safeguard for the CAC’s independence was the decision by the regional government to dismiss any board 
member if a majority of two-thirds in favor of the dismissal is achieved. Th is norm was approved in 2005. It 
implies that to renew or maintain membership, appointees must be very careful with political parties: being 
a board member is an exclusive position. 
On the other hand, an example of CAC good practice was the fi rst process to grant 83 FM radio licenses in 
May 2008. It was the fi rst time in Spain that an independent body was entrusted to design and implement 
the whole process. No direct political intervention or clientelism was possible. Th e Catalan government and 
political parties had the courage to delegate some of their more important powers to another institution. 
However, CAC’s fi nal decision was controversial, since some media groups identifying with Spanish right-
wing parties were excluded. However, the board member connected to the Spanish right-wing PP was in line 
with the fi nal agreement. In the end, there were no voices of dissent heard on the board.
7.2.3 Digital Licensing
Th e state normally uses the same procedure for granting radio and television licenses: the reservation of 
frequencies and a public tender. State organs start the procedure and execute it, but there is a tendency to 
favor those media companies that are ideologically close. Th e strength of television broadcasters is growing. In 
Spain, their economic and political power is able to directly infl uence the license-granting system. UTECA, 
the association grouping commercial television operators (see section 2), has succeeded in precluding the 
entrance of new broadcasters to the DTT market. Eff orts to change this structure, such as those made by the 
fi rst DTT platform, Quiero TV, did not bear fruit.
Th e launch of DTT allowed for the inclusion of new broadcasters close to the Government. In this way, 
under the PP’s rightist executive headed by José María Aznar, the two FTA DTT licenses were granted to 
the Vocento and UNEDISA groups (see sections 5 and 6). Th e rest were given to Quiero TV. Th e two main 
commercial broadcasters, Antena 3 and Telecinco, were left out, which explains their lack of enthusiasm in 
this initial DTT phase. When, fi ve years later, the PSOE government decided to relaunch DTT in 2005, 
groups ideologically related were privileged once again.
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Soon after this relaunch, Díaz Nosty put forward the notion that: 
negotiation practices between media groups and the Government have been institutionalized 
in Spain in terms of reciprocal action and reaction … Likewise, turbulences have been usual 
… Th ese practices have replaced regulation’s natural space with the direct relation between 
the political power and the media expressions and have prevented the development of 
transparent communication policies.352
Th e state-wide DTT frequencies allocation in 2005 was a controversial example. In February, a bill on 
urgent measures for the establishment of DTT submitted by the PSOE government opened the possibility 
of providing a license for a new analog channel that would make the digital transition and raised radio 
license ownership limits to 50 percent. On the grounds that it was intended to favor PRISA and Mediapro, 
it was opposed by the commercial media outlets owned by the groups already acting in the DTT market, 
most of them leaning to the political right.353 As previously described, the Government fi nally chose PRISA’s 
Sogecable, and this prompted a threat by Telecinco and Antena 3 to take the Government to court. Th ey 
did not do this in the end. Th e reason, according to scholars, was Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero’s 
commitment to reduce advertising on TVE. What eventually happened in 2009 was its complete elimination, 
along with a new merger regime allowing for concentration of ownership.354 
Th e board member of the CMT, Ángel G. Castillejo, who took part in the negotiations as adviser to the 
Secretary of State for Communication, absolutely denies Mr Zapatero’s use of advertising as a bargaining 
chip to favor either PRISA or La Sexta (the latter was licensed soon afterwards). What is more, he claims 
that the complete elimination of advertising was agreed in the midst of the 2008 economic depression. Mr 
Castillejo argues, as did the Government in response to press attacks at that time, that the prime objective 
was to promote external pluralism.355
Between external pluralism and private allegiances, Enrique Bustamante, who was appointed to a committee 
for RTVE’s reform in 2005, talks blatantly of “political friends.”356 What the executive wanted was to strike 
an ideological balance by countering the PSOE-friendly Sogecable (PRISA) and La Sexta (Mediapro) with 
the PP-leaning Net TV and Veo TV. Sogecable and Mediapro (La Sexta) would soon afterwards start a bitter 
war on football broadcast rights, and in parallel, PRISA’s El País newspaper criticized Mr Zapatero’s policies 
352. B. Díaz Nosty, “Repensar la comunicación. La huella es el mensaje” (Rethink communication. Th e footprint is the message), Tendencias, Fun-
dación Telefónica, Madrid, 2006, p. 39.
353. Th ese are Antena 3, Telecinco, Recoletos, El Mundo, La Razón, ABC, Punto Radio, Onda Cero, and Cadena COPE, controlled by Planeta, 
Mediaset, Unidad Editorial, Vocento, and the Spanish Catholic Church (Conferencia Episcopal).
354. L. Benítez and A. Labio, “Th e second digital war in Spain. Causes and consequences of a media reality marked by economic interests” (La seg-
unda “guerra digital” en España. Causas y consecuencias de una realidad mediática marcada por los intereses económicos), Actas y Memoria fi nal 
del II Congreso de la Asociación Española de Investigación de la Comunicación, at http://www.ae-ic.org/malaga2010/upload/ok/77.pdf (accessed 5 
April 2011).
355. Interview with Ángel G. Castillejo, CMT board member, Barcelona, 13 April 2011.
356. E. Bustamante, “Quality contents in the new audiovisual structure,” Infoamérica 3–4 (2010), pp. 143–144.
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and its links with Mediapro’s executives. In 2009, the new legal limits on concentration of ownership and the 
announced Telecinco-Cuatro merger was the evidence El País used in support of its argument that a further 
television license, the one given to the ideologically favorable La Sexta, had proved to be unsustainable.
Th e majority of regional and local licenses are suspected of being tainted with political clientelism. Autonomous 
Communities under PP rule have privileged some media groups close to the right, either operating state-
wide or regionally (COPE, UNEDISA or Vocento among the former, La Verdad or Las Provincias among 
the latter), whereas PRISA has been clearly favored in PSOE-governed regions.357 Regional and local tenders 
have marginalized the TS. Th e community media’s experience has not been considered and they have been 
forced to compete on equal terms with commercial broadcasters, thus having to face unaff ordable fi nancial 
conditions. Th is has been continuously denounced by the ReMC.358 Th ere are exceptions, however: regions 
like Catalonia and Andalusia have taken into account the 30 years’ experience of some of their local TS 
television companies.359
7.2.4 Role of Self-regulatory Mechanisms
Th ere are several instruments for self-regulation, some of which work eff ectively. Th is is the case with 
Autocontrol, the industry association grouping advertisers, media, and advertising agencies, which makes 
sure that advertisements are legal, veracious, and honest.
Another self-regulation instrument in the printed press and television is the ombudsman. Ombudsmen 
are available only in the largest media and their function is very positive, although often the audience is 
ignorant of their existence. However, the 2004 self-regulatory code on television content and children under 
specifi c protection during airtime has never been truly respected by broadcasters.360 As a consequence, the 
Government decided to incorporate it into LGCA 2010 (Art. 7), so it could gain coercive force.
Th e digital transition does not seem to have provoked the emergence of new deontological codes or systems 
for self-regulation. It is analog co-regulation that applies in both DTT and the internet, with hardly any 
change. Only Catalonia’s News Council (Consell de la Informació de Catalunya, CIC) includes in its code a 
recommendation to start a debate on the ethical implications of the internet and journalism in relation to 
phenomena like online advertising, hypertext links, e-commerce, image manipulation, copyright, privacy, 
impartiality, accuracy, and credibility in online news.361
357. Bustamente, “La comunicación en las Comunidades Autónomas,” pp. 235–236; A. Badillo, in A. Casero and J. Marzal, “Las políticas de comu-
nicación ante la implantación de la TDT en España. Balance crítico y retos pendientes” (Communication policies facing DTT implementation 
in Spain. Critical assessment and pending challenge). In Sphera Publica, no. 9, Murcia, 2009, p. 105.
358. Interview with Professor Laura Bergés, representative of Community Media Network ReMC, Bellaterra (Barcelona), 20 December 2010.
359. Bustamente, “La comunicación en las Comunidades Autónomas,” p. 236.
360. Ministerio de la Presidencia, Código de autorregulación sobre contenidos televisivos e infancia, at http://www.tvinfancia.es/Textos/CodigoAu-
torregulacion/Codigo.htm.
361. See Fundació Consell de la Informació de Catalunya, “Codi Deontològic” (Deontological Code), at http://www.periodistes.org/fcic/contingut.
php?codmenu=3 (accessed 10 January 2012).
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7.3 Government Interference
7.3.1 The Market
As section 7.2.3 shows, state and regional intervention concerned with broadcasting license allocation in the 
media market is high. Political considerations, clientelism, and partisanship have dominated the majority of 
analog and DTT license allocations over the last decade. Economic considerations over the sustainability of 
the DTT model or public interest goals such as pluralism have been secondary, even if they have often been 
used as justifi cation for licensing decisions.
However, the distortion of the media market through other means has been negligible in recent years. A 
controversial measure has been the recent tax on the gross income of FTA and pay-TV broadcasters, along 
with telecoms operators with audiovisual activities, in order to fi nance the public service corporation RTVE 
(see section 2.1.3). In spite of its importance, the fact that the tax is imposed on all state-wide broadcasters 
aff ects the market as a whole, and does not favor any particular operator.
Th e other main distorting factor is the availability of government advertising, but the level of advertisement 
spending by the state is insignifi cant compared with the total advertising market. However, at municipality 
level, institutional advertising and state subsidies can be used to control certain media (see section 6.2.1).
 
7.3.2 The Regulator
On the question whether Spanish regulatory bodies use their legal instruments to intimidate certain media 
outlets, CEMA’s continued non-existence prevents this from happening. One case in Catalonia could be 
mentioned: the refusal by the CAC to renew a license for the already operating conservative radio network, 
COPE, owned by the Spanish Church (see section 7.2).
7.3.3 Other Forms of Interference
No other forms of interference are known.
7.4 Assessments
Th e Spanish regulatory framework can be considered appropriate for facing the challenges of digitization, 
mainly due to the transposition of EU Directives. In broadcasting, LGCA 2010 has gathered and organized 
the various earlier regulations that were scattered and complex, as well as incorporating the distinction 
between linear and non-linear audiovisual services. For the internet EU Directives on the information society 
have been adopted through various laws. However, the Spanish data protection law is too restrictive and 
endangers investigative journalism.
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A certain competitive and neutral environment in the media market has been guaranteed thanks to the CNC. 
However, the recent decision by the Government to relax some conditions for the Antena 3-La Sexta merger 
potentially undermines this success (see section 6.1.3). 
Spain is still an exception in one key area of broadcast regulation: it has no independent authority for the 
broadcasting sector at state level. Th e non-existence of CEMA invalidates the control and sanctioning system 
envisaged under LGCA 2010. Th us, the law loses a great deal of its power to protect public interest and 
pluralism. To date, it is the Ministry of Industry that controls media content quality and applies sanctions 
in relation to broadcasters’ poor programming schedules. CEMA should fulfi ll this function independently. 
However, in its absence, the protection of program quality and internal pluralism is much more exposed 
to pressures from commercial broadcasters. At regional level, though, there is one authority, the CAC, that 
is even able to grant television and radio licenses, an example of remarkable progress towards achieving 
independence in regulation.
As far as DTT is concerned, Spain has thus far an adequate legal framework to succeed in the digitization 
process, since it has been suffi  ciently fl exible to adapt regulations to its diff erent phases and problems 
However, the fl exibility of consecutive laws, royal decrees, and technical plans has caused a certain legal 
insecurity among operators. In relation to this, there has been practically no transparency in license granting 
and renewal due to the lack of an IRA. In fact, digitization has made more frequent state intervention 
possible and this aff ects more actors than in the analog world. Th e intervention has been constant, especially 
in the case of television, and is often associated with ideological partisanship. State control consists almost 
exclusively in deciding who will obtain a license and under what conditions. Th is control is also applied by 
regional and local authorities.
For instance, in 2005 the Government rejected an application by the digital channels Veo TV and Net TV 
to broadcast in analog form, as these channels were not well regarded by the social democrats then in offi  ce. 
However, soon afterwards the Government authorized both analog and digital broadcasts by a new channel, 
La Sexta. 
When it became clear that an FTA model had been chosen for digital television after the failure of the 
subscription DTT platform Quiero TV, the socialist government opened up subscription DTT in 2009. Th e 
decision was enforced through a Decree-Law, a resort that the Constitution permits in extraordinary and 
urgent circumstances.362 As a result, a few weeks later, the Imagina group, ideologically close to the PSOE 
government, launched Gol TV, a premium channel specializing in football coverage. Previously, the group 
had gradually acquired a majority of the rights to broadcast the Spanish football premier league. 
362. Royal Decree-Law 11/2009 through which state-wide pay digital terrestrial television services on conditional access are regulated, BOE no. 197, 
15 August 2009. 
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Another example was the change in 2005 of the license contract originally signed between the Government 
and PRISA’s television division, Sogecable, in 1989. Th e change fi nally enabled Sogecable to broadcast 
FTA in 2005. A premium channel, Canal+, disappeared in favor of a free commercial off ering in the same 
frequency. Th e decision was made by the Council of Ministers in July 2005, using the argument that it 
favored pluralism, but in reality it privileged PRISA’s commercial interests.
 
Th erefore, the DTT regulatory framework has enabled technological transition, but it has impeded the 
possibility of giving new opportunities to new operators, which would have advanced pluralism. Moreover, 
regulation has been used to favor those broadcasters who are already operating, especially those that are more 
ideologically connected to the Government, a situation peculiar to the polarized pluralist media systems 
of southern Europe.363 Th e frequent meetings of members of the Government with the main broadcasters, 
resulting in agreements and action plans, have prevented civil society from participating in the development 
of DTT public policy. Th ere has been no public consultation in the transition process; participation and 
public debate have been minimal, a situation already familiar from the analog era.
Broadly speaking, the level and pace of state interference in the media market have not increased with 
digitization, but there are now more opportunities for it to occur. Situations distorting the market happened 
in the analog era, as they now happen in the digital age. Institutional advertising makes no distinction 
between transmission technologies, nor do media subsidies. Th ere are, however, more interventionist 
behaviors at the lower levels of political power, and digitization, with the multiplication of media actors, 
has also increased the possibility of state intervention or infl uence. Local or regional authorities have at 
their disposal more instruments to have an impact on smaller media: they can allocate subsidies or invest in 
institutional advertising at their discretion. Th erefore, these investments are more important for this type of 
media than those allocated by the central government to larger media. 
363. I. Fernández and M.J. Díaz-González, “Digital terrestrial television roll-out policies in Spain and the changing television scene in the context of 
analogue switch-off ,” International Journal of Digital Television 1(3) (September 2010), pp. 289–307.
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8. Conclusions
8.1 Media Today
Since 2005, the key trends in the Spanish media market could be summed up as follows:
  Th e technological deployment of DTT production, broadcasting, and reception;
 Th e lack of economic rationality in DTT licensing due to close linkages between the political and the 
television market powers;
 Limited gains in broadcasting quality following DTT switch-over, according to public perception;
 Th e growth of the internet as an important news media platform;
 Th e increasing ideological polarization in both new DTT channels and online news outlets;
 Th e use of social media as political mobilization tools;
 Th e deep impact of the economic crisis, in terms of loss of funding, employment, and content quality 
and diversity; 
 Th e resurgence of a state intervention model for the management of RTVE;
 An incipient conceptual change towards commercialism in the regional public service broadcasters, 
including privatization in some cases.
Apparently, the deployment of digital media—both DTT and online—has increased media choice: there 
are more media outlets, and, as such, higher external pluralism. On closer examination of the structure 
of ownership and content, this positive relation between outlet number and choice and pluralism is less 
straightforward. Nationwide DTT channels are mostly owned by the already consolidated analog operators. 
Th e situation varies from genre to genre in range of content. News, the preferred focus of this report, is being 
pushed into the state-owned, public service broadcast sector, and bulletins are privileged over more elaborate 
news genres, such as debates, documentaries and in-depth interviews. Some fi ction and entertainment 
programs are repeated across brands belonging to the same group, or are new broadcasts of formerly successful 
formats the broadcasters still hold the rights for. Many media outlets online do not survive under the pressure 
of competition and resource shortages, or do so under non-professional conditions. Th e few news outlets that 
succeed in gaining resonance and infl uence lose their independence when they become larger.
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Th e potential enhancement of pluralism has been hindered by at least two factors. Th e more recent one is 
the impact of the fi nancial crisis since 2008. Th is has resulted in an acute advertising crisis, especially in the 
printed press, where revenues have fallen by nearly half since 2007 and there has been a cascade of closures. 
Th is has also fostered a crisis in journalistic employment. According to FAPE, more than 7,000 journalists 
lost their jobs from November 2008 to October 2012. For those who are still employed, the fi nancial and 
productive crisis—in combination with digital technological innovations—have overloaded journalists’ 
production routines. 
Combined, these pressures may make journalists more prone to self-censorship and more vulnerable to 
editors’ control. Consequently, quality is threatened. In any case, the crisis shows that the assessment of 
potential gains as a result of digitization cannot be isolated from media market conditions.
A related factor hindering media choice applies more specifi cally to DTT and is entangled with the fi nancial 
crisis. Th e excessive number of licenses allocated in relation to the size and limits of the Spanish market has 
made the DTT deployment model unviable at state, regional, and local level. As a consequence, the stronger 
broadcasters are merging around the two largest groups, Antena 3 and Telecinco. At the regional and local 
levels, it is not unusual to see media outlets closing and media groups giving up their licenses. 
Close ties between incumbent broadcasters and political elites have survived digitization and precipitated 
regulatory changes that favor the interests of major market players over those of the public. As the DTT 
market consolidates, the lobbying power of broadcasters looks set to increase. Political clientelism and 
ideological affi  nity between authorities and broadcasters are particularly acute at the regional and local levels.
As a coda to this situation, the non-existence of an independent regulatory authority (IRA)—included in 
LGCA 2010 but not yet established, and not envisaged as of October 2012—leaves the public accountability 
of national operators directly in the hands of the Government. 
External pluralism is also counteracted by ideological polarization in the new digital media, both in DTT 
and internet platforms. It is reinforced by the excessive predominance of opinion and interpretation over 
facts and data.
It would be interesting to know whether or not, in view of the new consumption options made possible by 
digital television, consumers now use several media outlets with diff erent ideological profi les. If the trend of 
ideological polarization is indeed refl ected by the audience, it could result in the gradual disappearance of the 
public sphere where diff erent views and opinions intersect. 
In any case, this report has also noted that DTT products and services are not highly regarded by consumers 
in terms of improved quality.
In the public service media, the RTVE reform starting in 2004 seemed to fulfi ll a democratic transition that 
was still pending since the end of Franco’s dictatorship in the late 1970s. It put an end to governmental control 
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over board appointments, developed independent news programs that have been awarded professional prizes 
worldwide, and diversifi ed and expanded its services online. Th is process was not paralleled by other regional 
broadcasters in the Autonomous Communities, except for some notable cases such as the CCMA. 
But in very little time, this model has been put at risk, due to several policy decisions aff ecting corporate and 
fi nancial management. Th e abrupt removal of advertising in 2010, the European Commission’s objection 
to the tax on telecoms’ revenues, and the substantial budget cuts justifi ed by the public debt crisis seriously 
constrain RTVE. Furthermore, the urgent amendments to the law in 2012, changing the board’s parliamentary 
appointment procedures, threaten to halt or reverse advances toward independence. In connection with 
ideological polarization and the growing marginalization of news programs, these decisions on RTVE can 
seriously damage the provision and quality of public service news.
At the regional level, the public service broadcaster model based on state ownership is under sustained attack. 
Th e economic crisis is being used as an argument by the Autonomous Community governments to dismiss 
large numbers of staff  and outsource more production. In many cases, regional public service broadcasters 
have been criticised by professionals, citizens, and the largest commercial broadcasters for acting as the 
mouthpiece of local authorities and presiding over spiralling costs. Th e trend is towards more outsourcing 
and, fi nally, total privatization—something that is now a legal possibility following legislative amendments 
in April 2012.
Finally, digitization has enabled the expansion outside traditional mainstream media of social media and 
social movements that have had a certain infl uence on Spanish political and social life, such as the 15-M 
movement (launched with massive protests around the country on 15 May 2011, aimed at democratic 
regeneration).
8.2 Media Tomorrow
Th e digitization process in the years to come will be marked by spectrum policy. Th e reassignment of frequencies 
in order to create a digital dividend, and the position that will be awarded to television broadcasters in that 
process, will be decisive. Th e reallocation of DTT licenses after withdrawals, mergers, and takeovers will also 
be a key to making this sector fi nancially viable and reshape it in response to the economic crisis. 
It is highly probable that mobile phones will grow as news platforms and key instruments in the access to 
social media. Moreover, software and applications for mobile phones and television sets will be entry points 
to news and audiovisual content consumption. In this sense, the pre-eminent position of search engines will 
be threatened. Th e extension and importance of social media will be fundamental in news distribution and 
will be able to mobilize people in the event of social confl ict.
Th e press will continue to undergo a twofold crisis precipitated by the enduring economic downturn and 
structural issues that have made it diffi  cult for newspapers to off set losses in print revenue with new sources 
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in the digital domain. It is likely that more titles will close or migrate to the internet in the near future. Th e 
online press business model will combine a partly free access and a pay model, more aff ordable than the 
print issue. Labor precariousness and journalist unemployment will be dictated by the continuation of the 
economic crisis, whereas digitization will supply the few new jobs that will be created. 
Broadly speaking, it is likely that the largest media companies will continue to consolidate, while digitization 
goes on providing high diversity among the smallest, less infl uential players in the media chain, thanks to the 
internet. Th e intermediate media classes—those outlets whose structure is becoming too expensive for their 
modest audiences to support them—will, however, be threatened by digitization. It is easy to see that local 
and regional television will have enormous diffi  culties surviving in a digital environment, with their costs 
escalating while their revenues plummet due to the economic crisis.
Finally, the future of public service media as a state prerogative might be starting to disappear in Spain, at 
least at the regional level. Th e unfolding of reforms of regional public service broadcasters might result in 
complete privatization. In that case, the advantages of digitization would mainly benefi t commercial actors. 
Social and political reactions to this movement are still uncertain, but the possibility of building another 
consensus on public service values in a highly commercialized environment is not to be dismissed. 
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9. Recommendations
9.1 Policy
9.1.1 Media Policy
9.1.1.1 Public Participation in Media Policy Making
Issue
Media policy in Spain is developed through multiple laws and regulations in a process which substantially 
excludes civil society input. Moreover, media policy is driven by economic and political interests and groups, 
which try to isolate debate from public view and engagement.
Recommendation
Th e government should promote broader and deeper public consultations on broadcasting, as in other policy 
matters and areas. A new and regulation on public consultation could be helpful in sensitive areas such as 
media regulation. 
In order to maximize civil society participation, independent media viewers and listeners’ organizations (such 
as AUC and iCMedia) should try to reach a consensus on basic concerns, principles, and courses of action. 
Alternatively, they could work together on building an organization or platform that aggregates consumers’ 
requests as a single voice, so that their demands and suggestions are articulated more effi  ciently. Th irdly, 
media reform activists and civil society groups should invite politicians to a public debate about media. Th is 
debate shall meet at a place, on a date and with an agenda.
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9.2 Media Law and Regulation
9.2.1 Media Ownership
9.2.1.1 Transparency of Media Ownership and Control
Issue
Th e growing infl uence of private fi nancial groups over media ownership has made management and control 
structures more complicated to understand for non-specialists. Furthermore, the current normative discipline 
on transparency of media ownership does not require disclosure of all the basic information to identify the 
ultimate owners. In particular, there are no mandatory provisions for media operators to disclose the identity 
of so-called “benefi cial” owners, i.e. those whose shares are held by others on their behalf, e.g. through 
brokerage. Moreover, there are no legal obligations on the media to disclose their sources of revenue.
Recommendations
Civil society organizations and citizens’ movements should campaign to raise public awareness of the lack of 
ownership transparency and of the need for access to information on real ownership and control of the media. 
Th is campaign should also call for the introduction of more stringent requirements for all media outlets to 
disclose the identity of their benefi cial owners as well as the sources of their revenue. Th is information should 
be updated regularly and made available online in a comprehensible way for the general public. 
9.2.2 Regulation
9.2.2.1 Independence of Board Members of the Broadcasting Regulator 
Issue
Spain was, until 2013, the only European country without a nationwide independent regulatory authority 
for the audiovisual sector. Broadcasting issues were monitored by a low-level department in the Ministry of 
Industry. An independent regulatory authority, the National Commission for Markets and Competition 
(Comisió n Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia, CNMC) was created in June 2013, with a remit that 
includes broadcasting. Th is was justifi ed by the government as a cost-cutting measure. In theory, the CNMC 
should be independent; however, the government will appoint all ten of its members. Although Parliament 
can veto these appointments, there are grave suspicions about the degree of real independence, which the 
CNMC is likely to enjoy.
Recommendation
In the short term, Parliament should amend the law that established the CNMC to introduce an independent 
appointment system, which would ensure the regulator’s independence from government. As a practical 
measure, the Parliamentary hearings for CNMC board members should be more eff ective and allow for 
thorough examination and cross-examination.
An Advisory Board (Comité Consultivo) should be created to advise the CNMC’s broadcast division. Th is 
board should be created in line with the provisions in the General Broadcasting Law of 2010, and should 
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consist of representatives of civil society organizations, broadcasters, advertisers, trade unions and media 
consumer organizations.
In the longer term, audiovisual matters should be excluded from the CNMC’s competence; the government 
should establish a dedicated and independent audiovisual regulator.
9.2.2.2 Transparency of Broadcast Licensing
Issue
Economic and political pressures have had a negative impact on transparency and fairness in the allocation 
of television and radio licensing, especially at the regional and local levels.
Recommendation
Th e national and regional governments and authorities should publish the reasons and criteria used in each 
licensing decision. Every decision on broadcasting licensing should be justifi ed. Licensees’ documentation 
should be published, with the exception of sensitive commercial information.
9.2.2.3 Transparency of Institutional Advertising
Issue
Spending on institutional advertising in the media—at the state, regional, and local levels—is not documented 
in a transparent way, and suspicions are growing that funds for institutional advertising are used to favor media 
outlets that are more supportive of government policy, regardless of their dissemination, and to discriminate 
against media outlets that are more critical, in order to undermine their survival and independence.  
At state level, the Ministry of the Presidency publishes an annual Report on Institutional Advertising which 
provides only aggregated fi gures of state spending on institutional advertising, detailed by sector and media 
type. Th e Report does not detail the actual distribution of funds among media. A draft Transparency Law—
currently pending before the Senate for fi nal approval—includes an obligation for the government to disclose 
its contracts for the provision of institutional advertising. However, the majority of contracts are arranged via 
advertising agencies. As private entities, these agencies are not obliged to disclose the recipients of institutional 
campaigning and related funds.
Furthermore, at the regional and local levels, each Autonomous Community and municipality has an 
institutional advertising budget and the authority to dispose of this budget as it chooses. Th is creates 
discrepancies in the ways that regions disclose the allocation of funds for institutional advertising; in some 
cases, the data is not available at all or not reported regularly. 
Recommendations
In the short term, the current draft Transparency Law should be amended to include full disclosure of 
the public funds allocated by state entities to each outlet. Th e data could be made available on request or 
proactively published in the annual Report on Institutional Advertising.
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At the same time, civil society organisations and academics should initiate monitoring and research to gather 
data at national, regional, and local levels on the distribution of institutional advertising among media over 
a given period. Th e fi ndings should be made available in publications that would be presented at dedicated 
events with the participation of the relevant stakeholders. Th e ensuing debate should produce concrete 
recommendations on implementing transparent disclosure of allocation of public funding among the media. 
9.2.2.4 Implementation of Self-regulatory Codes on Media and Children
Issue
Th e Law on General Audiovisual Content (LGCA 2010, Article 7) incorporates the 2004 self-regulatory code 
on television content and children under specific protection during airtime, in order to give it coercive force. 
In the absence of a national independent regulatory authority for the audiovisual sector, the supervision of the 
application of this code is carried out by a department of the Ministry of Industry (SETSI), which has the power 
to sanction broadcasters that do not respect its provisions. However, the proceedings leading to sanctions are 
not adequately transparent: the Ministry of Industry occasionally publishes the sums of the sanctions issued, 
but without identifying the broadcasters concerned, thus limiting the deterrent eff ect of ‘naming and shaming’.
Recommendation
In line with Article 51.2 of the Constitution, which establishes that “the public powers will promote 
information for users and consumers as well as their education”, the infringements of the code on television 
content and children should be considered as information of public interest. As such, infringements should 
be disclosed and reported regularly and in full by the competent authority. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Industry should publish a regular report disclosing the number of complaints 
received, the allegations made by and against the parties, the motivations of the fi nal decision assessing the 
existence of a violation, the amount of the sanction issued, and the identity of the broadcasters found in 
breach and sanctioned.
9.3 Public Service in the Media
9.3.1 New Reform of Public Service Media 
Issue
Between 2006 and 2009, reform of the Spanish Radio and Television Corporation (Corporación de Radio 
y Televisión Española, RTVE) achieved a more independent and legitimate public service broadcaster. Th e 
new mode of regulation, new institutional framework, and new funding system have ended the long history 
of RTVE’s substantial dependence on government. 
However, the economic crisis and political infi ghting have undermined RTVE’s independence since 2012, by 
reducing its state funding and increasing the level of government control. Although Parliament has statutory 
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oversight of RTVE’s funding and expenditure, RTVE’s annual statements are irregular and unpublished. 
Parliamentary debates on this topic tend to be ill-informed and fruitless.
Recommendations
 Regarding the political independence of RTVE, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political 
parties should work together to restore the 2006 consensus that the appointment of RTVE board 
members should require the support of two-thirds of Parliament.
 NGOs and independent associations of viewers and listeners should demand that RTVE’s funding 
suffi  ces to guarantee its institutional and editorial independence. In return, RTVE should off er total 
transparency in its accountability and content contracts.  Spanish public service broadcasters should 
be required by Parliament to publish their sources, level of income, and main areas of spending. Th is 
measure is particularly important for regional public broadcasters.
 Independent organizations of viewers and listeners should join journalists from RTVE, their associations, 
and academics in setting up a public information campaign about the future of public service media in 
Spain by publicizing the impact of RTVE’s current funding arrangement on its independence, focusing 
on cuts in state funding and the privatization of regional public service broadcasters. 
Th is campaign should expose and counter the lack of political will to address public service media in terms 
other than those of “spending cuts” and “fi scal austerity.” At the same time, civil society organizations 
should call for a clear separation of the functions of management, accountability, and newsroom. Greater 
professionalism must be demanded of RTVE management. Th e appointment process should be open, more 
transparent, and based on merit.
9.4 Journalism
9.4.1 Promotion of Good-quality Journalism
Issue
An expensive enterprise by its nature, good-quality journalism has been aff ected by the cuts in state subsidies 
for public service broadcasting and by the general economic crisis. 
 
Recommendations
 Civil society organizations and professional associations should design and launch a national award for 
good-quality journalism. For example, a new category related with investigative journalism could be 
included in the Príncipe de Asturias awards.  
 NGOs, as well as journalists’ unions and associations, should promote the creation of a nationwide 
association of good-quality journalism, which might operate as an association of a special Spanish category 
called de utilidad pública (i.e. of public utility or value). “Utilidad pública” NGOs enjoy signifi cant fi scal 
benefi ts.
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 Tax deductions should be enabled for fi rms and NGOs over donations for good-quality journalism 
projects. (Th e draft of the cultural sponsorship act off ers an opportunity to adopt this measure.)
9.4.2 Improving the Working Conditions of Journalists
Issue
Spain’s economic crisis has had a huge impact on media revenue. As advertising investment fell sharply and 
far, media managers cut human resources, and a number of media outlets closed. As a consequence many 
journalists lost their jobs, while others experienced worsening pay and conditions. 
Recommendations
State institutions, journalists’ associations and unions, and universities should establish a strategy for concerted 
action to address this problem, including:  
 the consistent implementation of offi  cial labor inspections by the Ministry of Employment, as already 
provided in law 
 the more rigorous regulation by regional governments of intake to university departments of communi-
cations and journalism, in order to avoid saturating the labor market
 the design of higher quality and more specialized journalism education courses
 the establishment and consistent implementation of minimum freelance pay-scales 
 campaigns to promote union membership.   
9.5 Digital Media Literacy
9.5.1 Ideological Polarization and Media Fragmentation
Issue
Th e growth of traditional and internet media have been very important in the last decade. Some new digital 
outlets, however, including television stations and portals, produce content that does not comply with 
professional norms and standards of journalism. In these outlets, information is substituted by opinion and 
arguments by stereotypes. 
Recommendation
Th e Ministry of Education should introduce digital media as a topic in secondary school curricula, as a cross-
cutting theme or as part of language and literature teaching.
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